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i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the First Amendment protects a speaker
against a state-law right-of-publicity claim that
challenges the realistic use of a person’s name or
likeness in an expressive work.

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The Defendant-Appellee below, who is the
Petitioner before this Court, is Electronic Arts Inc.
The Plaintiff-Appellant below, who is the
Respondent before this Court, is Ryan Hart,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated.

iii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 29.6, Petitioner states that it has no
parent corporation and no publicly held corporation
owns ten percent or more of Petitioner’s stock.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Third Circuit reversing the grant
of summary judgment by the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey and remanding
the case is reported at 717 F.3d 141 and reproduced at
Petition to the Appendix (“Pet. App.”) 1a. The order of
the Third Circuit denying Petitioner’s subsequent
motion for rehearing is unreported and reproduced at
Pet. App. 174a.
An initial opinion of the District Court granting
Petitioner’s motion to dismiss is reported at 740 F.
Supp. 2d 658 and reproduced at Pet. App. 147a. The
opinion of the District Court granting summary
judgment for Petitioner is reported at 808 F. Supp. 2d
757 and reproduced at Pet. App. 72a.
JURISDICTION
The Third Circuit issued its opinion on May 21, 2013.
On June 25, 2013, the original panel and the en banc
Third Circuit denied rehearing, with two judges
dissenting from the en banc denial. The jurisdiction of
this Court is properly invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
This case involves the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, which states that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
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assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the collision of the First
Amendment and the state-law “right of publicity” tort,
an issue that has engendered conflict and disarray
among the lower courts. The right of publicity is a
1
modern tort, first recognized in 1953. Generally used
by celebrities, it accords persons an economic right in
their names and likenesses, so they may “profit from
the full commercial value of their identities.”
Cardtoons L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996).
In recent years, right-of-publicity suits have
proliferated, targeting a variety of speech and
speakers, including musicians who named famous
people in their lyrics; filmmakers who produced movies
documenting the lives of celebrities and historical
figures; authors who wrote “unauthorized biographies”;
magazines and greeting-card manufacturers who used
celebrity images; video-game makers who used
celebrity images in constructing virtual worlds; and
2
artists who depicted celebrities in their artworks.
1

Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1953).
2

See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003)
(OutKast song lyrics); Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430 (11th
Cir. 1983) (Bob Dylan song lyrics); Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949
F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (feature movie and book about the
Black Panther Party); Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d
723 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d, 267 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2001) (television
miniseries about the Temptations); Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t
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Courts have struggled to reconcile this new tort
with the protections afforded by the First Amendment.
This Court’s only contribution came nearly forty years
ago in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
433 U.S. 562 (1977), in which the Court held that the
First Amendment did not bar a right-of-publicity claim
against a television station that broadcast an
entertainer’s entire human-cannonball act. According
to the Court, broadcasting Zacchini’s entire act posed a
“substantial threat to the economic value of that
performance,” and the Court contrasted the use of a
performer’s “entire act” with the broadcast of a
person’s name or picture in media. Id. at 574-76. Thus,
Zacchini offers little or no guidance in cases involving
mere depictions of individuals, as opposed to
appropriation of their actual performances in full.
Indeed, the Court was careful to cabin its decision:
“[w]herever the line in particular situations is to be
drawn between media reports that are protected and
those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media
Co., L.P., 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005) (movie about a shipwreck);
Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994) (book about a
police officer); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180
(9th Cir. 2001) (magazine using image of Dustin Hoffman); Hilton
v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010) (greeting card
using image of Paris Hilton); Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal.
App. 4th 47 (2006) (video game); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g,
Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018 (2011) (video game); Martin Luther
King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc.,
296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) (bust of Martin Luther King, Jr.); ETW
Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (lithograph
of Tiger Woods); John Broder, Schwarzenegger Files Suit Against
Bobblehead Maker, N.Y. Times, May 18, 2004, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/18/national/18arnold.html.
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when they broadcast a performer’s entire act without
his consent.” Id. at 574-75.
The expressive work at issue in this case is
Petitioner’s college football video game, which was
alleged to include a realistic depiction of former college
football player Respondent Ryan Hart. The Third
Circuit (and the Ninth Circuit, in an essentially
identical case also before this Court on petition for writ
3
of certiorari) held that the First Amendment offered
no defense to Hart’s right-of-publicity claim, because
the game’s depiction of Hart was too realistic and
showed him engaged in the same activity—college
football—in which he had gained his fame.
The Third and Ninth Circuits recognized that
Petitioner’s video game was an expressive work, under
this Court’s holding in Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). Nonetheless,
they held that the game’s depiction of the plaintiffs did
not enjoy First Amendment protection. According to
the Third and Ninth Circuits, the depiction of a
person’s image or likeness in an expressive work enjoys
First Amendment protection against a right-ofpublicity claim only if the depiction sufficiently alters or
“transforms” the plaintiff’s image or likeness. That rule
is constitutionally perverse:
it affords First
Amendment protection only to fanciful or distorted
portrayals, not accurate or realistic ones. The rule also
3

Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete
Names & Likeness Litig.), No. 10-15387, 724 F.3d 1268, U.S. App.
LEXIS 15649 (9th Cir. July 31, 2013).
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chills expression, both because it is hard to predict
what
a
court
will
decide
is
sufficiently
“transformative,” and because such an inquiry
inevitably requires a court to make a subjective
judgment about whether a depiction is “artistic,” thus
warranting protection, or “literal,” and thus subject to
liability.
The test adopted by these two circuits, moreover,
conflicts with various other tests adopted by other
circuits and state supreme courts, which do not focus on
transformation at all. Some of these courts engage in
case-by-case balancing of First Amendment interests
and right-of-publicity interests—an approach that
raises its own constitutional problems. Others give
appropriate respect to the First Amendment by
confining the right-of-publicity tort to circumstances in
which the challenged depiction falsely claims a celebrity
commercial endorsement or is unrelated to any other
expression and thus gratuitous.
The lower courts’ various and conflicting
constitutional tests have resulted in numerous
irreconcilable outcomes.
For example, the Sixth
Circuit has held that the First Amendment protects the
inclusion of a professional golfer’s realistic image,
prominently displayed in a painted montage including
other golfers, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d
915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003), but the Third and Ninth
Circuits now have held that the First Amendment does
not protect an accurate digital depiction of a former
college football player in a video game. As the judicial
confusion has mounted, scholars, writers, and artists

6
have begun to recognize a major threat to free
4
expression. This Court’s guidance is urgently needed.
A. Factual Background
Petitioner Electronic Arts’ enormously popular
NCAA Football video game series, first unveiled in
1993, artistically creates a fictional interactive college
football gaming experience. In each annual edition of
NCAA Football, users can play individual games or
entire seasons, selecting from among thousands of
unnamed virtual players and over 100 virtual college
teams. Pet. App. 4a. The virtual football games occur
in virtual stadiums filled with virtual fans, coaches,
cheerleaders, mascots, and referees, all meticulously
crafted by Electronic Arts’ video game designers.
The virtual players (“avatars”) are clothed in their
teams’ uniforms and logos. The unnamed avatars are
identified only by position and jersey number (e.g., QB
4

See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of
Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1161
(2006); F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge: The
‘Transformativeness’ Test for Analyzing a First Amendment
Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a
Work of Art, 27 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1 (2003); Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L. Rev.
903 (2003); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Money as a Thumb on
the Constitutional Scale: Weighing Speech Against Publicity
Rights, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1503 (2009); Adam Liptak, When it May
Not Pay To be Famous, N.Y. Times, June 1, 2013, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/sunday-review/between-thefirst-amendment-and-right-of-publicity.html; Andrea Peterson,
U.S. Court Limits How Art Can Imitate Life, Wash. Post, Aug. 2,
2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2013/08/02/us-court-limits-how-art-can-imitate-life/.
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#7) but are meant to evoke real players. Thus, for
example, an avatar may have an appearance (e.g.,
height, weight, skin-tone, and throwing arm) and
biographical information (e.g., class year) that match
those of a real player. Id. at 5a.
Within this realistic setting, the game fosters the
user’s creativity and interactivity. As Judge Ambro
put it in his dissenting opinion in this case, “NCAA
Football involves myriad original graphics, videos,
sound effects, and game scenarios. . . . Users are not
reenacting real games, but rather are directing the
avatars in invented games and seasons.” Pet. App. 69a.
The game also includes a mode in which the user
“coaches” a college team for up to thirty seasons to
develop a school’s football program over time. Id. at 4a.
Another mode allows users to control a single virtual
player from high school through college, directing the
virtual player’s choices regarding practices, academics,
and social life—all of which affect the virtual player’s
performance in a game. Id. at 4a-5a. “At its essence,
EA’s NCAA Football is a work of interactive historical
fiction.” Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA StudentAthlete Names & Likeness Litig.), No. 10-15387, 724
F.3d 1268, __, U.S. App. LEXIS 15649, at *48 (9th Cir.
July 31, 2013) (Thomas, J. dissenting).
B. Procedural Background
1. Respondent Ryan Hart played quarterback for
Rutgers University from 2002 to 2005. Pet. App. 2a. In
June 2009, Hart filed this putative class action lawsuit
against Electronic Arts in New Jersey state court,
alleging violation of the right of publicity and other
claims, and seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in
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damages on behalf of the putative class and an
injunction prohibiting the use of players’ identities in
the future and mandating the destruction of all copies
of NCAA Football in Electronic Arts’ possession. C.A.
App. 93, 104-05. Electronic Arts removed the lawsuit
to the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey on diversity grounds, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332. Pet. App. 6a.
Hart’s right-of-publicity claim was based on the
alleged use of his biographical information and likeness
in the 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2009 editions of NCAA
Football. Id. at 6a, 57a. Specifically, he claimed that
two aspects of the game were tortious: First, the game
included an animated avatar of a quarterback wearing a
Rutgers uniform with Hart’s physical and biographical
attributes and career statistics, though not his name or
photographic image. Second, in the 2009 edition, a
photograph of Hart appeared in a montage when users
selected Rutgers as their team. Id. at 57a.
In September 2011, the District Court granted
summary judgment for Electronic Arts, holding that
the First Amendment barred Hart’s right-of-publicity
claim. Id. at 146a.
2. In May 2013, the Third Circuit reversed and
remanded. Id. at 59a. The court acknowledged that,
under this Court’s decision in Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729,
video games receive “the full force of First Amendment
protections.” Pet. App. 9a-10a. Nevertheless, the court
rejected Petitioner’s First Amendment defense. Id. at
58a-59a.
The Third Circuit surveyed the myriad legal
standards that courts have applied in different

9
jurisdictions to determine whether the First
Amendment bars a right-of-publicity claim. Among
them is the test announced in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875
F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), under which an expressive
work enjoys First Amendment protection against a
right-of-publicity claim, unless the use of the
individual’s likeness is unrelated to the work or merely
serves to create a false impression that the individual
has endorsed the product. See Pet. App. 23a-31a.
The Third Circuit rejected the Rogers test on the
ground that it was too protective of speech. In the
court’s view, it was “unfit for widespread application in
cases that require a carefully calibrated balancing of
two fundamental protections: the right of free
expression and the right to control, manage, and profit
from one’s own identity.” Id. at 30a.
The court also rejected the Missouri Supreme
Court’s “predominant use” test, enunciated in Doe v.
TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003). That test
asks whether the “predominant purpose” of expressive
speech “is to make an expressive comment on or about
a celebrity,” or instead whether expressive speech
“predominantly exploits the commercial value of an
individual’s identity.” Pet. App. 21a-22a (quoting Doe,
110 S.W.3d at 374) (quotation marks omitted).
The Third Circuit settled on a version of the
transformative-use test, which it derived from Comedy
III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797
(Cal. 2001). The Third Circuit’s transformative-use test
“singular[ly] focus[es] on whether the work sufficiently
transforms the celebrity’s identity or likeness.” Pet.
App. 43a. In the Third Circuit’s view, that test
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“appears to strike the best balance” between the
interests protected by the right of publicity and the
interests protected by the First Amendment “because
it provides courts with a flexible—yet uniformly
applicable—analytical framework.” Id. at 42a.
Applying this test, the Third Circuit held that the
First Amendment did not protect NCAA Football
against Hart’s right-of-publicity claim because the
game did not sufficiently “transform” Respondent’s
likeness. See id. at 58a. The court noted that the
avatar matched Hart “in terms of hair color, hair style,
and skin tone,” and that the avatar’s “accessories mimic
those worn by [Hart] during his time as a Rutgers
player.” Id. at 49a. The court also emphasized the
biographical information associated with the avatar,
which “accurately tracks [Hart’s] vital and biographical
details.” Id. The court summarized:
The digital Ryan Hart does what the actual Ryan
Hart did while at Rutgers: he plays college football,
in digital recreations of college football stadiums,
filled with all the trappings of a college football
game. This is not transformative; the various
digitized sights and sounds in the video game do not
alter or transform [Hart’s] identity in a significant
way.
Id. at 50a.
At the same time, the court concluded that the use
of an actual photo of Hart as part of a montage within
the video game was protected by the First Amendment
because the image appeared fleetingly and because “the
context of [Hart]’s photograph—the montage—imbues
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the image with additional meaning beyond simply being
a representation of the player.” Id. at 58a.
Judge Ambro issued a forceful dissent.
He
observed that the majority misapplied the
transformative-use test in its “narrow focus on an
individual’s likeness, rather than how that likeness is
incorporated into and transformed by the work as a
whole.” Id. at 65a. He explained that “[t]o determine
whether an individual’s identity has been ‘transformed,’
. . . it is necessary to review the likeness in the context
of the work in its entirety, rather than focusing only on
the individual’s likeness.” Id. at 62a. And here, he
found, Hart’s “likeness is transformed by the artistry
necessary to create a digitally rendered avatar within
the imaginative and interactive world” of the video
game. Id. at 70a.
Judge Ambro further pointed out that “[t]he
protection afforded by the First Amendment to those
who weave celebrities into their creative works and sell
those works for profit applies equally to video games,”
id. at 67a (citing Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733), and that the
“use of real-life likeness as ‘characters’ in . . . NCAA
Football . . . should be as protected as portrayals
(fictional or nonfictional) of individuals in movies and
books,” id. By focusing on Hart’s likeness without
regard to the context of the game as a whole, the
majority in effect created “a medium-specific metric
that provides less protection to video games than other
expressive works,” contrary to this Court’s decision in
Brown. Id. at 68a-69a.
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On June 25, 2013, the Third Circuit denied
Electronic Arts’ petition for rehearing and rehearing en
banc, with two judges dissenting. Id. at 175a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
This Court’s review is urgently needed to resolve
conflicting authority concerning First Amendment
protection against right-of-publicity claims. Since its
5
invention in the second half of the twentieth century,
the right of publicity increasingly has been used in
litigation against creators of expressive works—
including filmmakers, authors, musicians, and others—
whose expression includes the depiction of a real
person. In this case, the Third Circuit applied a
transformative-use test that makes First Amendment
protection depend upon whether the depiction distorts
5

The precise formulation of the tort varies from state to state. See
J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 6.66.133 (2d ed. 2000) (describing varying state-law formulations).
For example, some states, such as New Jersey, see Pet. App. 15a,
follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), which provides
that “[o]ne who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
privacy.” Id. at § 652C. Other states follow the more narrow
formulation of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
(1995), under which “[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value
of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s name,
likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject
to liability.” See id. § 46 (emphasis added). The phrase “for
purposes of trade” means “used in advertising the user’s goods or
services, or . . . placed on merchandise marketed by the user,” and
“does not ordinarily include the use of a person’s identity in news
reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or
nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such uses.” Id. §
47.
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reality enough to be deemed “transformative.” The
more accurate and realistic the depiction, the greater
the likelihood of liability. Other courts use a different
legal test, extending First Amendment protection to
expressive depictions of people regardless of whether
they are realistic or “transformed,” unless those uses
amount to commercial endorsements. Still other courts
engage in case-by-case balancing of First Amendment
interests against the economic interests protected by
the right of publicity.
This disarray and conflict has real-world
consequences: without this Court’s guidance, artists,
musicians, and other content creators will be unsure
what standards apply to their expression and, in
particular, whether the realistic depiction of real
individuals is tortious. If the realistic portrayal of a
person in an expressive work can strip the work of
First Amendment protection, then countless creative
works are at risk of suit, including films like The Social
Network, 42, A Beautiful Mind, and All the President’s
Men; documentaries like Ken Burns’ Baseball and Jazz;
works of historical fiction like E.L. Doctorow’s Ragtime
and Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow; and
“unauthorized biographies” like those by Kitty Kelley.
All of these works realistically portray actual
individuals in the contexts that made them famous and
use their biographical details. The effect of this
uncertainty is to chill protected expression, all in the
name of a tort with questionable underlying purposes.
This Court should grant review to resolve the conflicts
and provide clear direction.
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I.

The Lower Courts Are In Disarray
Concerning the First Amendment Limits on
Right-of-Publicity Claims.
A. The
Third
and
Ninth
Circuits’
Transformative-Use
Test
Protects
an
Expressive Work Only if the Plaintiff’s
Likeness Is “Transformed.”

This case is the first time a court other than the
Ninth Circuit or a California state court has adopted
transformative use as the definitive test separating
protected expressive speech from unprotected
expressive speech. The Third Circuit held that, to
enjoy First Amendment protection against a right-ofpublicity claim, an expressive depiction must
“sufficiently transform[] the celebrity’s identity or
likeness.” Pet. App. 43a. The Ninth Circuit in Keller,
likewise adopted this version of the transformative-use
test, see Keller, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649, at *4344, and held that NCAA Football failed that test
because it “realistically portrays college football
players in the context of college football games.” Id. at
*28.
The transformative-use test was first articulated in
2001, when the California Supreme Court addressed a
right-of-publicity claim based on a charcoal drawing of
The Three Stooges. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 799. That
court borrowed from copyright fair-use doctrine and
adopted what it described as “essentially a balancing
test . . . based on whether the work in question adds
significant creative elements so as to be transformed
into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or
imitation.” Id. Applying that test to the facts at hand,
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the court found the Three Stooges drawing, sold as a
lithograph and on t-shirts, to be insufficiently
transformative. Id. at 811. It explained that the
artist’s “undeniable skill is manifestly subordinated to
the overall goal of creating literal, conventional
depictions of The Three Stooges so as to exploit their
fame.” Id.
In so holding, the California Supreme Court
distinguished the drawing at issue from Andy Warhol’s
portraits of celebrities such as Marilyn Monroe,
Elizabeth Taylor, and Elvis Presley. It explained:
“Through distortion and the careful manipulation of
context, Warhol was able to convey a message that
went beyond the commercial exploitation of celebrity
images and became a form of ironic social comment on
the dehumanization of celebrity itself.”
Id.
Underscoring the unpredictability of its test, the court
acknowledged that the difference between works that
enjoy constitutional protections (like Warhol’s
depictions of Marilyn Monroe) and those that do not
(like the Three Stooges sketch) will “sometimes be
6
subtle.” Id.
B. The Constitutional Test Adopted Below Is
Inconsistent With Tests Applied By Other
Courts.
Other circuits and state supreme courts have
adopted a different constitutional approach, applying
6

See Aaron Moss, When It Comes to the Right of Publicity, Yes,
Doubt
(February
18,
2011)
http://www.lawlawlandblog.com/2011/02/when_it_comes_to_the_ri
ght_of.html (displaying the Marilyn Monroe painting and the
Three Stooges sketch side by side).
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different First Amendment tests that do not depend on
a depiction’s transformative character—albeit tests
that themselves conflict with one another.

1. Four Circuits and Two State Supreme
Courts Have Held that the First Amendment
Protects Non-Commercial Speech Depicting
Well-Known People, Even if the Depiction Is
Not “Transformed.”

The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits,
along with the Florida and Kentucky Supreme Courts,
all have held that the First Amendment protects the
depiction of an individual within an expressive work,
unless the depiction amounts to an unauthorized
commercial endorsement or is unrelated to any other
expression and thus gratuitous.
In Rogers, the Second Circuit considered a federal
Lanham Act claim and a state right-of-publicity claim
brought by Ginger Rogers against the makers of a
Federico Fellini film entitled “Ginger and Fred”—a
film not about Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire, but
instead about a fictional Italian duo who imitated them,
becoming known in Italy as “Ginger and Fred.” 875
F.2d at 996-97. The Second Circuit ruled in favor of the
filmmaker, holding first that the First Amendment
protects the use of a person’s name in a film title from a
Lanham Act claim unless the use was “‘wholly
unrelated’ to the movie or was ‘simply a disguised
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or
services.’” Id. at 1004; see id. at 998-1000. The court
then applied essentially the same standard in rejecting
Rogers’ right-of-publicity claim under Oregon law. Id.
at 1004-05.
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Other courts have applied the Rogers standard or a
similar test in describing the First Amendment limits
to right-of-publicity claims. For example, in Matthews
v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994), the Fifth
Circuit cited Rogers in concluding that the First
Amendment barred a right-of-publicity claim based on
a fictionalized, but accurate, account of an undercover
police officer’s experiences. Similarly, in Parks v.
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003), the
Sixth Circuit adopted Rogers and remanded for a
factual determination concerning whether the use of
the plaintiff’s name in a song title was a “disguised
commercial advertisement” that would remove it from
7
First Amendment protection. And in Valentine v.
C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430 (11th Cir. 1983), the Eleventh
Circuit construed the Florida right-of-publicity statute
to allow the use of a person’s name except “to directly
promote a product or service,” in order to avoid “grave
questions” about the constitutionality of any broader
interpretation. Id. at 433.
The Kentucky Supreme Court also has adopted this
constitutional line, holding that a right-of-publicity
7

Shortly after Parks, the Sixth Circuit decided ETW, which
involved a right-of-publicity claim challenging an artist’s use of
Tiger Woods’ image in a painting celebrating Woods’ golfing
achievements. 332 F.3d. at 918-19. The Third Circuit below stated
that ETW applied the transformative-use test. Pet. App. 28a-29a.
In fact, ETW confirmed that, in Parks, the Sixth Circuit had
“applied the Rogers test to . . . right-of-publicity claims,” ETW, 332
F.3d at 936 n.17. After applying that test to the facts before it,
ETW went on to analyze the case under a case-specific balancing of
interests, id. at 937-38 (citing Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996)), and the
transformative-use test, id. at 938, as well.
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claim may proceed only if the “use of a person’s name or
likeness or other interest[s]” “is not sufficiently related
to the underlying work, or, if the otherwise
constitutionally-protected work is simply disguised
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or
services.” Montgomery v. Montgomery, 60 S.W.3d 524,
529 (Ky. 2001) (footnote omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted). And the Florida Supreme Court
recently adopted a similar rule, stating that, in light of
First Amendment constraints, the state’s right of
publicity does not bar the use of a name or likeness
except to “directly promote a product or service.”
Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co. L.P., 901 So. 2d 802,
810 (Fla. 2005); see also Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC,
740 S.E.2d 622, 627 (Ga. 2013) (holding that the use of
the plaintiff’s image on the cover of a College Girls
Gone Wild video was actionable under Georgia’s right
of publicity, and did not violate the defendant’s
“freedoms of speech and press” because the image was
used “as a part of an advertisement”) (quotation marks
omitted).
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
encourages the adoption of this test as well, explaining
that the right of publicity is “fundamentally constrained
by the public and constitutional interest in freedom of
expression,” and the First Amendment ought to
provide a defense against a right-of-publicity claim
unless “the name or likeness is used solely to attract
attention to a work that is not related to the identified
person.” Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, §
47 cmt. c (1995).
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2. Other

Courts
Balancing.

Engage

in

Case-Specific

Still other courts engage in various forms of
balancing, weighing the expressive interests protected
by the First Amendment against the economic
interests protected by the right of publicity based on
the particular facts of the case before them. In so
doing, none of these courts has focused on whether a
likeness has been sufficiently “transformed.”
Thus, in C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing., Inc. v.
Major League Baseball Advanced Media, LP, 505 F.3d
818 (8th Cir. 2007), the Eighth Circuit held that the
First Amendment protected fantasy baseball products
that used the names of real players, their biographical
data, and their performance statistics. In reaching that
conclusion, the court emphasized “the public value of
information about the game of baseball and its players,”
id. at 823, noted that “the information used in CBC’s
fantasy baseball games is all readily available in the
public domain,” id., and reasoned that “it would be
strange law that a person would not have a [F]irst
[A]mendment right to use information that is available
to everyone,” id. By contrast, it continued, “the facts in
this case barely, if at all implicate the interests that
states typically intend to vindicate by providing rights
of publicity to individuals.” Id. at 824. Specifically, the
court reasoned that publicity rights to one’s name and
performance statistics were not needed to encourage
baseball players to play the sport, and that there was
little risk of consumer confusion, because the
defendant’s game included all players. Id.
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The Third Circuit below attempted to harmonize its
outcome with C.B.C. on the ground that C.B.C. did not
involve “[t]he presence of a digital avatar that
recreates [the players] in a digital medium.” Pet. App.
48a n.37. That distinction is not persuasive: if the First
Amendment protects the use of someone’s name and
publicly available performance and biographical data,
then it also protects the creation of an avatar reflecting
publicly available information about a player’s
appearance and playing style. Indeed, the Eighth
Circuit itself made clear that C.B.C.’s expressive
interests would have been no different had it used
actual photos of the players, see 505 F.3d at 823; nor
would the use of photos have changed the court’s
balancing of interests.
The Tenth Circuit in Cardtoons likewise applied a
case-specific balancing test to reject a right-of-publicity
claim against the creator of parody baseball cards
featuring recognizable caricatures of real baseball
players. 95 F.3d at 962-63. The court held that the
trading cards were expressive speech “subject to full
First Amendment protection,” id. at 970, and
emphasized that “[c]elebrities . . . are an important
element of the shared communicative resources of our
cultural domain,” and that “[r]estricting the use of
celebrity identities restricts the communication of
ideas.” Id. at 972. It further held that these interests
outweighed any purported justification for the right of
publicity. See id. at 973-76.
In Doe, the Missouri Supreme Court took a
markedly different approach, holding that speech
receives First Amendment protection against a rightof-publicity claim only if its “predominant purpose . . .
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is to make an expressive comment on or about a
celebrity.”
110 S.W.3d at 374 (quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added). If, on the other hand, the
speech “predominantly exploits the commercial value of
an individual’s identity,” it is subject to liability under
the right of publicity, “even if there is some ‘expressive’
content in it.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). In
devising that test, the court specifically rejected the
8
transformative-use test. Id.
II.

This Case Presents an Ideal Vehicle For
Addressing the Constitutional Question.

Plainly, the lower courts need guidance from this
Court delineating the scope of First Amendment
protection against a right-of-publicity claim. This case
presents an excellent vehicle for providing such
guidance. The Third Circuit not only acknowledged the
wide-ranging circuit conflict on the issue, but also
recognized that its decision to apply the
transformative-use test, as opposed to the more
speech-protective Rogers test, was outcomedeterminative.
The court acknowledged that the NCAA Football
video game is an expressive work, Pet. App. 9a-10a,
and that Petitioner’s alleged use of Hart’s likeness and
8

Other courts, applying state common law or statutory exceptions
designed to accommodate constitutional concerns, have drawn the
line between protected and unprotected celebrity depictions by
focusing on whether the publication is “newsworthy” or in the
“public interest.” See, e.g., Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Group, LLC,
572 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying Georgia law);
Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790,
793-94 (1995) (applying California law).
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biographical information plainly was related to the
work and not merely a “disguised commercial
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.”
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004-05; see Pet. App. 30a-31a.
Accordingly, if the Third Circuit had applied Rogers
and limited the right of publicity to situations involving
a false suggestion of commercial endorsement or purely
gratuitous depictions unrelated to other expression,
Electronic Arts would have prevailed. The Third
Circuit declined to do so, however, because it believed
that Rogers did not give sufficient weight to “the right
to control, manage, and profit from one’s own identity”
as against a speaker’s First Amendment rights. Pet.
App. 30a.
The Ninth Circuit’s opinions in two other lawsuits,
also involving claims challenging the depiction of
football players in Electronic Arts football video games,
illustrate how the choice of test is outcomedeterminative. In Keller, involving a right-of-publicity
claim against NCAA Football essentially identical to
Respondent’s, the Ninth Circuit adopted the same the
transformative-use test as the Third Circuit and
rejected Electronic Arts’ First Amendment defense.
Keller, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *26-27. Yet on the
same day, the same Ninth Circuit panel issued an
opinion in Brown v. Electronic Arts Inc, No. 09-56675,
724 F.3d 1235, U.S. App. LEXIS 15647 (9th Cir. July
31, 2013), in which it held that former NFL star Jim
Brown’s Lanham Act claim, based on the use of
Brown’s likeness in Electronic Arts’ Madden NFL, was
barred by the First Amendment. Because the Brown
case involved a Lanham Act claim, the panel applied
the Rogers test. Id. at *13. As these two decisions
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illustrate, the choice of test made all the constitutional
difference.
III.

The Third Circuit’s Holding Is Wrong and
Conflicts with This Court’s First Amendment
Jurisprudence.

This Court’s review also is warranted because the
Third Circuit’s decision—which allows a state to impose
tort liability for non-commercial expression that
portrays a person realistically—is both wrong and
dangerous. The decision cannot be squared with this
Court’s precedents, and it threatens to chill the
exercise of First Amendment rights.
A. The Adopted Transformative-Use Test Does
Not Adequately Respect First Amendment
Rights.
The Third and Ninth’s Circuits’ transformative-use
test does not properly limit the right of publicity so
that it becomes consistent with the First Amendment.
The right of publicity penalizes fully protected and
valuable speech based on its content:
the tort
proscribes expression because it includes another’s
name or likeness within its content. Bartnicki v.
9
This Court
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 521 (2001).
repeatedly has held, however, that “[c]ontent-based
regulations” of speech “are presumptively invalid” and
must be subjected to strict constitutional scrutiny.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992);
9

See also Volokh, supra n.4 at 912 n.35 (2003) (“The right of
publicity is clearly content-based: It prohibits the unlicensed use
of particular content (people’s name or likenesses).”).
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accord, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)
(“[A]s a general matter . . . government has no power to
restrict expression because of . . . its content.”)
(quotation marks omitted; bracket in original); Regan v.
Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648 (1984) (holding
unconstitutional a statute prohibiting accurate
depictions of U.S. currency unless for educational,
historic, or newsworthy purposes because those
determinations “cannot help but be based on the
content of the photograph and the message it
delivers”).
The limited exceptions to this rule consist of a few
“historic and traditional categories” of expression,
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010)
(quotation marks omitted), which are “of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.” R.A.V., 505 U.S.
at 383 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
These include obscenity,
defamation, fraud, fighting words, true threats, and
speech integral to criminal conduct, see United States v.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (collecting cases),
and “represent ‘well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.” Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733
(quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72). This Court
repeatedly has refused to expand these well-defined
and historical categories or to add new categories of
speech that the government may proscribe. See, e.g.,
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 482;
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741.
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An expressive work does not fall into any of these
traditional exceptions merely because it includes a
portrayal of an actual person. To the contrary, the
right-of-publicity tort penalizing such speech is a
modern innovation, not recognized in New Jersey itself
until 1967. See Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232
A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967). As a
leading commentator has put it, the right of publicity is
“still a relatively raw and brash newcomer,” 1 J.
Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and
Privacy (2d ed. 2000).
Because the right of publicity penalizes speech
based on its content and does not fall into one of the
recognized exceptions to full First Amendment
protection, it is invalid, unless its application can be
limited so as to avoid unconstitutional applications of
the tort. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (“It is rare that a
regulation restricting speech because of its content will
ever be permissible.” (quoting United States v. Playboy
Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)); id.
(explaining that content-based regulations of speech
are impermissible unless they can survive strict
scrutiny). The transformative-use test applied here
does not do that.
To the contrary, a test that protects fanciful
depictions of a person but imposes liability for realistic
depictions cannot be a suitable First Amendment
standard. Realistic depictions within expressive works
do not constitute a category of speech, like defamation
or obscenity, that warrants anything less than full First
Amendment
protection
against
content-based
restrictions. Indeed, many valuable works, including
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biographies, documentaries, and historical fiction,
include realistic portrayals or references to real people.
A transformative-use test also does not sufficiently
limit the right of publicity to circumstances where its
application can survive strict scrutiny. There is no
compelling state interest in stamping out realistic
portrayals of people. According to the Third Circuit,
the right of publicity serves both to protect “the
property interest that an individual gains and enjoys in
his identity through his labor and effort” and to
“encourage further development of this property
10
interest.” Pet. App. 16a. However, neither of those
interests is sufficiently compelling to justify penalizing
11
non-commercial expression.
A person’s appearance
10

The Third Circuit, in the course of justifying the transformativeuse test, compared the right of publicity to copyright law. Pet.
App. 33a.
That analogy is strained. Copyright protects
expression and does so for the purpose of preserving incentives to
create new expressive works. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). However, a person’s
likeness, or biographical facts about a person, are not expression;
rather, they are facts, and facts do not warrant any copyright
protection. “This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the
means by which copyright advances the progress of science and
art.” Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
350 (1991).
11

Many question the validity of the justifications for the right of
publicity altogether. See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 4, at
1188 (“Even if celebrities would make such an additional
investment, it is not at all clear that society should want to
encourage fame for fame’s sake.”); Michael Madow, Private
Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture & Publicity Rights,
81 Cal. L. Rev. 127, 238 (1993) (“[T]he standard justifications are
not nearly as compelling as is commonly supposed.”); Volokh,
supra note 4, at 911 (“If the law’s goal is encouraging the
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and biography—here, for example, Hart’s height,
weight, throwing arm, and visor—are facts in the
public domain. The First Amendment does not allow
the state to control or penalize another’s use of facts.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 823 (“[T]he information used in
CBC’s fantasy baseball games is all readily available in
the public domain, and it would be strange law that a
person would not have a [F]irst [A]mendment right to
use information that is available to everyone.”).
Indeed, the transformative-use test as applied here
is particularly perverse, because it assumes that the
state has a stronger interest in penalizing accurate
speech than in penalizing speech that is
“transformative.” That has things backwards: this
Court has repeatedly held that truthful and accurate
expression warrants maximum First Amendment
protection. Cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (“False statements of fact are
particularly valueless; they interfere with the truthseeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they
cause damage to an individual’s reputation that cannot
easily be repaired by counterspeech, however
persuasive or effective.”); The Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
491 U.S. 524, 534 (1989) (criticizing a Florida law
making it unlawful to publicize the name of the victim
of a sexual offense because it “punish[ed] truthful
publication”); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967)
(prohibiting false light liability even for false speech on
“matters of public interest in the absence of proof that
production of new works, the right of publicity will likely disserve
the interest more than it serves it.”).
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the defendant published the report with knowledge of
its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth”).
B. The Transformative-Use Test Will Chill
Protected Speech Because It Is Overbroad
and Unpredictable.
The Third Circuit’s decision is not only wrong but
also dangerous. Its transformative-use test is too
vague and unpredictable, and too susceptible to a
court’s subjective artistic judgments, to be a workable
First Amendment standard.
This Court repeatedly has emphasized the
importance of ensuring that restrictions on the content
of speech are “well-defined.” Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468.
Predictability is important because speakers otherwise
will “‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ . . . than if
the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly
marked,” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)
(quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)),
thereby causing an “obvious chilling effect on free
speech,” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997).
The Third Circuit’s transformative-use test fails
these requirements.
If taken literally, the
transformative-use test would allow states to subject
biographers, filmmakers, singers, photographers, and
other artists to tort liability whenever they include
realistic images of, or references to, famous people.
Yet many expressive works routinely use a real
person’s actual name or likeness, including, for
example, films like The Social Network, Moneyball, 42,
and The King’s Speech; documentaries like Ken Burns’
critically acclaimed series on the history of baseball;
and best-selling biographies, like those by Kitty Kelley.
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Indeed, a key element of the artistry in these works
is the realism or accuracy of the portrayal. For
example, the genius of Daniel Day-Lewis’ portrayal of
Abraham Lincoln was his ability to imitate, with great
realism, the likeness, mannerisms, and attributes of the
president doing what Lincoln actually did. It would be
disturbing if the artistic success of such a portrayal
were precisely what would make it actionable. Cf.
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1359
(D.N.J. 1981) (rejecting Elvis impersonator’s First
Amendment defense to a right-of-publicity claim
brought by Presley’s estate; “entertainment that is
merely a copy or imitation, even if skillfully and
accurately carried out, does not really have its own
creative component and does not have a significant
value as pure entertainment” (cited with approval by
the Third Circuit, see Pet. App. 46a)).
To avoid absurd and dangerous outcomes, courts
applying the transformative-use test will have little
choice but to draw distinctions among expressive works
reflecting their own subjective judgments about
whether a particular work is sufficiently “artistic” or
“creative” that it warrants protection. Thus, the
California Supreme Court in Comedy III determined
that a sketch of The Three Stooges was not creative
enough to receive First Amendment protection, but an
Andy Warhol portrait of Marilyn Monroe did deserve
such protection because it presented “a form of ironic
social comment on the dehumanization of celebrity
itself.” 21 P.3d at 811. Courts should not place
themselves in the role of art critic and make First
Amendment freedoms turn on subjective judgments of
this kind. Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
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Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (“It would be
a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits.”).
A legal regime turning on such “subtle” distinctions
among expressive works, Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 812, is
inherently unpredictable and will chill expression. This
case presents a good example of such unpredictability.
The Third Circuit concluded that an avatar portraying
a college football player in an animated and interactive
fictional college football game was actionable because
the player’s image was not sufficiently transformed;
yet, in the same decision, the court held that placement,
in a later edition of the same video game, of an actual
photograph of Respondent in a montage of other
photographs of Rutgers football players was not
actionable, because the context made the depiction
transformative. Pet. App. 57a-58a (citing ETW, 332
F.3d at 938).
It is hard rationally to reconcile these two rulings.
According to the dissent, the majority simply treated
video games as less worthy of constitutional protection
than other types of expressive works, such as
photomontages—despite this Court’s clear preclusion
of such a First Amendment double standard in Brown.
Pet. App. 65a, 68a-69a (Ambro, J., dissenting)
(expressing concern about “a medium-specific metric
that provides less protection to video games than other
expressive works”). The majority did not respond to
Judge Ambro’s concerns at all, except to claim that it
faithfully followed Brown’s admonition that video
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games “enjoy the full force of First Amendment
protections.” Pet. App. 9a-10a (majority opinion).
Speakers need certainty about whether their speech
will subject them to liability, or they will self-censor.
The transformative-use test cannot provide that
predictability.
C. Case-Specific
Problematic.

Balancing

Is

Equally

Decisions calling for ad hoc balancing of First
Amendment interests and the interests protected by
the right of publicity present just as many
constitutional problems. See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d
at 973-76; C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 824. This Court has
rejected any notion of a “free-floating test for First
Amendment coverage.” Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470; see
also Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734. As this Court has
explained, “[t]he First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech does not extend only to categories of speech
that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs
and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a
judgment by the American people that the benefits of
its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.
Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that
judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not
worth it.” Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470.
Moreover, here, ad hoc balancing requires a court to
weigh apples against oranges. There is no principled
way to determine, case by case, whether the economic
interest of a person in preventing a given portrayal
outweighs the social value of a given expressive work.
The two interests being compared are too different to
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enable judges to reach consistent and predictable
results.
D. The Rogers Test Confines the Right of
Publicity to Circumstances Where Its
Application Does Not Violate the First
Amendment.
Unlike the transformative-use test and case-by-case
balancing, the Rogers test confines the right-ofpublicity tort to situations in which speakers have used
a depiction of, or reference to, a celebrity to sell
something—either by falsely claiming a celebrity
commercial endorsement or by including a celebrity
image in a publication gratuitously, just to attract
attention.
Confined to these circumstances, the right of
publicity does not raise constitutional concerns. Speech
that falsely claims a commercial endorsement is akin to
the category of fraudulent speech that the government
has long regulated without any First Amendment
concerns. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976) (noting that fraudulent speech generally falls
outside the protections of the First Amendment). And
the gratuitous use of a celebrity’s image to attract
attention, unrelated to any expressive content in the
work, likewise falls outside First Amendment
protection altogether. Thus confined, the right-ofpublicity tort raises little constitutional concern.
*

*

*

This Court’s review is sorely needed. Because so
many expressive works are distributed nationwide, the
rule created by the Third and Ninth Circuits effectively
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has set the constitutional rule for the rest of the
country. But that rule makes no sense constitutionally.
Moreover, the rule is so vague and unpredictable in its
application that speakers will not know whether their
speech is constitutionally protected or tortious. Given
the potentially ruinous financial consequences of
guessing wrong (here, Respondent seeks hundreds of
millions of dollars on behalf of a class that could have
thousands of members), speakers will go too far in their
self-censorship. Unless and until this Court intervenes,
a great deal of valuable and protected expression will
be chilled.
CONCLUSION
This Court should grant the petition for a writ of
certiorari.
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OPINION
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
In 2009, Appellant Ryan Hart (“Appellant” or
1
“Hart”) brought suit against Appellee Electronic Arts,
Inc. (“Appellee” or “EA”) for allegedly violating his
right of publicity as recognized under New Jersey law.
Specifically, Appellant’s claims stemmed from
*

Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior United States Circuit
Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

1

Appellant’s action purports to be a class action on behalf of
similarly situated individuals. Because the putative class members
all face the same issues with regard to the First Amendment we
will focus our attention and analysis on Appellant in particular.
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Appellee’s alleged use of his likeness and biographical
information in its NCAA Football series of videogames.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor
of Appellee on the ground that its use of Appellant’s
likeness was protected by the First Amendment. For
the reasons set forth below, we will reverse the grant
of summary judgment and remand the case back to the
District Court for further proceedings.
I.

FACTS

Hart was a quarterback, player number 13, with the
Rutgers University NCAA Men’s Division I Football
team for the 2002 through 2005 seasons. As a condition
of participating in college-level sports, Hart was
required to adhere to the National Collegiate Athletic
Association’s (“NCAA”) amateurism rules as set out in
Article 12 of the NCAA bylaws. See, e.g., NCAA,
2011–12 NCAA Division I Manual § 12.01.1 (2011)
(“Only an amateur student-athlete is eligible for
inter-collegiate athletics participation in a particular
sport.”). In relevant part, these rules state that a
collegiate athlete loses his or her “amateur” status if (1)
the athlete “[u]ses his or her athletics skill (directly or
indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport,” id. §
12.1.2, or (2) the athlete “[a]ccepts any remuneration or
permits the use of his or her name or picture to
advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or
use of a commercial product or service of any kind,” id.
2
§ 12.5.2.1. In comporting with these bylaws, Hart
2

The NCAA Manual also states that where a collegiate athlete’s
name or picture appears on commercial items ... or is used
to promote a commercial product sold by an individual or
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purportedly refrained from seizing on various
3
commercial opportunities. On the field, Hart excelled.
At 6’2", weighing 197 pounds, and typically wearing a
visor and armband on his left wrist, Hart amassed an
impressive list of achievements as the Scarlet Knights’
starting quarterback. As of this writing, Hart still holds
the Scarlet Knights’ records for career attempts,
4
completions, and interceptions. Hart’s skill brought
success to the team and during his senior year the
Knights were invited to the Insight Bowl, their first
Bowl game since 1978.
Hart’s participation in college football also ensured
his inclusion in EA’s successful NCAA Football
videogame franchise. EA, founded in 1982, is “one of
the world’s leading interactive entertainment software
companies,” and “develops, publishes, and distributes
interactive software worldwide” for consoles, cell
phones, and PCs. (App. at 529–30.) EA’s catalogue
agency without the student-athlete’s knowledge or
permission, the student athlete (or the institution acting
on behalf of the student-athlete) is required to take steps
to stop such an activity in order to retain his or her
eligibility for intercollegiate athletics.
NCAA, 2011–12 NCAA Division I Manual § 12.5.2.2
(2011).
3

NCAA bylaws limit college athletes like Hart to receiving only
non-athletic financial aid, either through academic scholarships or
need-based aid, or athletic scholarships, which cover only tuition
and various school-related expenses. See NCAA, 2011–12 NCAA
Division I Manual § 15 (2011).

4

Until his recent displacement by Mike Teel, Hart also held the
team records for career yards and touchdowns.
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includes NCAA Football, the videogame series at issue
in the instant case. The first edition of the game was
released in 1993 as Bill Walsh College Football. EA
subsequently changed the name first to College
Football USA (in 1995), and then to the current NCAA
Football (in 1997). New editions in the series are
released annually, and “allow[] users to experience the
excitement and challenge of college football” by
interacting with “over 100 virtual teams and thousands
of virtual players.” (Id. at 530.)
A typical play session allows users the choice of two
teams. “Once a user chooses two college teams to
compete against each other, the video game assigns a
stadium for the match-up and populates it with players,
5
coaches, referees, mascots, cheerleaders and fans.”
(Id.) In addition to this “basic single-game format,” EA
has introduced a number of additional game modes that
allow for “multi-game” play. (Id. at 530–31.) Thus, with
the release of NCAA Football 98, EA introduced the
“Dynasty Mode,” which allows users to “control[] a
college program for up to thirty seasons,” including
“year-round responsibilities of a college coach such as
recruiting virtual high school players out of a
random-generated pool of athletes.” (Id. at 531.) Later,
in NCAA Football 2006, EA introduced the “Race for
the Heisman” (later renamed “Campus Legend”),
5

Appellee licenses, from the Collegiate Licensing Company (the
NCAA’s licensing agent), “the right to use member school names,
team names, uniforms, logos, stadium fight songs, and other game
elements.” (App. at 532.) Unlike certain of its other videogame
franchises, EA does not license the likeness and identity rights for
intercollegiate players.
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which allows users to “control a single [user-made]
virtual player from high school through his collegiate
career, making his or her own choices regarding
practices, academics and social activities.” (Id. at
531–32.)
In no small part, the NCAA Football franchise’s
success owes to its focus on realism and detail—from
6
realistic sounds, to game mechanics, to team mascots.
This focus on realism also ensures that the “over 100
virtual teams” in the game are populated by digital
avatars that resemble their real-life counterparts and
share their vital and biographical information. Thus, for
example, in NCAA Football 2006, Rutgers’
quarterback, player number 13, is 6’2" tall, weighs 197
pounds and resembles Hart. Moreover, while users can
change the digital avatar’s appearance and most of the
vital statistics (height, weight, throwing distance, etc.),
certain details remain immutable: the player’s home
state, home town, team, and class year.
Appellant filed suit against EA in state court for,
among other things, violation of his right of publicity.
Appellant’s first amended complaint, filed in October
2009, alleged that Appellee violated his right of
publicity by appropriating his likeness for use in the
NCAA Football series of videogames. Appellee
6

For example, an article on the EA Sports blog explainted that
“[e]ach year, NCAA Football playbook designer Anthony White
strives to make each team’s playbook accurately represent their
system and play style …. [E]ach year, Anthony adds in actual
plays run by teams that can only be found in specific playbooks.”
(App. At 663.).
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subsequently removed the action to federal court, and
the District Court subsequently dismissed all but one of
7
the claims. Thereafter, on October 12, 2010, Appellant
filed his second amended complaint, again alleging a
claim pursuant to the right of publicity based on
Appellee’s purported misappropriation of Appellant’s
identity and likeness to enhance the commercial value
of NCAA Football. Specifically, Appellant alleges that
(1) Appellee replicated his likeness in NCAA Football
2004, 2005, and 2006 (complete with biographical and
8
career statistics) and that (2) Appellee used
Appellant’s image “in the promotion for [NCAA
Football] wherein [Appellant] was throwing a pass
with actual footage from Rutgers University’s Bowl
9
Game against Arizona State University.” (App. at 370.)
On November 12, 2010, Appellee filed a motion to
dismiss the claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
7

The District Court had diversity jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

8

Appellant alleges that the physical attributes exhibited by the
virtual avatar in NCAA Football are his own (i.e., he attended
high school in Florida, measures 6’2" tall, weighs 197 pounds,
wears number 13, and has the same left wrist band and helmet
visor) and that the avatar’s speed, agility, and passer rating
reflected actual footage of Appellant during his tenure at Rutgers.
(App. at 369–71.).

9

It is unclear from the complaint what exactly this allegation
covers. However, Appellee concedes that “[a] photograph of
[Appellant] is included in a photo montage of actual players within
NCAA Football 09 which is visible only when the game is played
on certain game platforms by those users who select Rutgers as
their team.” (App. at 475.).
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Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, summary
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c). While conceding, for purposes of the motion only,
that it had violated Appellant’s right of publicity,
Appellee argued that it was entitled to dismissal or
summary judgment on First Amendment grounds.
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766
(D.N.J.2011). The motion was accompanied by a
Statement of Undisputed Fact and various supporting
materials, including declarations. Appellant opposed
the motion, arguing that “discovery [was] still in it’s
[sic] infancy.” (App. at 9.) The court below rejected this
argument, noting that Appellant had “fail[ed] to
identify how discovery would assist the Court in
deciding this speech-based tort case.” Hart, 808 F.
Supp. 2d at 764. The District Court then construed the
motion as one for summary judgment, citing its intent
to “rely on the affidavits and exhibits submitted by the
parties,” id., and ruled in favor of Appellee, holding that
NCAA Football was entitled to protection under the
First Amendment. Appellant timely appealed, arguing
that the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment prematurely and, in the alternative, erred in
holding that NCAA Football was shielded from right of
publicity claims by the First Amendment. The matter
is now before us for review.
II.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW

We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s
order granting summary judgment is plenary. Azur v.
Chase Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d
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Cir. 2010). “To that end, we are ‘required to apply the
same test the district court should have utilized
initially.’” Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of
Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Oritani Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co. of Md., 989 F.2d 635, 637 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Summary judgment is appropriate “where the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
admissions, and affidavits show there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Azur, 601
F.3d at 216 (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798,
805–06 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
10
56(c))). To be material, a fact must have the potential
to alter the outcome of the case. See Kaucher v. Cnty.
of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006). “Once the
moving party points to evidence demonstrating no
issue of material fact exists, the non-moving party has
the duty to set forth specific facts showing that a
genuine issue of material fact exists and that a
reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor.” Azur, 601
F.3d at 216. In determining whether summary
judgment is warranted “[t]he evidence of the
nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505,
91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); see also Chambers ex rel.
10

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 was revised in 2010. The standard previously
set forth in subsection (c) is now codified as subsection (a). The
language of this subsection is unchanged, except for “one
word—genuine ‘issue’ bec[ame] genuine ‘dispute.’” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56 advisory committee’s note, 2010 amend.
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Chambers, 587 F.3d at 181. “Further, [w]e may affirm
the District Court on any grounds supported by the
record.” Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir.
2009) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In connection with Appellant’s request for
additional discovery, we review “[w]hether a district
court prematurely grant[ed] summary judgment ... for
abuse of discretion.” Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391,
1393 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Dowling v. City of Phila., 855
F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1988)). “To demonstrate an abuse of
discretion, [an appellant] must show that the District
Court’s decision was arbitrary, fanciful or clearly
unreasonable.” Moyer v. United Dominion Indus., Inc.,
473 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v.
Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993) (“An abuse of
discretion arises when ‘the district court’s decision
rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to
fact.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
III.

DISCUSSION

We begin our analysis by noting the self-evident:
video games are protected as expressive speech under
the First Amendment. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n,
––– U.S. ––––, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708
(2011). As the Supreme Court has noted, “video games
communicate
ideas—and
even
social
messages—through many familiar literary devices
(such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and
through features distinctive to the medium (such as the
player’s interaction with the virtual world).” Id. As a
result, games enjoy the full force of First Amendment
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protections. As with other types of expressive conduct,
the protection afforded to games can be limited in
situations where the right of free expression
necessarily conflicts with other protected rights.
The instant case presents one such situation. Here,
Appellee concedes, for purposes of the motion and
appeal, that it violated Appellant’s right of publicity; in
essence, misappropriating his identity for commercial
exploitation. (Appellant’s Br. at 8, 34; Tr. at 50:12–:16.)
However, Appellee contends that the First
Amendment shields it from liability for this violation
because NCAA Football is a protected work. To
resolve the tension between the First Amendment and
the right of publicity, we must balance the interests
underlying the right to free expression against the
interests in protecting the right of publicity. See
Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562,
11
574–75, 97 S. Ct. 2849, 53 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1977).
Courts have taken varying approaches in
attempting to strike a balance between the competing
interests in right of publicity cases, some more
appealing than others. In our discussion below, we first
consider the nature of the interests we must balance
and then analyze the different approaches courts have
taken to resolving the tension between the First
Amendment and the right of publicity.
11

While it is true that the right of publicity is a creature of state
law and precedent, its intersection with the First Amendment
presents a federal issue, and, thus, permits us to engage in the sort
of balancing inquiry at issue here. See, e.g., Zacchini, 433 U.S. at
566–68, 97 S. Ct. 2849.
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A.

The Relevant Interests at Issue

Before engaging with the different analytical
schemes, we first examine the relevant interests
underlying the rights of free expression and publicity.

1.

Freedom of Expression

Freedom of expression is paramount in a democratic
society, for “[i]t is the function of speech to free men
from the bondage of irrational fears.” Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 376, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed.
1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). As Justice Louis
Brandeis wrote nearly a century ago:
Those who won our independence believed that
the final end of the state was to make men free
to develop their faculties. . . . They valued liberty
both as an end and as a means. They believed
liberty to [be] the secret of happiness and
courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed
that freedom to think as you will and to speak as
you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; that
without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile; that with them, discussion
affords ordinarily adequate protection against
the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people;
that public discussion is a political duty; and that
this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government.
Id. at 375, 47 S. Ct. 641.
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In keeping with Justice Brandeis’ eloquent analysis,
the great legal minds of generations past and present
have recognized that free speech benefits both the
individual and society. The Supreme Court in
Procunier v. Martinez noted that the protection of free
speech serves the needs “of the human spirit—a spirit
that demands self-expression,” adding that “[s]uch
expression is an integral part of the development of
ideas and a sense of identity.” 416 U.S. 396, 427, 94 S.
Ct. 1800, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1974), overruled on other
grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 109 S.
Ct. 1874, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1989). Suppressing such
expression, therefore, is tantamount to rejecting “the
basic human desire for recognition and [would] affront
the individual’s worth and dignity.” Id. Indeed, First
Amendment protections have been held applicable to
not only political speech, but to “entertainment
[including, but certainly not limited to,] motion
pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television,
and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic
works.” Tacynec v. City of Phila., 687 F.2d 793, 796 (3d
Cir. 1982). Thus, “[t]he breadth of this protection
evinces recognition that freedom of expression is not
only essential to check tyranny and foster
self-government but also intrinsic to individual liberty
and dignity and instrumental in society’s search for
truth.” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 787, 105 S. Ct. 2939, 86 L. Ed. 2d 593
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The interest in safeguarding the integrity of these
protections therefore weighs heavily in any balancing
inquiry. Still, instances can and do arise where First
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Amendment protections yield in the face of competing
interests. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
219–20, 123 S. Ct. 769, 154 L. Ed. 2d 683 (2003)
(discussing the interplay between copyright law and
First Amendment protections); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
472 U.S. at 757–61, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (determining that a
state may allow recovery of damages in certain
defamation cases after balancing “the State’s interest in
compensating private individuals for injury to their
reputation against the First Amendment interest in
protecting this type of expression”). Ultimately, we
must determine whether the interest in safeguarding
the right of publicity overpowers the interest in
safeguarding free expression.

2.

12

The Right of Publicity

The right of publicity grew out of the right to
privacy torts, specifically, from the tort of “invasion of
privacy by appropriation.” J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §
1:23 (2d ed. 2012). Thus, when New Jersey first
recognized the concept in 1907, its analysis looked to
the “so-called right of privacy” and the limits on that
concept. Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73
N.J.Eq. 136, 67 A. 392, 394 (N.J. Ch. 1907) (enjoining a
company from using the name or likeness of Thomas
12

As we have noted, Appellee concedes that NCAA Football
infringes on the right of publicity as recognized in New Jersey.
Our inquiry, therefore, does not concern the elements of the tort or
whether Appellee’s actions satisfy this standard. Rather, we are
concerned only with whether the right to freedom of expression
overpowers the right of publicity.
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Edison to promote its products). Additionally, we note
that, even at this early stage the New Jersey court
recognized that an individual enjoyed a property
interest in his or her identity. Id. (“[I]t is difficult to
understand why the peculiar cast of one’s features is
not. . . one’s property, and why its pecuniary value, if it
has one, does not belong to its owner, rather than to the
person seeking to make an unauthorized use of it.”).
However, this early conceptualization had
limitations, particularly when it came to protecting the
property interests of celebrities and people already in
the public eye. See id. (“It is certain that a man in
public life may not claim the same immunity from
publicity that a private citizen may.”); see also
MCCARTHY, supra, at § 1:25. Faced with this
limitation on the legal doctrine, courts began to
recognize a “right of publicity,” which protected
publicly known persons from the misappropriation of
their identities. The first case to describe this
protection as a “right of publicity” was Haelan Labs.,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.
1953) (concerning baseball cards in gum packages).
There, the Second Circuit held that “in addition to and
independent of that right of privacy. . ., a man has a
right in the publicity value of his photograph. . . . This
right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’” Id. at 868.
New Jersey courts, which had long recognized a “right
of privacy [and] a right of property,” were not far
behind in voicing their support for this concept. Ettore
v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 491 (3d
Cir. 1956).
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In the seminal case of Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters.,
Inc., the Superior Court of New Jersey noted that
[p]erhaps the basic and underlying theory is that
a person has the right to enjoy the fruits of his
own industry free from unjustified interference.
It is unfair that one should be permitted to
commercialize or exploit or capitalize upon
another’s name, reputation or accomplishments
merely because the owner’s accomplishments
have been highly publicized.
96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458, 462 (Ch. Div. 1967)
(citations omitted) (finding an infringement of property
rights where a golfer’s name was used in connection
with a golf game); see also Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc.,
97 N.J. Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62, 76 (Law Div. 1967)
(“[T]he reality of a case such as we have here is, in the
court’s opinion, simply this: plaintiffs’ names and
likenesses belong to them. As such they are property.
They are things of value.”).
The current incarnation of the right of publicity in
New Jersey is that set forth in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS (1977). See, e.g., Bisbee v. John
C. Conover Agency, Inc., 186 N.J.Super. 335, 452 A.2d
689, 690–91 (App. Div. 1982) (looking to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts for the “four areas of
invasion of privacy,” including “appropriation of the
other’s name or likeness”); see also G.D. v. Kenny, 205
N.J. 275, 15 A.3d 300, 311 (2011). According to the
Restatement, “[o]ne who appropriates to his own use or
benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of privacy.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 C. The
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comments also make clear that “the right created by
[the rule in § 652 C] is in the nature of a property
13
right.” Id. § 652 C cmt a.
New Jersey law therefore recognizes that “[t]he
right to exploit the value of [an individual’s] notoriety
or fame belongs to the individual with whom it is
associated,” for an individual’s “name, likeness, and
endorsement carry value and an unauthorized use
harms the person both by diluting the value of the
name and depriving that individual of compensation.”
McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919, 923 (3d Cir.
1994). As such, the goal of maintaining a right of
publicity is to protect the property interest that an
individual gains and enjoys in his identity through his
labor and effort. Additionally, as with protections for
intellectual property, the right of publicity is designed
to encourage further development of this property
interest. Accord Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573, 97 S. Ct.
2849 (“[T]he State’s interest in permitting a ‘right of
publicity’ . . . is closely analogous to the goals of patent
and copyright law, focusing on the right of the
individual to reap the reward of his endeavors. . . .”).
13

In 1995 the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION set forth the elements of a free-standing right of
publicity claim, unconnected to the right of privacy torts. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §
46–49 (1995). While we discuss this version of the tort further
below, we decline to address it here because New Jersey has yet to
adopt the Restatement (Third)’s version of the tort and the
accompanying comments. Accord Castro v. NYT Television, 370
N.J.Super. 282, 851 A.2d 88, 96–97 (App. Div. 2004) (citing to
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 C (1977) in
discussing a right of publicity claim).
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Since neither the New Jersey courts nor our own
circuit have set out a definitive methodology for
balancing the tension between the First Amendment
and the right of publicity, we are presented with a case
of first impression. We must therefore consult the
approaches of other courts in the first instance.
B.

How Courts Balance the Interests

We begin our inquiry by looking at Zacchini v.
Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co., the only Supreme
Court case addressing the First Amendment in a right
of publicity context. In this case, the Court called for a
balancing test to weigh the interest underlying the
First Amendment against those underpinning the right
of publicity. 433 U.S. at 574–75, 97 S. Ct. 2849. This
decision sets the stage for our analysis of three
systematized analytical frameworks that have emerged
as courts struggle with finding a standardized way for
performing this balancing inquiry.

1. Zacchini and the Need for Balance
In Zacchini, an Ohio television news program
recorded and subsequently broadcast Mr. Hugo
Zacchini’s entire “human cannonball” act from a local
fair. The daredevil brought suit alleging a violation of
his right of publicity as recognized by Ohio law. Id. at
563–66, 97 S. Ct. 2849. The Ohio courts held that
Zacchini’s claim was barred on First Amendment
grounds, and the case then came before the Supreme
Court.
In setting out the interests at issue in the case, the
Supreme Court noted (as we did above) that “the
State’s interest in permitting a ‘right of publicity’ is in
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protecting the proprietary interest of the individual in
his act in part to encourage such entertainment.” Id. at
573, 97 S. Ct. 2849. This aspect of the right, the Court
noted, was “analogous to the goals of patent and
copyright law,” given that they too serve to protect the
individual’s ability to “reap the reward of his
endeavors.” Id. In Zacchini, the performance was the
“product of [Zacchini’s] own talents and energy, the end
result of much time, effort and expense.” Id. at 575, 97
S. Ct. 2849. Thus much of its economic value lay “in the
right of exclusive control over the publicity given to his
performance.” Id. Indeed, while the Court noted that
“[a]n entertainer such as petitioner usually has no
objection to the widespread publication of his act as
long as [he] gets the commercial benefit of such
publication,” id. at 573, 97 S. Ct. 2849, the claim at issue
in the Zacchini concerned “the strongest case for a
‘right of publicity,’ ” because it did not involve the
“appropriation of an entertainer’s reputation to
enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product,”
but instead involved “the appropriation of the very
activity by which the entertainer acquired his
reputation in the first place,” id. at 576, 97 S. Ct. 2849.
Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of the human
cannonball, and held that
[w]herever the line in particular situations is to
be drawn between media reports that are
protected and those that are not, we are quite
sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
do not immunize the media when they broadcast
a performer’s entire act without his consent. The
Constitution no more prevents a State from
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requiring respondent to compensate petitioner
for broadcasting his act on television than it
would privilege respondent to film and broadcast
a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to
the copyright owner.
Id. at 574–75, 97 S. Ct. 2849. Thus, while the Court did
not itself engage in an explicit balancing inquiry, it did
suggest that the respective interests in a case should be
balanced against each other.
In the wake of Zacchini, courts began applying a
balancing inquiry to resolve cases where a right of
publicity claim collided with First Amendment
protections. While early cases approached the analysis
from an ad hoc perspective, see, e.g., Guglielmi v.
Spelling–Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860, 160 Cal.Rptr.
352, 603 P.2d 454 (1979) (en banc), courts eventually
began developing standardized balancing frameworks.
Consequently, we now turn our attention to more
standardized balancing tests to see whether any of
them offer a particularly compelling methodology for
14
resolving the case at hand and similar disputes.

14

We reject as inapplicable in this case the suggestion that those
who play organized sports are not significantly damaged by
appropriation of their likeness because “players are rewarded, and
handsomely, too, for their participation in games and can earn
additional large sums from endorsement and sponsorship
arrangements.” C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League
Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007)
(discussing Major League Baseball players); see also, e.g.,
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d
959, 974 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he additional inducement for
achievement produced by publicity rights are often
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2.

The Modern Balancing Tests

Following Zacchini, courts began developing more
systematized balancing tests for resolving conflicts
between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment. Of these, three tests are of particular
note: the commercial-interest-based Predominant Use
Test, the trademark-based Rogers Test, and the
copyright-based Transformative Use Test. The Rogers
and Transformative Use tests are the most
well-established, while the Predominant Use Test is
addressed below only because Appellant argues in
favor of its adoption. We consider each test in turn,
looking at its origins, scope of application, and possible
limitations. For the reasons discussed below, we adopt
the Transformative Use Test as being the most
appropriate balancing test to be applied here.

inconsequential because most celebrities with valuable commercial
identities are already handsomely compensated.”). If anything, the
policy considerations in this case weigh in favor of Appellant. As
we have already noted, intercollegiate athletes are forbidden from
capitalizing on their fame while in school. Moreover, the NCAA
most recently estimated that “[l]ess than one in 100, or 1.6 percent,
of NCAA senior football players will get drafted by a National
Football League (NFL) team.” NCAA, Estimated Probability of
Competing in Athletics Beyond the High School Interscholastic
Level, available at http:// www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/
public/ncaa/pdfs/2012/estimated+probability+of+competing+in+at
hletics+beyond+the+high +school+ interscholastic+ level. Despite
all of his achievements, it should be noted that Ryan Hart was
among the roughly ninety-nine percent who were not drafted after
graduation.
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a. Predominant Use Test
Appellant urges us to adopt the Predominant Use
Test, which first appeared in Doe v. TCI Cablevision,
110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), a case that
considered a hockey player’s right of publicity claim
against a comic book publishing company. In TCI,
Anthony “Tony” Twist, a hockey player, brought suit
against a number of individuals and entities involved in
producing and publishing the Spawn comic book series
after the introduction of a villainous character named
Anthony “Tony Twist” Twistelli.
In balancing Twist’s property interests in his own
name and identity against the First Amendment
interests of the comic book creators, the TCI court
rejected both the Transformative Use and Rogers
tests, noting that they gave “too little consideration to
the fact that many uses of a person’s name and identity
have both expressive and commercial components.” Id.
at 374. The Supreme Court of Missouri considered both
tests to be too rigid, noting that they operated “to
preclude a cause of action whenever the use of the
name and identity is in any way expressive, regardless
of its commercial exploitation.” Id. The court instead
applied what it called a “sort of predominant use test”:
If a product is being sold that predominantly
exploits the commercial value of an individual’s
identity, that product should be held to violate
the right of publicity and not be protected by the
First Amendment, even if there is some
‘expressive’ content in it that might qualify as
‘speech’ in other circumstances. If, on the other
hand, the predominant purpose of the product is
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to make an expressive comment on or about a
celebrity, the expressive values could be given
greater weight.
Id. (quoting Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial
Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity–Free
Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. V. 471,
500 (2003)). The TCI court considered this to be a
“more balanced balancing test [particularly for] cases
where speech is both expressive and commercial.” Id.
After applying the test, the court ruled for Twist,
holding that “the metaphorical reference to Twist,
though a literary device, has very little literary value
compared to its commercial value.” Id.
We decline Appellant’s invitation to adopt this test.
By our reading, the Predominant Use Test is subjective
at best, arbitrary at worst, and in either case calls upon
judges to act as both impartial jurists and discerning
art critics. These two roles cannot co-exist. Indeed,
Appellant suggests that pursuant to this test we must
evaluate “what value [Appellee is] adding to the First
Amendment expressiveness [of NCAA Football ] by
appropriating the commercially valuable likeness?” (Tr.
at 14:15–:18.) Since “[t]he game would have the exact
same level of First Amendment expressiveness if
[Appellee] didn’t appropriate Mr. Hart’s likeness,”
Appellant urges us to find that NCAA Football fails
the Predominant Use Test and therefore is not shielded
by the First Amendment. (Tr. at 7:10–12.) Such
reasoning, however, leads down a dangerous and
rightly-shunned road: adopting Appellant’s suggested
analysis would be tantamount to admitting that it is
proper for courts to analyze select elements of a work
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to determine how much they contribute to the entire
work’s expressiveness. Moreover, as a necessary (and
insidious) consequence, the Appellant’s approach would
suppose that there exists a broad range of seemingly
expressive speech that has no First Amendment
15
value.
Appellee rightly argues that the Predominant Use
Test is antithetical to our First Amendment precedent,
16
(Tr. at 25:2–:9), and we likewise reject the Test. We
instead turn our attention to the Rogers Test, which
was proposed by Appellee and which draws its
inspiration from trademark law.
b. The Rogers Test
The Rogers Test looks to the relationship between
17
the celebrity image and the work as a whole. As the
following discussion demonstrates, however, adopting
15

This concept is almost wholly foreign to free expression save for
highly circumscribed categories of speech: obscenity, incitement,
and fighting words. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, ––– U.S.
––––, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011).

16

We also agree with Chief Justice Bird’s rejection of an identical
argument: “The right of publicity derived from public prominence
does not confer a shield to ward off caricature, parody and satire.
Rather, prominence invites creative coment.” Guglielmi, 160
Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 460.

17

The various cases and scholarly sources refer to this test in three
different ways: the Relatedness Test, the Restatement Test, and
the Rogers Test. The “Relatedness” moniker should be
self-explanatory even at this early point in our discussion; the
propriety of the other two names will become clear shortly. For
our purposes, we will refer to the test as the Rogers Test.
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this test would potentially immunize a broad swath of
tortious activity. We therefore reject the Rogers Test
as inapposite in the instant case.
i. Origins and Scope of the Rogers
Test
Various commentators have noted that right of
publicity claims—at least those that address the use of
a person’s name or image in an advertisement—are
akin to trademark claims because in both instances
courts must balance the interests in protecting the
relevant property right against the interest in free
expression. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc.,
332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that “a Lanham
Act false endorsement claim is the federal equivalent of
the right of publicity” (citing Bruce P. Keller, The Right
of Publicity: Past, Present, and Future, 1207 PLI
CORP. LAW & PRAC. HANDBOOK 159, 170 (2000))).
It is little wonder, then, that the inquiry championed by
Appellee originated in a case that also focused upon
alleged violations of the trademark-specific Lanham
Act. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
In that case, Ginger Rogers brought suit against the
producers and distributors of, Ginger and Fred, a film
that was alleged to infringe on Rogers’ right of
publicity and confuse consumers in violation of the Act.
(Despite its title, the film was not about either Ginger
Rogers or Fred Astaire.) In analyzing the right of
publicity claim under Oregon law, the Second Circuit
noted Oregon’s “concern for the protection of free
expression,” and held that Oregon would not “permit
the right of publicity to bar the use of a celebrity’s
name in a movie title unless the title was wholly
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unrelated to the movie or was simply a disguised
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or
services.” Id. at 1004 (internal quotation marks
18
omitted). After applying this test, the Rogers court
concluded that the right of publicity claim merited
dismissal because “the title ‘Ginger and Fred’ is clearly
related to the content of the movie and is not a
disguised advertisement for the sale of goods and
services or a collateral commercial product.” Id. at
19
1004–05.
But while the test, as articulated in Rogers,
arguably applied only to the use of celebrity identity in
a work’s title, Appellee suggests that the test can—and
should—be applied more broadly. For support,
Appellee looks to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
18

For support, the Rogers court looked to California and New
York case law. Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768,
427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (1980) (“It is enough that the book is a
literary work and not simply a disguised commercial
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.”); Guglielmi v.
Spelling–Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603
P.2d 454, 457 n.6 (1979) (“Such statements establish that this is not
a case in which the use is wholly unrelated to the individual. . . .
[T]his is not a case in which a celebrity’s name is used to promote
or endorse a collateral commercial product or is otherwise
associated with a product or service in an advertisement.”).

19

Still, it bears noting that while the Rogers Test was arguably
forged in the crucible of trademark law—and the Rogers court
appeared to consult trademark principles for inspiration—the
court also pointed out that “the right of publicity, unlike the
Lanham Act, has no likelihood of confusion requirement” and is
therefore “potentially more expansive than the Lanham Act.”
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989).
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Competition, released in 1995, which characterizes the
tort as follows:
One who appropriates the commercial value of a
person’s identity by using without consent the
person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of
identity for purposes of trade is subject to
liability for [appropriate relief].
RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)
OF
UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 46. In explaining the term “use for
purposes of trade,” the Restatement notes that it does
not “ordinarily include the use of a person’s identity in
news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of
fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental
to such uses.” Id. § 47.
Moreover, the comments to Section 47 of the
Restatement also note that:
[t]he right of publicity as recognized by statute
and common law is fundamentally constrained
by the public and constitutional interest in
freedom of expression. The use of a person’s
identity primarily for purpose of communicating
information or expressing ideas is not generally
actionable as a violation of the person’s right of
publicity. . . . Thus the use of a person’s name or
likeness in news reporting, whether in
newspapers, magazines, or broadcast news, does
not infringe the right of publicity. The interest in
freedom of expression also extends to use in
entertainment and other creative works,
including both fiction and nonfiction. The use of a
celebrity’s name or photograph as part of an
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article published in a fan magazine or in a
feature story broadcast on an entertainment
program, for example, will not infringe the
celebrity’s right of publicity. Similarly, the right
of publicity is not infringed by the dissemination
of an unauthorized print or broadcast biography.
Use of another’s identity in a novel, play, or
motion picture is also not ordinarily an
infringement. . . . However, if the name or
likeness is used solely to attract attention to a
work that is not related to the identified person,
the user may be subject to liability for a use of
the other’s identity in advertising.
Id. at § 47 cmt. c (emphasis added). Appellee argues
that the above language adopts the Rogers Test and
applies it to right of publicity claims dealing with any
part of a work, not only its title. Appellee also cites to a
number of cases purportedly supporting its position.
See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th
Cir. 2003); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th
Cir. 1994). We do not find any of these cases
particularly persuasive.
In Matthews, for example, the Fifth Circuit
considered whether a fictional novel incorporating
events from the life of an undercover narcotics officer
violated the officer’s right of publicity. In setting out
the legal standard for a right of publicity claim, the
court noted that it made no difference “whether [the
book] is viewed as an historical or a fictional work, so
long as it is not simply a disguised commercial
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.”
Matthews, 15 F.3d at 440 (quotation marks and internal
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citations omitted). This single, cryptic quotation
notwithstanding, the court ultimately held in favor of
the book’s author after applying a wholly
different—and
seemingly
inapposite—First
20
Amendment analysis: actual malice. See id. (“[A]bsent
a showing of actual malice . . . [the book] is protected by
the First Amendment.”).
But where Matthews took an ambivalent position,
the Sixth Circuit seemed—at least for a short time—to
embrace the Rogers Test. In Parks v. LaFace Records,
the Sixth Circuit was asked to determine whether a rap
song entitled Rosa Parks infringed on the Civil Rights
icon’s right of publicity. Parks, 329 F.3d at 441–42.
After noting that Rogers was decided in the context of
a movie, the Sixth Circuit held that an expansion of the
test to “the context of other expressive works [was
supported] by comment c of § 47 of the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition.” Id. at 461.
Consequently, the Sixth Circuit ruled that there was an
issue of material fact as to whether the title of the song
(“Rosa Parks”) was “wholly unrelated” to the lyrics. Id.
We find Parks to be less than persuasive given that
just over a month later another panel of the Sixth
Circuit decided ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., a
right of publicity case where the Circuit applied the
20

In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S. Ct. 876,
99 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1988), the Supreme Court clarified its holding in
Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.
Ct. 2849, 53 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1977), as standing for the proposition
that “the ‘actual malice’ standard does not apply to the tort of
appropriation of a right of publicity.” Hustler, 485 U.S. at 52, 108
S. Ct. 876.
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Transformative Use Test. See 332 F.3d 915, 937 (6th
21
Cir. 2003).
Interestingly, this is not the first time that we have
considered the proper scope of the Rogers Test. Indeed,
we expressed doubt (albeit in dicta) over whether the
Test could apply beyond the title of a work in Facenda
v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008), a
case centering on a suit by the estate of a well-known
sports narrator against a sports film production
company for Lanham Act violations and breach of the
narrator’s right of publicity. In analyzing the
trademark claim, we expressed hesitation at extending
the Rogers Test beyond the title of a work, adding that
few other courts had done so at the time of our decision.
Id. at 1018. Nothing in Appellee’s argument has swayed
us from this position and we thus remain skeptical that
the Rogers Test applies to the general contents of a
work when analyzing right of publicity claims.
ii. Analysis of the Rogers Test
Ultimately, we find that the Rogers Test does not
present the proper analytical approach for cases such
as the one at bar. While the Test may have a use in
trademark-like right of publicity cases, it is inapposite
21

To be fair, the ETW court did briefly mention the Rogers
decision before engaging in a lengthy discussion of the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION,
ultimately concluding that the Restatement stood for the rather
mundane principle that a right of publicity implicates a balancing
test. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 930–36. As we noted above, the
balancing utilized by the ETW court was the Transformative Use
Test.
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here. We are concerned that this test is a blunt
instrument, unfit for widespread application in cases
that require a carefully calibrated balancing of two
fundamental protections: the right of free expression
and the right to control, manage, and profit from one’s
own identity.
The potential problem with applying the Rogers
Test in this case is demonstrated by the following
statement from Appellee’s brief:
Because, as a former college football player,
Hart’s likeness is not ‘wholly unrelated’ to
NCAA Football and the game is not a
commercial advertisement for some unrelated
product, Hart ... does not try to meet the ... test.
(Appellee’s Br. at 24.) Effectively, Appellee argues
that Appellant should be unable to assert a claim for
appropriating his likeness as a football player precisely
because his likeness was used for a game about football.
Adopting this line of reasoning threatens to turn the
right of publicity on its head.
Appellant’s career as a college football player
suggests that the target audience for his merchandise
and performances (e.g., his actual matches) would be
sports fans. It is only logical, then, that products
appropriating and exploiting his identity would fare
best—and thereby would provide ne’er-do-wells with
the greatest incentive—when targeted at the
sports-fan market segment. Given that Appellant
played intercollegiate football, however, products
targeting the sports-fan market would, as a matter of
course, relate to him. Yet under Appellee’s approach,
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all such uses would be protected. It cannot be that the
very activity by which Appellant achieved his renown
now prevents him from protecting his hard-won
celebrity. We decline to endorse such a conclusion and
22
therefore reject the Rogers test as inapplicable.
On the other hand, we do agree with the Rogers
court in so far as it noted that the right of publicity
does not implicate the potential for consumer confusion
and is therefore potentially broader than the
protections offered by the Lanham Act. Rogers, 875
F.2d at 1004. Indeed, therein lies the weakness of
comparing the right of publicity to trademark
protections: the right of publicity is broader and, by
extension, protects a greater swath of property
interests. Thus, it would be unwise for us to adopt a
test that hews so closely to traditional trademark
principles. Instead, we need a broader, more nuanced
test, which helps balance the interests at issue in cases
such as the one at bar. The final test—the
Transformative Use Test—provides just such an
approach.
c. The Transformative Use Test
Looking to intellectual property law for guidance on
how to balance property interests against the First
Amendment has merit. We need only shift our gaze
22

We recognize that in Brown v. Elec. Arts, No.
2:09–cv–01598–FMC–RZ, 2009 WL 8763151 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23,
2009), the District Court applied the Rogers test in analyzing
another EA sports game: Madden NFL. Note, however, that the
case did not involve a right of publicity claim, but a claim under the
Lanham Act. Id. at *1–2.
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away from trademark, to the broader vista of copyright
law. Thus, we come to the case of Comedy III Prods.,
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., which imported the concept
of “transformative” use from copyright law into the
right of publicity context. 25 Cal.4th 387, 106
Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797, 804–08 (2001). This
concept lies at the core of a test that both Appellant
and Appellee agree is applicable to this case: the
23
Transformative Use Test.
i. Genesis of the Transformative
Use Test
The Transformative Use Test was first articulated
by the Supreme Court of California in Comedy III.
23

Unlike in New Jersey, California’s right of publicity is a matter
of both the state’s statutory law and its common law. Laws v. Sony
Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing
both the statutory and the common law cause of action); see also
Cal. Civ.Code § 3344; Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal.App.3d
409, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342, 347 (1983). This difference notwithstanding,
the laws are strikingly similar—and protect similar interests.
Under California law, “any person who knowingly uses another’s
name . . . or likeness, in any manner, or in any products,
merchandise, or goods, or for the purposes of advertising or
selling, or soliciting purchases of . . . shall be liable for any damages
sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.”
Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a). In the words of the California Supreme
Court, “the right of publicity is essentially an economic right.
What the right of publicity holder possesses is not a right of
censorship, but a right to prevent others from misappropriating
the economic value generated by the celebrity’s fame. . . .” Comedy
III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 807. This is analogous to the
conceptualization of the right of publicity in New Jersey, and we
consequently see no issue in applying balancing tests developed in
California to New Jersey.
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That case concerned an artist’s production and sale of
t-shirts and prints bearing a charcoal drawing of the
Three Stooges. The California court determined that
while “[t]he right of publicity is often invoked in the
context of commercial speech,” it could also apply in
instances where the speech is merely expressive. Id.,
106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 802–803. The court also
noted, however, that when addressing expressive
speech, “the very importance of celebrities in society
means that the right of publicity has the potential of
censoring significant expression by suppressing
alternative versions of celebrity images that are
iconoclastic, irreverent or otherwise attempt to
redefine the celebrity’s meaning.” Id., 106 Cal.Rptr.2d
126, 21 P.3d at 803. Thus, while the “the right of
publicity cannot, consistent with the First Amendment,
be a right to control the celebrity’s image by censoring
disagreeable portrayals,” id., 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21
P.3d at 807, the right, like copyright, nonetheless offers
protection to a form of intellectual property that
society deems to have social utility, id., 106 Cal.Rptr.2d
126, 21 P.3d at 804.
After briefly considering whether to import the
“fair use” analysis from copyright, the Comedy III
court decided that only the first fair use factor, “the
purpose and character of the use,” was appropriate. Id.,
106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 808. Specifically, the
Comedy III court found persuasive the Supreme
Court’s holding in Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc.
that
the central purpose of the inquiry into this fair
use factor ‘is to see . . . whether the new work
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merely “supercede[s] the objects” of the original
creation, or instead adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering
the first with new expression, meaning, or
message; it asks, in other words, whether and to
what extent the new work is “transformative.”
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Campbell v. Acuff–Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 127 L.
Ed. 2d 500 (1994)).
Going further, the court explained that works
containing “significant transformative elements” are
less likely to interfere with the economic interests
implicated by the right of publicity. For example,
“works of parody or other distortions of the celebrity
figure are not, from the celebrity fan’s viewpoint, good
substitutes for conventional depictions of the celebrity
and therefore do not generally threaten markets for
celebrity memorabilia that the right of publicity is
designed to protect.” Id. The court was also careful to
emphasize that “the transformative elements or
creative contributions” in a work may include—under
the
right
circumstances—factual
reporting,
fictionalized portrayal, heavy-handed lampooning, and
subtle social criticism. Id., 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d
at 809 (“The inquiry is in a sense more quantitative
than qualitative, asking whether the literal and
imitative or the creative elements predominate in the
24
work.”).
24

The court in Comedy III also added an ancillary question to its
inquiry: “does the marketability and economic value of the
challenged work derive primarily from the fame of the celebrity
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Restating its newly-articulated test, the Supreme
Court of California held that the balance between the
right of publicity and First Amendment interests turns
on
[w]hether the celebrity likeness is one of the
“raw materials” from which an original work is
synthesized, or whether the depiction or
imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and
substance of the work in question. We ask, in
other words, whether the product containing a
celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has
become primarily the defendant’s own
expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.
And when we use the word “expression,” we
mean expression of something other than the
likeness of the celebrity.
Id. (emphasis added).
Applying this test, the court concluded that charcoal
portraits of the Three Stooges did violate the Stooges’
rights of publicity, holding that the court could “discern
no significant transformative or creative contribution”
and that “the marketability and economic value of [the
work] derives primarily from the fame of the celebrities
depicted.” Id., 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 811.

depicted?” Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 810. If not,
then “there would generally be no actionable right of publicity.”
Id. However, the inverse is not necessarily true: even if the work
does derive its value principally from the celebrity’s depiction, “it
may still be a transformative work.” Id.
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ii. Application
of
Transformative Use Test

the

Given its relative recency, few courts have applied
the Transformative Use Test, and consequently there
is not a significant body of case law related to its
application. Nonetheless, a handful of cases bear
mention as they help frame our inquiry.
In 2003, the Supreme Court of California revisited
the Transformative Use Test when two musicians,
Johnny and Edgar Winter, who both possessed long
white hair and albino features, brought suit against a
comic book company over images of two villainous
half-man, half-worm creatures, both with long white
hair and albino features, named Johnny and Edgar
Autumn. Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal.4th 881, 134
Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473, 476 (2003). As the
brothers’ right of publicity claims necessarily
implicated DC Comics’ First Amendment rights, the
Winter court looked to the Transformative Use Test. In
summarizing the test, the court explained that “[a]n
artist depicting a celebrity must contribute something
more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation, [but must create]
something recognizably ‘his own,’ in order to qualify for
legal protection.” Id., 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d at
478 (alteration in original) (quoting Comedy III, 106
Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 810–11). Thus, in applying
the test, the Winter court held that
[a]lthough the fictional characters Johnny and
Edgar Autumn are less-than-subtle evocations
of Johnny and Edgar Winter, the books do not
depict plaintiffs literally. Instead, plaintiffs are
merely part of the raw materials from which the
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comic books were synthesized. To the extent the
drawings of the Autumn brothers resemble
plaintiffs at all, they are distorted for purposes
of lampoon, parody, or caricature. And the
Autumn
brothers
are
but
cartoon
characters—half-human and half-worm—in a
larger story, which is itself quite expressive.
Id., 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d at 479. The court
therefore found that “fans who want to purchase
pictures of [the Winter brothers] would find the
drawing of the Autumn brothers unsatisfactory as a
25
substitute
for
conventional
depictions.”
Id.
Consequently, the court rejected the brothers’ claims
for a right of publicity violation.
Also in 2003, the Sixth Circuit decided ETW, a case
focusing on a photograph of Tiger Woods set among a
collage of other, golf-related photographs. As we
previously noted, while ETW mentioned both the
Rogers case and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition, the test it ultimately applied was a
combination of an ad-hoc approach and the
Transformative Use Test. See ETW, 332 F.3d at
937–38. In holding that the collage “contain[ed]
significant transformative elements,” id. at 938, the
court compared it to the Three Stooges portraits from
25

The Winter court also found unpersuasive arguments that the
comic books were marketed by “trading on [the brothers’]
likenesses and reputations to generate interest in the comic book
series.” Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal.4th 881, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634,
69 P.3d 473, 479 (2003). The court held that considerations of
marketing strategy were “irrelevant” because the “question is
whether the work is transformative, not how it is marketed.” Id.
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Comedy III, and noted that the collage “does not
capitalize solely on a literal depiction of Woods.” Id.
Instead, the “work consists of a collage of images in
addition to Woods’s image which are combined to
describe, in artistic form, a historic event in sports
history and to convey a message about the significance
of Woods’s achievement in that event.” Id.; see also
Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 809 (noting
that “transformative elements or creative contributions
. . . can take many forms”).
ETW presents an archetypical example of a case
falling somewhere in the middle of Transformative Use
Test jurisprudence, given that it focuses on the use of
photographs (literal depictions of celebrities), but adds
a transformative aspect to the work, thereby altering
the meaning behind the use of the celebrity’s likeness.
Arguably, the Comedy III and Winter decisions
bookend the spectrum of cases applying the
Transformative Use Test. Where Comedy III presents
a clear example of a non-transformative use (i.e., mere
literal depictions of celebrities recreated in a different
medium), Winter offers a use that is highly
transformative (i.e., fanciful characters, placed amidst a
fanciful setting, that draw inspiration from celebrities).
As with ETW, however, most of the cases discussed
below (along with the instant case), fall somewhere
between these two decisions. This same analytical
approach—focusing on whether and how the celebrity’s
likeness is transformed—appears in decisions by courts
applying the Transformative Use Test to video games,
an area of law which we consider next.
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iii. The Transformative Use Test
and Video Games
In mid–2006, the California Court of Appeal decided
Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 47, 50
Cal.Rptr.3d 607 (2006), which addressed a musician’s
right of publicity claim against a video game company.
Specifically, the musician (Kierin Kirby) had claimed
that Sega misappropriated her likeness and signature
phrases for purposes of creating the character of Ulala,
a reporter in the far flung future. In applying the
Transformative Use Test, the court noted that not only
did Kirby’s signature phrases included “ooh la la” but
that both she and the videogame character would often
use phrases like “groove,” “meow,” “dee-lish,” and “I
won’t give up.” Id. at 613. The court also found
similarities in appearance between Kirby and Ulala,
based on hair style and clothing choice. Id. At the same
time, the court held that differences between the two
did exist—both in appearance and movement—and that
Ulala was not a mere digital recreation of Kirby. Id.
Thus, the court concluded that Ulala passed the
Transformative Use Test, rejecting Kirby’s argument
that the differences between her and the character
added no additional meaning or message to the work.
Id. at 616–17 (“A work is transformative if it adds ‘new
expression.’ That expression alone is sufficient; it need
not convey any ‘meaning or message.’ ”); see also id. at
617 (“[A]ny imitation of Kirby’s likeness or identity in
Ulala is not the sum and substance of that character.”).
Several years later, in early 2011, the California
courts again confronted the right of publicity as it
related to video games in No Doubt v. Activision
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Publishing, Inc., 192 Cal.App.4th 1018, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d
397 (2011). The case centered on Band Hero, a game
that allows player to “simulate performing in a rock
band in time with popular songs” by selecting digital
avatars to represent them in an in-game band. Id. at
401. Some of the avatars were digital recreations of
real-life musicians, including members of the band No
26
Doubt. After a contract dispute broke off relations
between the band and the company, No Doubt sued,
claiming a violation of their rights of publicity. The
California Court of Appeal applied the Transformative
Use Test.
The No Doubt court began by noting that “in stark
contrast to the ‘fanciful creative characters’ in Winter
and Kirby,” the No Doubt avatars could not be altered
by players and thus remained “at all times immutable
images of the real celebrity musicians.” Id. at 410. But
this fact, by itself, did not end the court’s inquiry since
“even literal reproductions of celebrities can be
‘transformed’ into expressive works based on the
26

According to the decision,
members of No Doubt participated in a full-day motion
capture photography session at Activision’s studios so that
the band members’ Band Hero avatars would accurately
reflect their appearances, movements, and sounds. No
Doubt then closely reviewed the motion capture
photography and the details related to the appearance and
features of their avatars to ensure the representations
would meet with approval. The end results are avatars
that closely match the appearance of each of the No Doubt
band members.

No Doubt, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d at 402.
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context into which the celebrity image is placed.” Id.
(citing Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at
811). Looking to the context of the Band Hero game,
the court found that “no matter what else occurs in the
game during the depiction of the No Doubt avatars, the
avatars perform rock songs, the same activity by which
the band achieved and maintains its fame.” Id. at
410–11 (emphasis added). The court explained:
[T]he avatars perform [rock] songs as literal
recreations of the band members. That the
avatars can be manipulated to perform at
fanciful venues including outer space or to sing
songs the real band would object to singing, or
that the avatars appear in the context of a
videogame that contains many other creative
elements, does not transform the avatars into
anything other than the exact depictions of No
Doubt’s members doing exactly what they do as
celebrities.
27

Id. at 411 (emphasis added). As a final step in its
analysis, the court noted that Activision’s use of highly
realistic digital depictions of No Doubt was motivated
27

For support, the No Doubt court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, where our sister court held
that a greeting card depicting Paris Hilton’s head on a cartoon
waitress accompanied by the line “that’s hot” was not
transformative and thus infringed on Hilton’s right of publicity.
599 F.3d 894, 911 (9th Cir. 2010) (“While a work need not be
phantasmagoric as in Winter or fanciful as in Kirby in order to be
transformative, there is enough doubt as to whether Hallmark’s
card is transformative under our case law that we cannot say
Hallmark is entitled to the defense. . . .”).
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by a desire to capitalize on the band’s fan-base,
“because it encourages [fans] to purchase the game so
as to perform as, or alongside, the members of No
Doubt.” Id. (emphasis added). Given all this, the court
concluded that Activision’s use of No Doubt’s
likenesses did infringe on the band’s rights of publicity.
28
Id. at 411–12.
iv. Analysis of the Transformative
Use Test
Like the Predominant Use and Rogers tests, the
Transformative Use Test aims to balance the interest
protected by the right of publicity against those
interests preserved by the First Amendment. In our
view, the Transformative Use Test appears to strike
the best balance because it provides courts with a
flexible—yet
uniformly
applicable—analytical
framework. Specifically, the Transformative Use Test
seems to excel precisely where the other two tests
28

Before moving on, it behooves us to mention a pair of cases
decided in the Northern District of California: Davis v. Elec. Arts
Inc., No. 10–cv–03328, 2012 WL 3860819 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012);
Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09–cv–01967, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). Both cases concern right of publicity claims
asserted against EA for use of football players’ likenesses in their
game franchises. Davis related to EA’s Madden NFL games while
Keller is simply our own case incarnated in California. In both
disputes the court applied the Transformative Use Test, and in
both instances the court decided that EA’s use of the players’
likenesses failed the Test. Davis, 2012 WL 3860819, at *5–6; Keller,
2010 WL 530108, at *3–5. We note these cases in passing only
because they are both currently on appeal before the Ninth Circuit
and we feel it imprudent to rely too heavily on decisions that our
sister court is still considering.
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falter. Unlike the Rogers Test, the Transformative Use
Test maintains a singular focus on whether the work
sufficiently transforms the celebrity’s identity or
likeness, thereby allowing courts to account for the fact
that misappropriation can occur in any market
segment, including those related to the celebrity.
On the other hand, unlike the Predominant Use
Test, applying the Transformative Use Test requires a
more circumscribed inquiry, focusing on the specific
aspects of a work that speak to whether it was merely
created to exploit a celebrity’s likeness. This test
therefore recognizes that if First Amendment
protections are to mean anything in right of publicity
claims, courts must begin by considering the extent to
29
which a work is the creator’s own expression.
Additionally, the Transformative Use Test best
comports with the cautionary language present in
various right of publicity cases. Specifically, we believe
that an initial focus on the creative aspects of a work
helps address our own concern from Facenda, where
we noted that “courts must circumscribe the right of
publicity.” Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1032. As our discussion
below demonstrates, the Transformative Use Test
effectively restricts right of publicity claims to a very
29

While we acknowledge that the test in Comedy III included a
question as to whether the “marketability and economic value of
[the work] derive primarily from the fame of the celebrities
depicted,” Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 810, we
note that this is a secondary question. The court in Comedy III
rightly recognized that the balancing inquiry suggested by the
Supreme Court in Zacchini cannot start and stop with commercial
purpose or value.
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narrow universe of expressive works. Moreover, we
believe that the Transformative Use Test best
exemplifies the methodology suggested by Justice
Powell’s dissent in Zacchini:
Rather than begin with a quantitative analysis of
the performer’s behavior—is this or is this not
his entire act?—we should direct initial attention
to the actions of the news media: what use did
the station make of the film footage? When a film
is used, as here, for a routine portion of a regular
news program, I would hold that the First
Amendment protects the station from a “right of
publicity” or “appropriation” suit, absent a
strong showing by the plaintiff that the news
broadcast was a subterfuge or cover for private
or commercial exploitation.
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 581, 97 S. Ct. 2849 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Consistent with Justice Powell’s argument,
the Transformative Use Test begins by asking “what
use did the [defendant] make of the [celebrity
30
identity]?” Id.
Finally, we find that of the three tests, the
Transformative Use Test is the most consistent with
other courts’ ad hoc approaches to right of publicity
cases. For example, a majority of the Supreme Court of
California in Guglielmi
v.
Spelling–Goldberg

30

While the Predominant Use Test may appear to accomplish the
same task, we think it does not. In point of fact, it merely looks to
the expressive “value” of a celebrity’s identity, not its use,
vis-à-vis the challenged work.
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31

Productions argued that the “fictionalized version” of
a late actor’s life, “depicting the actor’s name, likeness
and personality without obtaining ... prior consent” was
entitled to protection from a right of publicity claim.
32
160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 455, 457–59. In essence,
the actor’s identity was sufficiently transformed by the
fictional elements in the book so as to tip the balance of
interests in favor of the First Amendment. See id., 160
Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 457 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
31

The Supreme Court of California affirmed the lower court’s
decision to dismiss the case without engaging with the right of
publicity claim beyond noting that the right “expires upon the
death of the person so protected.” Guglielmi, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352,
603 P.2d at 455. The Chief Justice’s concurring opinion, joined by a
majority of the court, provided a full analysis of the issue, and in
subsequent years has been treated as the Court’s majority opinion.
See Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 803 (citing the
Guglielmi concurrence while noting that “[a] majority of this
court” had agreed to its reasoning); see also Guglielmi, 160
Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 464 (Newman, J., concurring) (“I concur
in the discussion in the Chief Justice’s opinion that sets forth
principles for determining whether an action based on the invasion
of an individual’s right of publicity may be maintained in the face
of a claim that the challenged use is an exercise of freedom of
expression.”).

32

After noting that the movie was protected despite being a work
of fiction that was made for profit, Guglielmi, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352,
603 P.2d at 458–59, Chief Justice Bird rejected the contention that
defendants “could have expressed themselves without using [the
actor’s] name and likeness,” arguing that “[n]o author should be
forced into creating mythological worlds or characters wholly
divorced from reality. The right of publicity derived from public
prominence does not confer a shield to ward off caricature, parody
and satire. Rather, prominence invites creative comment.” Id., 160
Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 459–60.
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Likewise, in Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp.
1339 (D.N.J. 1981), the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey held that an Elvis
impersonator’s act was subject to right of publicity
claims because “entertainment that is merely a copy or
imitation, even if skillfully and accurately carried out,
does not really have its own creative component and
does not have a significant value as pure
entertainment.” Id. at 1359 (emphasis added). Seen
through the lens of the Transformative Use Test, the
Russen decision demonstrates that where no additional
transformative elements are present—i.e., the work
contains “merely a copy or imitation” of the celebrity’s
identity—then there can be no First Amendment
33
impediment to a right of publicity claim. Additionally,
in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996), which focused on
the use of baseball players’ identities for parody
trading cards, the transformative nature of the
caricatures on the cards (and the parodic text about the
players’ “statistics”) was sufficient to quash any right
of publicity claim. Id. at 972–73 (“Because celebrities
are an important part of our public vocabulary, a
parody of a celebrity does not merely lampoon the

33

The court’s “recognition that defendant’s production has some
[First Amendment] value,” did not diminish its conclusion that
“the primary purpose of defendant’s activity [was] to appropriate
the commercial value of the likeness of Elvis Presley.” Russen, 513
F. Supp. at 1360. In this regard the court analogized the case to
Zacchini, holding that the Elvis impersonator had “appropriated
the ‘very activity [live stage show] by which [Presley initially]
acquired his reputation.” Id. at 1361 (alteration in original).
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celebrity, but exposes the weakness of the idea or value
34
that the celebrity symbolizes in society.”).
It is little wonder, then, that the Comedy III
decision looked to all three of these cases for guidance
in defining the Transformative Use Test. See Comedy
35
III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 806–09. The fact
that such prior holdings can be reconciled with the Test
not only bolsters our views as to its propriety, but also
ensures that adopting the Transformative Use Test
does not result in the sort of backward-looking
jurisprudential revision that might disturb prior
36
protections for expressive speech Quite to the
34

The Tenth Circuit also considered the economic incentives
underlying the right of publicity. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973–74.
After a close examination, the court recognized only one principal
benefit for celebrities from having control over works of parody:
“control over the potential effect the parody would have on the
market for nonparodic use of one’s identity.” Id. at 974. However,
the court quickly added that parody “rarely acts as a market
substitute for the original.” Id. As a consequence, the court ruled
in favor of the card manufacturer.

35

We note here that, by our reading, the Transformative Use Test
best comports with the language in RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c. While we acknowledge
that other courts have read the Restatement as adopting the
Rogers Test, we believe that the various examples listed in
Comment C all exemplify the sort of transformative uses that
would generally pass the analysis set forth in Comedy III.

36

Indeed, in compiling its non-exhaustive list of “transformative
elements or creative components,” the Comedy III court looked
for examples from previous decisions—including Guglielmi,
Cardtoons, and even Parks. See Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126,
21 P.3d at 809–10.
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contrary,
adopting
the
Test
ensures
that
already-existing First Amendment protections in right
of publicity cases apply to video games with the same
force as to “biographies, documentaries, docudramas,
and other expressive works depicting real-life figures.”
(Dissent Op. at 173.)
In light of the above discussion, we find that the
Transformative Use Test is the proper analytical
framework to apply to cases such as the one at bar.
Consequently, we now apply the test to the facts of the
instance case.
C.

Application

In applying the Transformative Use Test to the
instant case, we must determine whether Appellant’s
identity is sufficiently transformed in NCAA Football.
As we mentioned earlier, we use the term “identity” to
encompass not only Appellant’s likeness, but also his
biographical information. It is the combination of these
two parts—which, when combined, identify the digital
avatar as an in-game recreation of Appellant—that
37
must be sufficiently transformed.

37

This joint focus on both likeness and identifying information
avoids a conflict with C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major
League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir.
2007), which held that use of major league baseball players’
records in a fantasy baseball game was protected by the First
Amendment even against right of publicity claims because such
information was publicly available. Id. at 823–24. The presence of a
digital avatar that recreates Appellant in a digital medium
differentiates this matter from C.B.C.
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Having thus cabined our inquiry to the appropriate
form of Appellant’s identity, we note that—based on
the combination of both the digital avatar’s appearance
and the biographical and identifying information—the
digital avatar does closely resemble the genuine article.
Not only does the digital avatar match Appellant in
terms of hair color, hair style and skin tone, but the
avatar’s accessories mimic those worn by Appellant
during his time as a Rutgers player. The information,
as has already been noted, also accurately tracks
Appellant’s vital and biographical details. And while
the inexorable march of technological progress may
make some of the graphics in earlier editions of NCAA
Football look dated or overly-computerized, we do not
believe that video game graphics must reach (let alone
cross) the uncanny valley to support a right of publicity
38
claim. If we are to find some transformative element,
we must look somewhere other than just the in-game
39
digital recreation of Appellant. Cases such as ETW

38

It remains an open question, however, whether right of publicity
claims can extend into the bygone days of 8–bit graphics and
pixilated representations.

39

It is no answer to say that digitizing Appellant’s appearance in
and of itself works a transformative use. Recreating a celebrity’s
likeness or identity in some medium other than photographs or
video cannot, without more, satisfy the test; this would turn the
inquiry on its head—and would contradict the very basis for the
Transformative Use Test. See, e.g., Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d
126, 21 P.3d at 809 (applying the Transformative Use Test to
charcoal drawings of the Three Stooges); see also Estate of Presley
v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1359 (D.N.J. 1981) (“[E]ntertainment
that is merely a copy or imitation, even if skillfully and accurately
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and No Doubt, both of which address realistic digital
depictions of celebrities, point to the next step in our
analysis: context.
Considering the context within which the digital
avatar exists—effectively, looking at how Appellant’s
identity is “incorporated into and transformed by”
NCAA Football, (Dissent Op. at 173)—provides little
support for Appellee’s arguments. The digital Ryan
Hart does what the actual Ryan Hart did while at
Rutgers: he plays college football, in digital recreations
of college football stadiums, filled with all the trappings
of a college football game. This is not transformative;
the various digitized sights and sounds in the video
game do not alter or transform the Appellant’s identity
in a significant way. See No Doubt, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d at
410–11 (“[N]o matter what else occurs in the game
during the depiction of the No Doubt avatars, the
avatars perform rock songs, the same activity by which
the band achieved and maintains its fame.”). Indeed,
the lack of transformative context is even more
pronounced here than in No Doubt, where members of
the band could perform and sing in outer space.
Even here, however, our inquiry is not at an end.
For as much as the digital representation and context
evince no meaningful transformative element in NCAA
Football, a third avatar-specific element is also present:
the users’ ability to alter the avatar’s appearance. This
distinguishing factor ensures that we cannot dispose of
this case as simply as the court in No Doubt. See No
carried out, does not really have its own creative component and
does not have a significant value as pure entertainment.”).
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Doubt, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d at 410 (noting that the digital
avatars representing No Doubt were “at all times
immutable images of the real celebrity musicians”).
Indeed, the ability for users to change the avatar
accounted, in large part, for the District Court’s
deciding that NCAA Football satisfied the
Transformative Use Test. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at
40
785. We must therefore consider to what extent the
ability to alter a digital avatar represents a
transformative use of Appellant’s identity.
At the outset, we note that the mere presence of
this feature, without more, cannot satisfy the
Transformative Use Test. True, interactivity is the
basis upon which First Amendment protection is
41
granted to video games in the first instance. See
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733. However, the balancing test
in right of publicity cases does not look to whether a
40

To be clear, the District Court focused specifically on the ability
to alter the digital avatars, not on the alterations themselves:
[I]t is not the user’s alteration of Hart’s image that is
critical. What matters for my analysis of EA’s First
Amendment right is that EA created the mechanism by
which the virtual player may be altered, as well as the
multiple permutations available for each virtual player
image.
Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 785. That is, the court below did not look
to the users’ creations as proxies for Appellee’s expression. While
we disagree with its final decision, we agree with the District
Court’s careful navigation of this point.
41

We note, too, that all games are interactive—that is a product of
the medium. Identifying an interactive feature that acts upon the
celebrity’s likeness, therefore, is only the first step in the analysis.
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particular work loses First Amendment protection.
Rather, the balancing inquiry looks to see whether the
interests protected by the right of publicity are
sufficient to surmount the already-existing First
Amendment protections. See, e.g., Guglielmi, 160
Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 458 (considering whether
right of publicity protections “outweigh [ ] any
protection [the] expression would otherwise enjoy
under the [First Amendment]”). As Zacchini
demonstrated, the right of publicity can triumph even
when an essential element for First Amendment
protection is present. In that case, the human
cannonball act was broadcast as part of the newscast.
See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563, 97 S. Ct. 2849. To hold,
therefore, that a video game should satisfy the
Transformative Use Test simply because it includes a
particular interactive feature would lead to improper
42
results. Interactivity cannot be an end onto itself.
Moreover, we are wary of converting the ability to
alter a digital avatar from mere feature to talisman,
thereby opening the door to cynical abuse. If the mere
presence of the feature were enough, video game
companies could commit the most blatant acts of
misappropriation only to absolve themselves by
including a feature that allows users to modify the
digital likenesses. We cannot accept that such an

42

The other side of this coin is equally true: interactivity is not the
sine qua non of transformative use. Works involving video games
may still be transformative even where no specific interactive
features affect the celebrity likeness. See, e.g., Kirby v. Sega of
Am., Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 47, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 (2006).
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outcome would adequately balance the interests in
right of publicity cases. As one amicus brief noted:
[U]nder [Appellee’s] application of the
transformative test [sic], presumably no
infringement would be found if individuals such
as the Dalai Lama and the Pope were placed
within a violent “shoot-em-up” game, so long as
the game include[d] a “mechanism” by which the
user could manipulate their characteristics.
43

(Screen Actors Guild, Inc. et al., Amicus Br. at 21. )
With this concern in mind, therefore, we consider
whether the type and extent of interactivity permitted
is sufficient to transform the Appellant’s likeness into
the Appellee’s own expression. We hold that it does
not.
In NCAA Football, Appellee seeks to create a
realistic depiction of college football for the users. Part
of this realism involves generating realistic
representations of the various college teams—which
includes the realistic representations of the players.
Like Activision in No Doubt, therefore, Appellee seeks
to capitalize on the respective fan bases for the various
teams and players. Indeed, as the District Court
recognized, “it seems ludicrous to question whether
video game consumers enjoy and, as a result, purchase
more EA-produced video games as a result of the
heightened realism associated with actual players.”
43

We do not discount the possibility that such a game—given the
juxtaposition of spiritual leaders and the hyper violence of certain
modern video games—could still pass the Transformative Use
Test on other grounds.
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Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 783 (quoting James J.S.
Holmes & Kanika D. Corley, Defining Liability for
Likeness of Athlete Avatars in Video Games, L.A.
Law., May 2011, at 17, 20). Moreover, the realism of the
games—including the depictions and recreations of the
players—appeals not just to home-team fans, but to
bitter rivals as well. Games such as NCAA Football
permit users to recreate the setting of a bitter defeat
and, in effect, achieve some cathartic readjustment of
history; realistic depictions of the players are a
44
necessary element to this. That Appellant’s likeness is
the default position only serves to support our
conclusion that realistic depictions of the players are
45
the “sum and substance” of these digital facsimiles.
See Kirby, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d at 617–18. Given that
Appellant’s unaltered likeness is central to the core of
the game experience, we are disinclined to credit users’
ability to alter the digital avatars in our application of
the Transformative Use Test to this case.
We are likewise unconvinced that NCAA Football
satisfies the Transformative Use Test because
44

We set aside the “Dynasty” and “Campus Legends” game modes
in this inquiry. We see no legally significant difference between
these modes and the ability in Band Hero to select alternative
avatars to represent the players or to allow members of No Doubt
to play with other bands or sing other musicians’ songs. See No
Doubt, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d at 401.

45

Admittedly, just as the presence of a photorealistic depiction of a
celebrity cannot be the end of the inquiry, the mere fact that
Appellant’s likeness is the default appearance of the avatar cannot,
without more, end our analysis. It is merely another factor to
consider in the balancing exercise.
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Appellee created various in-game assets to support the
altered avatars (e.g., additional hair styles, faces,
accessories, et al.). In the first instance, the relationship
between these assets and the digital avatar is
predicated on the users’ desire to alter the avatar’s
appearance, which, as we have already noted, is
insufficient to satisfy the Test. The ability to make
minor alterations—which substantially maintain the
avatar’s resemblance to Appellant (e.g., modifying only
the basic biographical information, playing statistics, or
uniform accessories)—is likewise insufficient, for “[a]n
artist depicting a celebrity must contribute something
more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation.” Winter, 134
Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d at 478–79. Indeed, the ability
to modify the avatar counts for little where the appeal
of the game lies in users’ ability to play “as, or
alongside” their preferred players or team. See No
Doubt, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d at 411. Thus, even avatars with
superficial modifications to their appearance can count
as a suitable proxy or market “substitute” for the
original. See Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d
at 808; Winter, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d at 479;
Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 974. For larger potential
changes, such as a different body type, skin tone, or
face, Appellant’s likeness is not transformed; it simply
ceases to be. Therefore, once a user has made major
changes to the avatar, it no longer represents
Appellant, and thus it no longer qualifies as a “use” of
the Appellant’s identity for purposes of our inquiry.
Such possibilities therefore fall beyond our inquiry into
how Appellant’s likeness is used in NCAA Football.
That the game may lend itself to uses wholly divorced
from the appropriation of Appellant’s identity is
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insufficient to satisfy the Transformative Use Test. See
No Doubt, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 (focusing on the use of
the No Doubt avatars, not alternative avatars or
custom-made characters).
In an attempt to salvage its argument, Appellee
suggests that other creative elements of NCAA
Football, which do not affect Appellant’s digital avatar,
are so numerous that the videogames should be
considered transformative. We believe this to be an
improper
inquiry.
Decisions
applying
the
Transformative Use Test invariably look to how the
celebrity’s identity is used in or is altered by other
aspects of a work. Wholly unrelated elements do not
bear on this inquiry. Even Comedy III, in listing
potentially “transformative or creative contributions”
focused on elements or techniques that affect the
celebrity identity. See Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126,
21 P.3d at 809 (discussing factual reporting,
fictionalized portrayal, heavy-handed lampooning, and
subtle social criticism); see also Winter, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d
634, 69 P.3d at 478–79 (noting that “[a]n artist depicting
a celebrity must contribute something more than a
‘merely trivial’ variation” before proceeding to discuss
how the Winter brothers’ likenesses were altered
directly and through context); Kirby, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d at
616–18. To the extent that any of these cases
considered the broader context of the work (e.g.,
whether events took place in a “fanciful setting”), this
inquiry was aimed at determining whether this context
acted upon the celebrity identity in a way that
transformed it or imbued it with some added creativity
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beyond providing a “merely trivial variation.” Thus,
while we recognize the creative energies necessary for
crafting the various elements of NCAA Football that
are not tied directly to reality, we hold that they have
no legal significance in our instant decision.
To hold otherwise could have deleterious
consequences for the state of the law. Acts of blatant
misappropriation would count for nothing so long as the
larger work, on balance, contained highly creative
elements in great abundance. This concern is
particularly acute in the case of media that lend
themselves to easy partition such as video games. It
cannot be that content creators escape liability for a
work that uses a celebrity’s unaltered identity in one
section but that contains a wholly fanciful creation in
the other, larger section.
For these reasons, we hold that the broad
application of the Transformative Use Test represents
an inappropriate application of the standard.
Consequently, we shall not credit elements of NCAA
Football that do not, in some way, affect the use or
meaning of Appellant’s identity.
As a final point, we note that the photograph of
Appellant that appears in NCAA Football 2009 does
not bear on our analysis above. On that subject, we
agree with the District Court that the photograph is
46

As we have already discussed, the broader context of NCAA
Football does not transform Appellant’s likeness into anything
other than a digital representation of Appellant playing the sport
for which he is known, while surrounded by the trappings of
real-world competition.
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“but a fleeting component part of the montage” and
therefore does not render the entire work
nontransformative. Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 786. The
reasoning from ETW is sufficiently applicable: the
context
of
Appellant’s
photograph—the
montage—imbues the image with additional meaning
beyond simply being a representation of the player. See
ETW, 332 F.3d at 938 (holding that the photographs in
a collage were “combined to describe, in artistic form, a
historic event in sports history and to convey a
message about the significance of [Tiger] Woods’s
achievement in that event”). Consequently, this
particular use of Appellant’s likeness is shielded by the
First Amendment and therefore can contribute nothing
to Appellant’s claim for violation of his right of
publicity.
IV.

CONCLUSION

We therefore hold that the NCAA Football 2004,
2005 and 2006 games at issue in this case do not
sufficiently transform Appellant’s identity to escape
the right of publicity claim and hold that the District
Court erred in granted summary judgment in favor of
47
Appellee. While we do hold that the only apparent use
47

There can be no doubt that video games such as NCAA Football
are the product of great effort, skill, and creative and technical
prowess. As the Supreme Court noted in Brown, video games
convey messages and expressive content in a way that is similar to
prior media for expression. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, –––
U.S. ––––, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011). At the
same time, games open new avenues through which artists and
speakers can express their opinions and observations—by playing
the game, a user is integrated into the expressive work in a way
that has never before been achieved. Surely, then, the First
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of Appellant’s likeness in NCAA Football 2009 (the
photograph) is protected by the First Amendment,
Appellant’s overall claim for violation of his right of
publicity should have survived Appellee’s motion for
summary judgment. Consequently, we need not
address Appellant’s desire for additional discovery. We
shall reverse the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment and remand this case back to the court below
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Amendment protects video games in the first instance, and
nothing in our decision today should be read to diminish this fact.
Rather, our inquiry looked to whether other interests may
surmount the First Amendment protection—as they can surmount
protections for other modes of expression. In finding that NCAA
Football failed to satisfy the Transformative Use Test, we do not
hold that the game loses First Amendment protection. We merely
hold that the interest protected by the right of publicity in this
case outweighs the Constitutional shield.
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
My colleagues and I take the same road but read the
signs differently. Hence we stop at different places. I
wish I was with them; I am not. I recognize that
Electronic Arts, Inc. (“EA”) has taken for the 2005
version of NCAA Football what most good Rutgers
fans during Ryan Hart’s playing days know—the
Rutgers quarterback is Hart—and parlayed that
1
recognition into commercial success A key to the
profitability of NCAA Football is consumers’ desire to
experience a realistic football playing experience with
their favorite teams. EA’s use of actual college athletes’
likenesses motivates buyers to purchase a new edition
each year to keep up with their teams’ changing
rosters. The burn to Hart and other amateur athletes is
that, unlike their active professional counterparts, they
are not compensated for EA’s use of their likenesses in
its video games. Were this case viewed strictly on the
public’s perception of fairness, I have no doubt Hart’s
2
position would prevail.

1

That said, most outside Rutgers do not know that quarterback #
13 is Ryan Hart. They did not know that in 2005, and even today
many, if not most, Rutgers fans no longer connect # 13 with Hart.
Fame fades so quickly we call it fleeting. Even nostalgic memories
nod off. For example, name the BYU quarterback when it was
college football’s national champion in 1984. (Hint: it wasn’t Ty
Detmer.).

2

See generally Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, The
Atlantic, Oct. 2011, at 80–110 (lambasting NCAA “amateurism”
and “student-athlete” policies as “legalistic confections propagated
by the universities so they can exploit the skills and fame of young
athletes,” and discussing lawsuits challenging these policies); see
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Hart claims that he has under New Jersey law a
right of publicity to prevent others from unfairly
appropriating the value of his likeness for their
commercial benefit, and that the First Amendment
does not shield EA’s infringement of this right. This
claim requires us to balance the competing interests
implicated by the right of publicity and the First
Amendment. I agree with my colleagues that the
Transformative Use Test is the preferred approach for
balancing these interests, but we part ways on its
interpretation and application. The result is that they
side with Hart, and I with EA.
The Transformative Use Test gives First
Amendment immunity where, in an expressive work,
an individual’s likeness has been creatively adapted in
some way. Correctly applied, this test strikes an
appropriate
balance
between
countervailing
rights—the publicity interest in protecting an
individual’s right to benefit financially when others use
his identifiable persona for their own commercial
benefit versus the First Amendment interest in
insulating from liability a creator’s decision to
interweave real-life figures into its expressive work.
My colleagues limit effectively their transformative
inquiry to Hart’s identity alone, disregarding other
features of the work. This approach, I believe, does not
find support in the cases on which they rely. Further,
also Alexander Wolff, When Worlds Collide, Sports Illustrated,
Feb. 11, 2013, at 18; Joe Nocera, Pay Up Now, N.Y. Times Mag.,
Jan. 1, 2012, at 30–35 (advocating payment of college athletes to
alleviate “[t]he hypocrisy that permeates big-money college
sports” arising from amateurism rules).
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my colleagues penalize EA for the realism and financial
success of NCAA Football, a position I find difficult to
reconcile with First Amendment protections
traditionally afforded to true-to-life depictions of real
figures and works produced for profit. Because I
conclude that the Transformative Use Test protects
EA’s use of Hart’s likeness in NCAA Football, I
respectfully dissent.
I.

FORMULATION OF THE TRANSFORMATIVE INQUIRY

To determine whether an individual’s identity has
been “transformed” for purposes of the Transformative
Use Test, I believe it is necessary to review the
likeness in the context of the work in its entirety,
rather than focusing only on the individual’s likeness.
This interpretation is in line with the approach taken in
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25
Cal.4th 387, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797 (2001), in
which the Supreme Court of California first put in play
the Transformative Use Test. Per Comedy III, the
right of publicity prevails over competing First
Amendment interests “[w]hen artistic expression takes
the form of a literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity
for commercial gain.” Id., 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d
at 808 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broad. Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 575–76, 97 S. Ct. 2849, 53 L. Ed. 2d 965
(1977)). To determine whether a work qualifies as
“transformative” and not simply “literal,” the Comedy
III Court explained that “the inquiry is whether the
celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from
which an original work is synthesized, or whether the
depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum
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and substance of the work in question.” Id., 106
Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 809 (emphases added).
Likewise, when applying the Transformative Use
Test two years later in Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal.4th
881, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473 (2003), the
California Supreme Court explained that the
defendant’s use was transformative because it could
“readily ascertain that [the portrayals] are not just
conventional depictions of plaintiffs but contain
significant expressive content other than plaintiffs’
mere likenesses.” Id., 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d at
479 (emphasis added). The Court also observed that the
characters were placed in a “larger story, which is itself
3
quite expressive.” Id. The repeated focus on the use of
an individual’s likeness in the context of the work as a
whole leaves me little doubt that we must examine the
creative work in the aggregate to determine whether it
satisfies the Transformative Use Test and merits First
Amendment protection.
My colleagues correctly recite the Transformative
Use Test set out in Comedy III and Winter [Majority
Op. at 158–61], but later disregard that recitation.
3

While the Winter decision makes several references to the
physical differences between the plaintiffs and their likenesses,
these statements were made with respect to the Court’s conclusion
that “the portrayals do not greatly threaten plaintiffs’ right of
publicity” insofar as they were unlikely to decrease their
commercial value. 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d at 479. Similarly,
there is no real contention that NCAA Football is harming ticket
sales of college football games or decreasing Hart’s commercial
value; if anything, it seems more likely that both have been
augmented by the popularity of EA’s video games.
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When addressing Hart’s claim, their analysis proceeds
by analyzing, on a step-by-step basis, the digital avatar
based on Hart, the context in which that avatar is set in
NCAA Football, and the users’ ability to alter the
avatar’s appearance, concluding at each step that
Hart’s likeness is not sufficiently changed to qualify as
“transformative.” In the last instance, my colleagues
reject as immaterial the myriad other creative
elements of the video game on the ground that
“[d]ecisions applying the Transformative Use Test
invariably look to how the celebrity’s identity is used,”
and that “[w]holly unrelated elements do not bear on
this inquiry.” [Majority Op. at 169 (emphasis in
original).] But by cabining their inquest to Hart’s
likeness alone, their approach is at odds with California
Supreme Court decisions on the Transformative Use
4
Test.
The infirmity of this approach is highlighted by
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th
Cir. 2003), in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that an artist’s use of several photographs of
4

The majority opinion relies heavily on two lower court decisions
in California considering the right of publicity in the video game
context, No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 192 Cal.App.4th
1018, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 (2011), and Kirby v. Sega of America,
Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 47, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 (2006). I do not
consider these cases particularly instructive, as they were not
decided by the architect of the Transformative Use Test, the
Supreme Court of California. Thus, I do not attempt to explain or
distinguish their holdings except to note that I believe No Doubt,
which focused on individual depictions rather than the work in its
entirety, was wrongly decided in light of the prior precedent in
Comedy III and Winter.
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Tiger Woods in a commemorative collage was
“transformative,” and thus shielded from Woods’
right-of-publicity suit. My colleagues do not—and, in
my view, cannot—explain how the photographic images
of Woods were transformed if they limit their analysis
to “how the celebrity’s identity is used.” [Majority Op.
at 169 (emphasis in original).] Instead, their discussion
of ETW recognizes that the Sixth Circuit held that the
artist’s use qualified for First Amendment protection
under the Transformative Use Test because “the
collage
‘contain[ed]
significant
transformative
elements,’” and the combination of images
“‘describe[d], in artistic form, a historic event in sports
history[—the 1997 Masters golf tournament—]and ...
convey[ed] a message about the significance of Woods’
achievement in that event.’” [Majority Op. at 161 (first
alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting ETW,
332 F.3d at 938; citing Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126,
21 P.3d at 809).] No doubt the use at issue
here—creating digital avatars of football teams and
placing them in an interactive medium designed for
user interaction and manipulation—is significantly
more “transformative” than the use in ETW, which
simply combined several photographs into a
photomontage.
To me, a narrow focus on an individual’s likeness,
rather than how that likeness is incorporated into and
transformed by the work as a whole, is a flawed
formulation of the transformative inquiry. The
whole—the aggregate of many parts (including, here,
many individuals)—is the better baseline for that
inquiry.
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II.

HARMONIZATION OF THE TRANSFORMATIVE USE TEST WITH FIRST
AMENDMENT PRECEDENT

Transformative use must mesh with existing
constitutional protections for works of expression. The
First Amendment extends protection to biographies,
documentaries, docudramas, and other expressive
works depicting real-life figures, whether the accounts
are factual or fictional. See, e.g., Matthews v.
Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 439–40 (5th Cir. 1994)
(biographical novel); Ruffin–Steinback v. dePasse, 82
F. Supp. 2d 723, 730–31 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (television
miniseries), aff’d, 267 F.3d 457, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2001);
Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 337 (E.D.
Pa. 1996); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp.
426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (docudrama and novel);
Guglielmi v. Spelling–Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860,
160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d 454, 458–59 (1979)
5
(docudrama). “That books, newspapers, and magazines
are published and sold for profit does not prevent them
from being a form of expression whose liberty is
safeguarded by the First Amendment.” Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501, 72 S. Ct. 777,
96 L. Ed. 1098 (1952). Accordingly, courts have rejected
as counter to free expression the claim that
constitutional protection is diminished because a
celebrity’s name or likeness was used to increase a
5

While my colleagues acknowledge the need for uniform First
Amendment treatment of different mediums in the abstract
[Majority Op. at 165], it is difficult to reconcile their actual
application of the Transformative Use Test to the video game here
with the above-cited cases.
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product’s value and marketability. See Guglielmi, 160
Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 460–62 (Bird, C.J.,
6
concurring).
The protection afforded by the First Amendment to
those who weave celebrities into their creative works
and sell those works for profit applies equally to video
games. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, ––– U.S.
––––, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011).
Thus EA’s use of real-life likenesses as “characters” in
its NCAA Football video game should be as protected
as portrayals (fictional or nonfictional) of individuals in
movies and books. I do not suggest that all digital
portrayals of an individual are entitled to First
Amendment protection. Rather, the work should be
protected if that likeness, as included in the creative
composition, has been transformed into something
more or different than what it was before. And in any
event the profit that flows from EA’s realistic depiction
of Hart (and the myriad other college football players
portrayed in NCAA Football ) is not constitutionally
significant, nor even an appropriate consideration,
7
when applying the Transformative Use Test.
6

As recognized by my colleagues, then-Chief Justice Bird’s views
in Guglielmi commanded the support of the majority of the
California Supreme Court, and were relied on by the Comedy III
Court to guide its definition of the Transformative Use Test.
[Majority Op. at 164 n.31.].

7

In devising the Transformative Use Test, the California Supreme
Court borrowed from “the purpose and character of the use” factor
relevant to a copyright fair use defense, see 17 U.S.C. § 107(1), yet
it rejected “a wholesale importation of the fair use doctrine into
right of publicity law,” Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at
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My colleagues’ understanding of the Transformative
Use Test underplays the creative elements of NCAA
Football by equating its inclusion of realistic player
likenesses to increase profits with the wrongful
appropriation of Hart’s commercial value. This
approach is at odds with the First Amendment
protection afforded to expressive works incorporating
real-life figures. That protection does not depend on
whether the characters are depicted realistically or
whether their inclusion increases profits. See
Guglielmi, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 460–62 (Bird,
C.J., concurring) (concluding that acceptance of this
argument would chill free expression and mean “the
creation of historical novels and other works inspired
by actual events and people would be off limits to the
fictional author”).
In sum, applying the Transformative Use Test in
the manner done by my colleagues creates a
medium-specific metric that provides less protection to

807. Nonetheless, it appears my colleagues permit another fair use
factor to creep into their transformative analysis. Namely, their
focus on the marketability of NCAA Football seems colored by the
factor considering “the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work,” see 17 U.S.C. § 107(4),
notwithstanding that this element was expressly excluded from
Comedy III ‘s articulation of the Transformative Use Test, see 106
Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 808 n.10. Further, even if consideration
of “market effect” were appropriate in a transformative analysis, I
do not believe this factor would weigh in favor of finding an
infringing use here because, as pointed out supra note 3, there is
no contention that EA’s inclusion of Hart’s likeness in NCAA
Football has caused a decline in the commercial value of his
identity or persona.
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video games than other expressive works. Because the
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown forecloses just such
a distinction, see 131 S. Ct. at 2740, my colleagues’
treatment of realism and profitability in their
transformative use analysis puts us on a different
course.
III.

APPLICATION TO HART’S CLAIM

With this understanding of the Transformative Use
Test, I conclude EA’s use of avatars resembling actual
players is entitled to First Amendment protection.
NCAA Football transforms Hart’s mere likeness into
an avatar that, along with the rest of a digitally created
college football team, users can direct and manipulate
in fictional football games. With the many other
creative features incorporated throughout the games,
sufficient expressive transformation takes place to
merit First Amendment protection.
NCAA Football involves myriad original graphics,
videos, sound effects, and game scenarios. These
artistic aspects permit a user to direct the play of a
college football team whose players may be based on a
current roster, a past roster, or an entirely imaginary
roster comprised of made-up players. Users are not
reenacting real games, but rather are directing the
avatars in invented games and seasons. Further, the
“Campus Legend” and “Dynasty Mode” features
permit users to control virtual players and teams for
multiple seasons, creating the means by which they can
generate their own narratives. Such modes of
interactive play are, I submit, imaginative
transformations of the games played by real players.
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As noted by the District Court, it is not only the
user that contributes to the interactivity; EA has
created “multiple permutations available for each
virtual player image.” Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F.
Supp. 2d 757, 785 (D.N.J. 2011). This furthers the
game’s transformative interactivity. In fact, the
majority opinion expressly approves the District
Court’s analysis on this point. [Majority Op. at 167
n.40.].
By limiting their inquiry to the realistic rendering
of Hart’s individual image, my colleagues misapply the
Transformative Use Test. Contrary to their assertion
that the other creative elements of NCAA Football are
“[w]holly unrelated” [Majority Op. at 169], those
elements are, in fact, related to EA’s use of Hart’s
likeness. If and when a user decides to select the virtual
2005 Rutgers’ football team as a competitor in a game,
and to the extent that user does not alter the
characteristics of the avatar based on Hart’s likeness,
the numerous creative elements of the video games
discussed above are part of every fictional play a user
calls. Any attempt to separate these elements from the
use of Hart’s likeness disregards NCAA Football ‘s
many expressive features beyond an avatar having
characteristics similar to Hart. His likeness is
transformed by the artistry necessary to create a
digitally rendered avatar within the imaginative and
interactive world EA has placed that avatar.
I am thus convinced that, as used in NCAA
Football, Hart’s “likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’
from which [the] original work is synthesized . . .
[rather than] the very sum and substance of the work
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in question.” Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d
at 809. EA bases its NCAA Football characters on
countless real-life college football players, and it
certainly seeks to depict their physical and biographical
characteristics realistically. Yet these “are not just
conventional depictions of [Hart] but contain significant
expressive content other than [his] mere likeness[].”
Winter, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d at 479. NCAA
Football uses creative means to achieve its overall goal
of realistically replicating a college football experience
in which users may interact, direct, and control the
players’ avatars, including the one based on Hart’s
likeness. I find this use transformative.
******
The Transformative Use Test I support would
prevent commercial exploitation of an individual’s
likeness where the work at issue lacks creative
contribution that transforms that likeness in a
meaningful way. I sympathize with the position of Hart
and other similarly situated college football players,
and understand why they feel it is fair to share in the
significant profits produced by including their avatar
likenesses into EA’s commercially successful video
game franchise. I nonetheless remain convinced that
the creative components of NCAA Football contain
sufficient expressive transformation to merit First
Amendment protection. Thus I respectfully dissent,
and would affirm the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of EA.
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Appendix B
United States District Court
D. New Jersey
Ryan HART, individually and on: behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v.
ELECTRONIC ARTS, INC., a Delaware Corporation;
and Does 1–50, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 09–cv–5990 (FLW).
Sept. 9, 2011.
OPINION
WOLFSON, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on a motion by
Defendant Electronic Arts, Inc. (“Defendant” or “EA”)
to dismiss Plaintiff Ryan Hart’s Second Amended
Complaint (“Plaintiff” or “Hart”) pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative,
for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(c). The allegations giving rise to
Plaintiff’s putative class action lawsuit stem from
Defendant’s purported misappropriation of the likeness
and identity of Plaintiff, a former college football
athlete, as well as those similarly situated, for a
commercial purpose in connection with four of
Defendant’s NCAA Football video games. Defendant
contends that Plaintiff’s claims under New Jersey law
for misappropriation of his likeness, which claims the
Court treats as a single right of publicity claim, are
barred by the First Amendment. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court treats Plaintiff’s motion as one
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for summary judgment. The Court, further agrees that,
on balance, on the facts of this case, Defendant’s First
Amendment right to free expression outweighs
Plaintiff’s right of publicity. Accordingly, the Court
grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

NCAA Football Games

EA produces a video game series annually called
NCAA Football. NCAA Football video games permit
users to manipulate the actions of over 100 college
football teams and thousands of virtual players in a
virtual world with simulated games that “allows users
to experience the excitement and challenge of college
1
football.” Def.’s R. 56.1 Stat. at 1. The college football
teams represented in the game are identifiable by
name, as well as through the use of trademarks such as
2
uniform designs and logos. Id. at 21. The virtual
players are identified by jersey number and position,
1

Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 56. 1, which requires a
response to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute to be filed. Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(a). Plaintiff included a list of
“Material Facts” in his brief in opposition, Opp. at 3–7, but wholly
failed to respond to Defendant’s purported facts, which is required
by Local Rule 56.1. Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(a). As a result, for the purpose of this summary judgment motion, the facts submitted by
Defendant are admitted and deemed undisputed. Malik v. Hannah, 799 F. Supp. 2d 355, 356, 2011 WL 2580454, *1 (D.N.J. 2011)
(citing Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(a)).

2

Trademarks such as school names, team names, uniforms, logos,
and stadium fight songs appear in the game through licensing
agreements between EA and the NCAA’s licensing agent, the
Collegiate Licensing Company. Def.’s R. 56.1 Statement at 21.
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although a user can edit game data to give the player a
surname, which then appears on the player’s jersey.
See Supp. Decl. of Strauser, Ex. E; Second Am. Compl.
at 59. Each virtual player’s unique attributes, including
personal characteristics (height, weight, athletic
ability), accessories (helmet visor, wristband), physical
abilities (speed and agility, throwing arm, passing
accuracy), and biographical details (place of origin) can
3
also be edited by the user. Def.’s R. 56.1 Statement at
14–15. Additionally, users with an Internet connection
can modify entire teams by downloading custom rosters
that have been created and uploaded by video game
consumers, including a section of EA’s website called
Teambuilder. Second Am. Compl. at 59. Some rosters
available on these websites seek to replicate actual
current and former football team rosters. See id. at
59–61.
These video games are interactive, and users “most
directly influence the games’ outcome through their
own play-calling and their ability to use their hand-held
controllers to manipulate the actions of the virtual
players.” Id. at 11. For example, each time during
gameplay that a user has the option of throwing a
football, the user can control the virtual player’s throw
distance and accuracy. Id. at 12. Users can choose to
play a single game against a game-controlled opponent,
a second player connected to the same system, or
another person connected to the Internet. Id. at 5.
3

Certain biographical data may be altered, i.e., the virtual player’s
First Name, Last Name, Position, Number, and Hand (right or
left-handed). The virtual player’s Home State, Hometown, Team,
and Year (freshman, senior, etc.) may not be altered.
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Multi-game options are also available for users. Id. at
18. One of these options is “Dynasty” mode, in which
the “user controls a college program for up to thirty
seasons, creating his own story of the program’s
development.” Id. at 19. Users in “Dynasty” mode are
tasked with the “year-round responsibilities of a college
coach, such as recruiting virtual high school players out
of a random-generated pool of athletes.” Id.
B.

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint in the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset
County, on October 27, 2009. In that complaint, on
behalf of himself and similarly situated athletes,
Plaintiff asserted, among other claims, that Defendant
had violated his right of publicity based on its use of
Plaintiff’s likeness as a virtual player on the Rutgers
University football team in EA’s 2004, 2005, 2006, and
4
2009 editions of NCAA Football. First Am. Compl. at
22.
On November 24, 2009, EA removed Plaintiff’s
action to this Court, and then moved to dismiss all
counts of the First Amended Complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In connection
with its motion to dismiss, EA attached copies of the
video games for the Court’s review since the games
were referenced in Hart’s initial complaint. In arguing
for dismissal of the right of publicity claim, EA
4

As New Jersey and federal courts applying New Jersey law interchangeably refer to these claims as appropriation or misappropriation of commercial likeness, and “right of publicity,” this Court
will do the same.
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contended that Plaintiff’s claim failed as a matter of law
under both New Jersey state law and the First
Amendment. See Docket. No. 8 at 10–23. Moreover, EA
argued that Plaintiff had not stated a claim for right of
publicity because the First Amended Complaint did not
identify the attributes of Plaintiff that had been
incorporated into the NCAA Football games. Id. at 11.
Plaintiff submitted a brief in opposition to EA’s
motion to dismiss, as well as a Declaration. Both
submissions averred misappropriation of specific
attributes of Plaintiff into EA’s NCAA Football games.
See Court’s Sept. 22, 2010 Opinion, Docket No. 23
(“Court’s Opinion”), 740 F. Supp. 2d 658 at 660–62
(D.N.J. 2010). In his Declaration, Plaintiff asserted that
the disputed games depicted a “virtual” player that had
been designed to replicate Plaintiff’s physical
attributes, as well as his football skills. Id. at 660–62.
Further, Plaintiff contended that Defendant had used
video footage of him playing in a Rutgers University
Football game “in promotion for . . . EA’s NCAA
game.” Id. at 661. Plaintiff described Defendant’s
games as allowing consumers “to simulate the college
football playing experience by stepping into the shoes
of Rutgers’ QB Ryan Hart, and other college football
players, where fans can mimic Plaintiff’s style and
movements and play against Plaintiff’s actual
opponents.” Id. at 662 (citation omitted).
On September 22, 2010, the Court granted
Defendant’s motion to dismiss the First Amended
Complaint with prejudice on all counts with the
exception of Plaintiff’s right of publicity claim, which it
dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 668, 671. The Court

77a
determined that it could not consider allegations
presented by Plaintiff outside of its pleadings on a
motion to dismiss, and subsequently determined that
because the First Amended Complaint did not contain
allegations “as to what aspects of [Plaintiff’s] likeness
[were] appropriated” by EA, the Court was unable to
decide, as a matter of law, whether Plaintiff could state
a right of publicity claim under New Jersey law. Id. at
662–63, 664–65. Nonetheless, the Court did undertake
an analysis of New Jersey right of publicity law as it
related to the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Declaration and
opposition brief, and found that the allegations “appear
to state a right of publicity claim under New Jersey
law.” Id. at 665. Thus, the Court granted Plaintiff’s
request for an opportunity to amend his Complaint for
the second time, and informed EA that the Court would
consider its First Amendment defense if Plaintiff filed a
Second Amended Complaint. Id. at 664–65.
C.

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

On October 12, 2010, Plaintiff filed his Second
Amended Complaint (“Complaint”), in which he alleges
that EA violated his right of publicity under New
Jersey law by misappropriating and incorporating his
identity and likeness for a commercial purpose in
5
connection with EA’s video games. As discussed
5

The two-count Complaint asserts “Invasion of Privacy–Misappropriation of Identities and Likenesses” (Count I) and
“Electronic Arts’ Misappropriation of Plaintiff and Class Members’
Identities and Likenesses is for a Commercial / Trade Purpose-(Infringement).” EA argues, and Plaintiff does not dispute,
that Plaintiff’s second “count” is a legal conclusion, and that both
counts should be treated as a single right of publicity claim because Plaintiff is seeking “redress for an appropriation of the
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herein, Plaintiff incorporated the proposed allegations
that the Court addressed in its September 22, 2010
Opinion. The Complaint states that Hart’s likeness is
found in NCAA Football 2004, NCAA Football 2005,
NCAA Football 2006, and NCAA Football 2009, in
violation of his right of publicity. See Second Am.
Compl. at 32. Thereafter, by way of example of the
alleged misappropriation of Hart’s image, the
Complaint makes specific factual allegations about the
NCAA Football 2006 game.
With respect to the NCAA Football 2006 video
game, the Complaint alleges that “[t]he attributes of
the ‘virtual’ player . . . are Plaintiff Ryan Hart’s
physical attributes as referenced in the Rutgers
University Football Media Guide.” Id. at ¶ 34. In
addition, the Complaint alleges, that “in its NCAA
Football 2006 video game, Defendant lists the . . .
‘virtual’ player quarterback as hailing from Florida . .
.,” id. at ¶ 35, “standing six (6) feet and two (2) inches
tall,” id. at ¶ 36, and “weigh[ing] one hundred
ninety-seven (197) pounds (lbs.) . . .,” id. at ¶ 37. The
Complaint further alleges that the virtual player wears
“Hart’s jersey number . . . thirteen (13),” id. at ¶ 38, a
“left wrist band,” id. at ¶ 39, and “a helmet visor,” id. at
¶ 40. Finally, Hart’s “speed and agility rating . . .
passing accuracy rating [and] arm strength” all reflect
actual footage of Hart during his 2005 college season,
according to the Complaint. Id. at ¶¶ 41–43. Based on
the language of the Complaint, it appears that Hart
commercial value of [his] identity.” Def. Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 16
(quoting J. Thomas McCarthy, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND
PRIVACY § 1:35 (2d ed. 2010)). The Court agrees.

79a
intends for the allegations related to NCAA Football
2006 to be imputed to NCAA Football 2004 and NCAA
Football 2005.
Attached to the Complaint are copies of screenshots
taken from NCAA Football games, and a copy of the
2004 Rutgers University Football Media Guide. See
Second Am. Compl., Exh. A–E. The media guide lists
biographical facts about Hart, such as his hometown
and his physical attributes, such as height and weight.
See id. at Exh. A. It, further, describes his football
statistics, such as his number of attempts, total offense,
and passing yards. Id. The screenshots show images of
the virtual player that have been allegedly modeled
after Hart. However, Plaintiff did not label the
screenshots to link each screenshot to a particular
game.
Plaintiff’s allegation concerning NCAA Football
2009 is similarly unclear on the face of the Complaint.
For one, the Complaint does not allege that the virtual
character that purportedly mimics Plaintiff is featured
in NCAA Football 2009. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that
his “image was used in the promotion for ... EA’s
NCAA Football game wherein [Plaintiff] was throwing
a pass with actual footage from Rutgers University’s
Bowl Game against Arizona State University.” Id. at
45. Plaintiff does not expressly identify the video game
in dispute, nor any details about the promotion, but
based on allegations found in his First Amended
Complaint and Defendant’s responses, this allegation
appears to be referencing NCAA Football 2009. EA
does not dispute that a photo of Plaintiff “throwing a
pass appears in a photo montage inside NCAA Football
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[2009] that can only be seen when a user selects
Rutgers as his or her favorite team,” Supp. Decl. of
Strauser, Ex. E at 16, Ex. I, but EA contends that it
has never used an image of Plaintiff in any
advertisement. Def.’s R. 56.1 Statement at 24.
Plaintiff
avers
that
these
instances
of
misappropriation of his identity and likeness were
“committed with the full intent of increasing the sales
and profits for Defendant(s) since [EA’s] heightened
realism in NCAA Football videogames translates
directly into increased sales and revenues for EA.”
Second Am. Compl. at 48. According to Plaintiff, video
game consumers demand that these games “simulate
actual college football matches in the most realistic
manner possible, including the use of the ‘virtual’
players that are modeled after real-life NCAA Football
players such as [Plaintiff].” Id. Further, in regards to
the users’ ability to upload and download team rosters
with names of real-life players, Plaintiff, while not
alleging that EA has itself made this information
available, does fault EA for “tak[ing] no courses of
action to prevent” users from uploading rosters that
use real players’ names without authorization. Id. at
59–63. Plaintiff contends that EA’s “courses of action
and in-action” on this issue have allowed users to
“effectively heighten [] the authenticity and realism of
a true NCAA football experience.” Id. at 64–65.
D.

Instant Motion

EA filed the instant motion on November 12, 2010,
arguing that the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution mandates dismissal of the
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, summary judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
Plaintiff has opposed this motion, and both parties have
filed declarations, affidavits, and exhibits. For the
reasons explained herein, the Court elects to treat EA’s
motion as one for summary judgment, and finds that
summary judgment is appropriate.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As noted, Defendant has moved for dismissal, or, in
the alternative, summary judgment. Defendant opposes
consideration under either standard on the basis that
discovery is not complete. See Opp. at 8–9. However,
Plaintiff fails to identify how discovery would assist the
6
Court in deciding this speech-based tort case. Indeed,
discovery is irrelevant to a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), which is limited to the complaint
allegations. And, for summary judgment purposes, it is
Plaintiff’s obligation to identify why disposition by way
of summary judgment requires discovery. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(d) (permitting a court to defer considering a
motion “if a nonmovant shows by affidavit or
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present
facts essential to justify its opposition”) (emphasis
added).
Moreover, the question of whether the First
Amendment limits Plaintiff’s right of publicity claim is
6

Plaintiff states that he “intends to show Defendant’s sales
records and anticipate [sic] that the sales of each year’s NCAA
Football release remain relatively steady.” Pl. Opp. at 19. This
“discovery” would have no bearing on the Court’s analysis of EA’s
First Amendment defense.
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one of law, and courts answer this type of question by
independently reviewing the disputed speech at the
summary judgment stage. See Facenda v. N.F.L.
Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1016 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he
categorization of speech is a question of law that we
must resolve through independent review of the
program.”); see e.g., id. at 1016 (rejecting First
Amendment defense to Lanham Act trademark claims
on motion for summary judgment); Hoepker v. Kruger,
200 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344, 347–354 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (under
summary judgment standard, examining a challenged
work of art and dismissing New York statutory right of
privacy claim based on First Amendment defense). In
that connection, as indicated supra, EA has provided
the Court with copies of the video games for the
Court’s review. Furthermore, because the Court will
further rely on the affidavits and exhibits submitted by
the parties, this motion will be treated as one for
summary judgment as opposed to a motion to dismiss.
“Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine
issue of material fact and if, viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471,
482 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265
(1986)); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). For an issue to be
genuine, there must be “a sufficient evidentiary basis
on which a reasonable jury could find for the
non-moving party.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455
F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202
(1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of
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material fact exists, the court must view the facts and
all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986);
Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276–77 (3d Cir. 2002). For
a fact to be material, it must have the ability to “affect
the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Kaucher,
455 F.3d at 423. Disputes over irrelevant or
unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary
judgment.
Initially, the moving party has the burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct.
2548. Once the moving party has met this burden, the
nonmoving party must identify, by affidavits or
otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Id.; Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198,
206–07 (3d Cir. 2008). Thus, to withstand a properly
supported motion for summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must identify specific facts and
affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by
the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256–57, 106 S.
Ct. 2505. The nonmoving party “must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as
to material facts.” Id. at 206, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (quoting
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348). Moreover,
the non-moving party must present “more than a
scintilla of evidence showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396
F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005). Indeed, the plain language
of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon
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motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548.
Additionally, in deciding the merits of a party’s
motion for summary judgment, the court’s role is not to
evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the
matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S. Ct.
2505. The nonmoving party cannot defeat summary
judgment simply by asserting that certain evidence
submitted by the moving party is not credible. S.E.C. v.
Antar, 44 Fed.Appx. 548, 554 (3d Cir. 2002).
III.

ANALYSIS

For the purposes of this motion, Defendant
concedes that Plaintiff has stated a prima facie right of
publicity claim under New Jersey law. Mot. at 1.
Despite this concession, in its moving papers, EA
expresses disagreement with statements of New
Jersey law made in this Court’s September 22, 2010
Opinion. In that opinion, which granted EA’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to sufficiently
plead a right of publicity claim under New Jersey law,
the Court interpreted New Jersey’s right of publicity
law and concluded that Hart’s proposed allegations
“appear[ed] to state a right of publicity claim under
New Jersey law.” Court’s Opinion at 665.
To the extent that some of EA’s comments suggest
that the Court’s interpretation of New Jersey case law
is inconsistent with First Amendment principles, EA
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7
misreads the September 22nd Opinion. That opinion
focused on the scope of New Jersey’s right of publicity
7

For example, in footnote 12 of its moving brief, EA takes issue
with this Court’s discussion of Castro v. NYT Television, 370
N.J.Super. 282, 296, 851 A.2d 88 (App. Div. 2004), which held that a
right of publicity claim could not be lodged by patrons at the
emergency room of a public hospital who were videotaped and,
later, shown on a reality-based television program. As explained in
the opinion, EA relied upon the following language from Castro, to
argue that NCAA Football was entitled to First Amendment protection: “it is irrelevant whether a videotape is broadcast in connection with a television story about important public events or a
subject that provides only entertainment and amusement....” 370
N.J.Super. at 298, 851 A.2d 88. Def. Mov. Br. on Mot. to Dismiss at
13.
Castro did not discuss the First Amendment in its analysis of the
plaintiffs’ claim in that case, however. Rather, Castro held that the
plaintiffs in that case failed to “allege that any of the videotape
footage taken of them ... has been used for ‘trade purposes” and,
therefore, that the “plaintiffs’ complaints [did] not state causes of
action for commercial appropriation of their likenesses.” 370
N.J.Super. at 298, 851 A.2d 88. EA now takes issue with the
Court’s comment in the September 22nd Opinion that cases interpreting Castro have limited its holding to news-related entities.
Court’s Opinion at 667–68 (discussing Liebholz v. Harriri, Civil
Action No. 05–5148, 2006 WL 2023186 (D.N.J. Jul. 12, 2006)).
Reading that comment out of context, EA argues that Castro, and
other cases discussed by this Court in that opinion, do not stand for
the proposition that the First Amendment distinguishes between
media and non-media defendants. Read in context, it is clear that
this Court was not discussing the First Amendment nor opining on
whether a ruling that distinguishes between media and non-media
defendants would be appropriate. Indeed, the paragraph following
the Court’s discussion of how Castro’s holding has been interpreted explains that the “the touchstone of the commercial purpose requirement is whether the publication uses the plaintiff’s
likeness ‘for the purpose of capitalizing upon the name by using it
in connection with a commercial project . . . .’” Court’s Opinion at
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claim as expressed by state and federal New Jersey
decisional law at that time. The opinion did not address
the scope of federal constitutional principles that might
affect a New Jersey court’s interpretation of such a
claim. Rather, the Court dismissed Hart’s complaint
and granted him leave to amend. In so doing, the Court
provided an overview of New Jersey’s right of publicity
law in ascertaining whether granting leave to amend
would be futile. The Court was careful to explain that,
in granting Hart leave to amend, “the Court is not
holding that Plaintiff’s proposed allegations are
sufficient as a matter of law. Rather, the Court merely
concludes that the sort of allegations Plaintiff proposes
667–68 (emphasis added). For EA to now argue that the Court
suggested that “ ‘non-media’ expressive speech is entitled to less
First Amendment protection than ‘media’ speech,” Def. Mov. Br.
in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 22, is unfounded.
This is not to say that the Castro court’s distinction between media
and non-media defendants in its trade purposes analysis may reflect the century-old “newsworthiness” exception to misappropriation claims, which was an early attempt by courts to take into account First Amendment concerns as they related to freedom of the
press. See generally Amicus Brief of 73 Law Professors in Support
of Defendant/Appellee Jireh Publishing, Inc., For Affirmance,
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., No. 00–3584 at 6–8, 2000 WL
35456243 (6th Cir. 2000) available at http:// jurist. law. pitt. edu/
amicus/ etw_ v_ jireh. pdf (arguing that “The Definition of Commercial Use in Publicity Law Reflects Understandings of the First
Amendment from the Early Twentieth Century”). While more recent cases make clear that non-newsworthy works are likewise
entitled to First Amendment protection, as discussed herein, the
Castro court did not explicitly address First Amendment concerns.
Moreover, as EA recognizes, the defendant in that case was a media defendant, thus, the Castro court did not address the applicability of its holding to non-media defendants.
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suggest that an amendment may not be futile.” Id. at
668. Without a fully articulated amended complaint
before it, the Court chose not to define the precise
contours of the misappropriation doctrine, including all
potential interpretive effects of First Amendment
8
doctrine.
Indeed, at the time the Court issued its September
22, 2010 Opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court had
not addressed the misappropriation tort and the First
Amendment in one case. A decision by the New Jersey
Supreme Court rendered after this Court’s September
22, 2010 opinion, and after the parties’ initial briefing in
this case, jointly considers the prima facie
misappropriation elements and First Amendment
9
principles.

8

This approach of focusing first on whether a prima facie case misappropriation claim is properly pled before ruling on a First
Amendment defense to that claim is the approach taken by a recent California district court decision that EA cites to in a supplemental memorandum to this Court. See EA Supp. Memo dated
Sept. 6, 2011. That case, Arenas v. Shed Media US, Inc., No. CV
11–05279, Slip Op. (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011), involved a NBA player’s motion for a preliminary injunction against the producers of
Basketball Wives, a reality television show starring current and
former significant others of professional basketball players. The
Arenas court first held that the NBA player sufficiently pled a
prima facie misappropriation case, under California law, for the
use of his identity. Slip Op. at 6. Only after concluding that the
prima facie case was properly pled did the court consider the producer’s First Amendment defense. Id. at 8.
9

EA’s reply brief for the instant motion was filed on January 20,
2011, and G.D. was decided on January 31, 2011.
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In G.D. v. Kenny, 205 N.J. 275, 15 A.3d 300 (2011),
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the use of a
political aide’s criminal history in a campaign flyer,
created by a public relations and marketing firm at the
request of a political opponent, failed to satisfy the
commercial purpose element of the misappropriation
tort. Id. at 311. In reaching that conclusion, the Court
reasoned:
That the . . . defendants are in the business of
public relations and marketing and prepared the
campaign flyers does not make publication of the
flyers a publication in the commercial sense. The
campaign flyers represented political speech
attacking the judgment of a candidate running
for public office. This is the type of speech that is
at the heart of First Amendment guarantees.
That books, newspapers, and magazines are
published and sold for profit does not prevent
them from being a form of expression whose
liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment.
[Plaintiff] cannot show that the use of his name
and
image
constitutes
the
tort
of
misappropriation of one’s name and image for a
wrongful purpose.
Id. at 311–12 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). While the G.D. Court did not explicitly define
the relationship between the misappropriation tort and
the First Amendment, nonetheless, by including First
Amendment rationale in its analysis of the plaintiff’s
prima facie case, the Court construed the tort in a
manner to avoid conflict with First Amendment
principles.
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Because of EA’s decision not to challenge the
sufficiency of Hart’s right of publicity allegations for
the purpose of this motion, the Court will focus solely
upon EA’s assertion of the First Amendment
defense—rather than upon how a New Jersey court
might construe the prima facie elements of the right of
publicity. For this reason, the Court finds EA’s
inclusion of its disagreement with the Court’s
interpretation of New Jersey right of publicity law in
several footnotes throughout its brief not only
irrelevant to the motion but also a distraction from the
issue at hand—the scope of EA’s First Amendment
defense.
Turning now to the First Amendment defense, the
parties dispute whether the First Amendment trumps
Plaintiff’s claim. In EA’s opening brief, it argued that
the First Amendment bars Plaintiff’s right of publicity
claim because NCAA Football video games constitute
protected expressive works. Plaintiff disagreed, in its
opposition papers, contending that the NCAA Football
games constitute speech made for commercial purposes
that is not afforded extensive First Amendment
protections.
While the motion was under consideration, the
United States Supreme Court decided Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.
Ct. 2729, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011). That suit involved a
First Amendment challenge to a California statute that
“prohibits the sale or rental of ‘violent video games’ to
minors, and requires their packaging to be labeled ‘18.”
Id. at 2732. Violation of the statute was punishable by
civil fine. Id. In light of Brown’s potential applicability
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to the instant motion, the Court directed the parties to
file supplemental briefs discussing that decision.
In ruling that the statute was unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court confirmed that video games are
entitled to First Amendment protection:
Like the protected books, plays, and movies that
preceded them, video games communicate
ideas—and even social messages—through many
familiar literary devices (such as characters,
dialogue, plot, and music) and through features
distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s
interaction with the virtual world). That suffices
to confer First Amendment protection.
Id. at 2733.

10

Plaintiff argues, in his supplemental briefing, that
Brown is of no help to EA here. In Plaintiff’s view,
Brown is distinguishable because it involved a
content-based statute deserving of strict First
Amendment scrutiny whereas a New Jersey right of
publicity claim, in contrast, is not content-based. EA
agrees, in its supplemental briefs, that the statute in
Brown was content-based, but further argues that the
right of publicity claim asserted here also operates as a
10

Prior to Brown, several appellate and lower court decisions had
similarly concluded that video games are entitled to First
Amendment protection. See e.g., E.S.S. Entert. 2000, Inc. v. Rock
Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008); Interactive Digital
Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 F.3d 954, 957 (8th
Cir. 2003); American Amusement Machine Association v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir. 2001); Dillinger, LLC v. Electronic Arts Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835–36, 2011 WL 2446296, *5
(S.D. Ind. Jun. 15, 2011).
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content-based restriction because the claim “turns on
the particular content of the defendant’s work and, in
particular, whether the defendant used the plaintiff’s
name, likeness, or other attribute within the
defendant’s work.” Def. Supp. Br. at 4. EA, further,
focuses on Brown’s confirmation that video games are
entitled to full First Amendment protection, and
construes Brown as suggesting that video games are
not commercial speech entitled to less than full First
Amendment protection.
A content-based speech restriction is one that
regulates “speech when the specific motivating
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is
the rationale for the restriction.” Galena v. Leone, 638
F.3d 186, 199 (3d Cir. 2011). While EA cites to a law
review article to support its contention that a New
Jersey right of publicity claim operates as a
content-based restriction, see Thomas F. Cotter, et al.,
Integrating the Right of Publicity with First
Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 33
Colum. J. of Law & the Arts 165 (Winter 2011), that
article acknowledges that most courts have not adopted
the argument it advocates that the “exercise of state
publicity rights is a content-based regulation of
11
speech.” Id. at 169; id. at 167–68 (describing court
11

The authors’ “argument that the right of publicity is a form of
content-based regulation rests on two premises. The first is that
the right of publicity regulates words, sounds and visual images
that clearly qualify as ‘speech.’ The second is that, because the
right of publicity cannot be ‘justified without reference to the content of the speech,’ it is content-based, not content-neutral. Id. at
190–91 (internal footnotes omitted).
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opinions applying the First Amendment to right of
publicity claims as “all over the map” resulting in
“confusion reflected in the differing approaches.”). In
addition, the article’s thesis turns on whether the
speech is commercial or non-commercial; in the authors’
view, commercial speech implicating the right of
publicity must be judged under intermediate scrutiny
and noncommercial speech under strict scrutiny.
Contrary to the article’s proposal, courts apply one
of several tests, referred to in the legal discourse as
“balancing tests,” that are unique to intellectual
property-related cases, to determine whether the First
Amendment limits a right of publicity claim in that
context. Courts do not tend to apply strict or
intermediate scrutiny tests when addressing a First
Amendment defense to intellectual property-related
claims, such as the right of publicity. Accordingly, this
Court’s analysis will focus on the tests actually applied
by courts, which tests are explained in more detail
infra.
As to EA’s latter argument regarding commercial
speech, Brown does not explicitly discuss commercial
speech. However, another recent decision of the
Supreme Court, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., ––– U.S.
––––, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 180 L. Ed. 2d 544 (2011), does so.
In that case, the Supreme Court made clear that
challenges to content-based restrictions on both
commercial and noncommercial speech are generally
subject to heightened scrutiny. Id. at 2664 (“The First
Amendment requires heightened scrutiny whenever
the government creates ‘a regulation of speech because
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of disagreement with the message it conveys.’ . . .
Commercial speech is no exception.”).
Sorrell was not an intellectual-property related
case, however. Moreover, Sorrell did not explicitly
overrule Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S. Ct.
2343, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1980), which recognized a
“commonsense distinction between speech proposing a
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area
traditionally subject to government regulation, and
other varieties of speech,” Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
562, 100 S. Ct. 2343, and applied intermediate scrutiny
to restrictions on commercial speech. And, Sorrell
acknowledges that “the government’s legitimate
interest in protecting consumers from ‘commercial
harms’ explains ‘why commercial speech can be subject
to
greater
governmental
regulation
than
noncommercial speech.’” (citation omitted). 131 S. Ct. at
2672. Thus, even after Sorrell, commercial speech may
still be entitled to less First Amendment protection
than that afforded non-commercial speech, in certain
contexts.
In any event, whatever First Amendment
protection is afforded to commercial speech, NCAA
Football is not commercial speech. The Third Circuit’s
decision in Facenda, supra, explains that courts are to
consider three factors in determining whether speech is
commercial or noncommercial:
(1) is the speech an advertisement; (2) does the
speech refer to a specific product or service; and
(3) does the speaker have an economic
motivation for the speech. An affirmative
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answer to all three questions provides ‘strong
support’ for the conclusion that the speech is
commercial.
Id. at 1017 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). In conducting this inquiry, courts are to make
“a commonsense distinction between speech proposing
a commercial transaction . . . and other varieties of
speech.” Id.
Applying Facenda here, Plaintiff cannot reasonably
contend that the NCAA Football games constitute
commercial speech. The speech at issue in Facenda was
a video that the court characterized as a “late-night,
half-hour-long ‘infomercial’ [for the Madden Football
video game, that was] only broadcast eight times in a
three-day span immediately before the release of the
video game to retail stores—much like an
advertisement for an upcoming film.” Id. at 1017. The
“infomercial” referred specifically, and solely, to the
Madden
Football
video
game.
And,
the
defendant-producer of the game had a financial interest
in the sales of the game. Id. at 1017–18. In short, the
video “aim[ed] to promote another creative work, the
video game.” Id. at 1018. Here, by contrast, the speech
is the video game that is being sold. It is not a separate
instance of speech that promotes the purchase of
another work.
Similarly, in Tellado v. Time–Life, 643 F. Supp. 904,
914 (D.N.J.1986), a court in this district found that the
First Amendment did not insulate the defendant from a
right of publicity claim by a Vietnam veteran whose
photograph was used in an advertisement for a book
series the defendant produced about the Vietnam War.
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The Tellado court distinguished between use of the
plaintiff’s photograph in an advertisement for a book
and the hypothetical use of the photograph in the book
itself, noting that in the latter case, “defendant’s use
clearly would have been protected by the First
Amendment, regardless of what type of profit
defendant expected to make with its book series.” Id.
Further, as courts have long recognized, the First
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech extends not
only to political and ideological speech, but also to
“[e]ntertainment . . . motion pictures, programs
broadcast by radio and television, and live
entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works.”
Tacynec v. City of Philadelphia, 687 F.2d 793, 796 (3d
Cir. 1982) (First Amendment protects Mummers-type
string band performance) (quoting Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65, 101 S. Ct. 2176, 68 L.
Ed. 2d 671 (1981)) (citations omitted) (live
entertainment, including non-obscene nude dancing, is
protected by First Amendment); accord United States
v. Stevens, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585, 176 L.
Ed. 2d 435 (2010) (videos showing animal cruelty not
categorically unprotected by the First Amendment);
Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
U.S. 562, 97 S. Ct. 2849, 53 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1977) (“There
is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys
First Amendment protection.”); Kaplan v. California,
413 U.S. 115, 119–120, 93 S. Ct. 2680, 37 L. Ed. 2d 492
(1973) (“[P]ictures, films, paintings, drawings, and
engravings . . . have First Amendment protection.”).
The Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Brown confirms
that video games are entitled to the same treatment.
131 S. Ct. at 2733.
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For these reasons, the Court finds no support for
Plaintiff’s contention that EA’s NCAA Football video
games are not expressive works entitled to the same
protections afforded to other expressive works.
Plaintiff’s only allegation that appears to make a
commercial speech argument is that his “image was
used in the promotion for . . . EA’s NCAA Football
game wherein [Plaintiff] was throwing a pass with
actual footage from Rutgers University’s Bowl Game
against Arizona State University.” Second Am. Compl.
at 45. Yet, Plaintiff has produced no evidence that his
likeness was ever used in an advertisement for a
NCAA Football video game, nor has he suggested that
discovery would reveal such evidence. In addition,
Defendant denies ever using Plaintiff’s image in any
advertisement for the games, but has submitted a
photograph of Plaintiff “throwing a pass [that] appears
in a photo montage inside NCAA Football [2009] that
can only be seen when a user selects Rutgers as his or
her favorite team.” See Def.’s R. 56.1 Statement at 24;
Supp. Decl. of Strauser, Ex. E at 16, Ex. I. Because this
photograph is part of the video game itself, the
commercial transaction has already taken place, and
because Plaintiff’s photo does not advertise another
product or service, the Court finds no basis for
concluding that NCAA Football 2009—or any other
12
NCAA Football video game—is commercial speech.

12

To be sure, this commercial speech inquiry differs from my analysis of New Jersey’s interpretation of the “commercial purpose”
element in Castro, supra, and other decisions, in the September
22nd Opinion. As explained above, at the time of that ruling, there
was no New Jersey Supreme Court case that considered First
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Having concluded that NCAA Football is not
commercial speech, the Court now turns to the more
thorny question of whether the First Amendment
grants EA the right to impinge upon Plaintiff’s New
Jersey common law right of publicity. The Court begins
by discussing the competing interests protected by the
right of publicity and the First Amendment, as well as
the tests used by courts in balancing those competing
interests. Therefore, the Court considers the party’s
arguments regarding what test the Court should
employ to balance Defendant’s First Amendment
rights against Plaintiff’s right of publicity—the
13
transformative test or the Rogers test. Finally, the
Court performs both balancing tests in light of the
parties’ arguments, and concludes that, in this case, the
First Amendment serves as a defense to Plaintiff’s
right of publicity claim under either test.
A.

Competing Interests of the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment

“The area of interrelated torts encompassed by the
umbrella term ‘invasion of privacy’ is largely an
American contribution to the common law, which is
usually said to have its origins in the seminal law
review article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
published in 1890.” Rodney A. Smolla, 3 SMOLLA &
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 24:2 (2011)
Amendment principles in construing the elements of the right of
publicity tort.
13

For reasons explained below, the Court will not engage in an
analysis under the “predominance test,” an additional test that
Hart urges the Court to adopt.
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(“Smolla”). New Jersey first recognized this common
law right in 1907, in a case holding that an individual
has the “right to prevent the unauthorized, commercial
appropriation of his name or likeness.” See Edison v.
Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J.Eq. 136, 67 A. 392
(Ch. Div. 1907) cited in Brent A. Olson, Esq., et al., The
Right of Publicity, 49 N.J. Prac. § 16:3 n. 9 (2010–2011
ed.) (“Right of Publicity ”). Years later, in a 1960
article, Dean William Prosser proposed four distinct
privacy torts, including one for the “appropriation, for
the defendant’s benefit, of the plaintiff’s name or
likeness.” Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J.Super.
327, 334, 235 A.2d 62 (Law Div.1967) (citing W. Page
Keeton, et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed.1984)). See William L.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960).
14

Despite its early characterization as a privacy right,
by 1967, New Jersey cases treated the tort as a
property right. See Canessa, 97 N.J.Super. at 352, 235
A.2d 62 (“We therefore hold that, insofar as plaintiffs’
claim is based on the appropriation of their likeness and
name for defendant’s commercial benefit, it is an action
for invasion of their ‘property’ rights and not one for
15
‘injury to the person.’”). To be sure, the privacy-based
14

A New Jersey court notes that “[i]t was first discussed in an essay published in a law journal in 1860 but it never gained prominence until the article written by former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brandeis, in collaboration with Frank Warren, was published
in 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).” Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises,
Inc., 96 N.J.Super. 72, 75, 232 A.2d 458 (Ch. 1967).

15

The distinction between a privacy-based versus a property-based tort is that
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appropriation tort, as envisioned by Prosser,
encompassed “both personal and commercial interests
caused by an unauthorized exploitation of the plaintiff’s
identity.” Restatement (Third) of the Law of Unfair
Competition § 46, comment b.
Throughout the tort’s development, its underlying
purpose has been to protect a person’s name, likeness,
voice, and biographical data from exploitation by others
who seek economic or other benefit from that use. See
Bisbee v. John C. Conover Agency, Inc., 186 N.J.Super.
335, 343, 452 A.2d 689 (App. Div. 1982); Tellado v.
Time–Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904, 909–10 (D.N.J.
1986). As explained in this Court’s September 22, 2010
Opinion granting EA’s motion to dismiss without
prejudice,
Underlying this right is the theory that “a
celebrity has the right to capitalize on his
persona, and the unauthorized use of that
[t]he privacy-based action is designed for individuals who
have not placed themselves in the public eye. It shields
such people from the embarrassment of having their faces
plastered on billboards and cereal boxes without their
permission. The interests protected are dignity and peace
of mind, and damages are measured in terms of emotional
distress. By contrast, a right of publicity action is designed
for individuals who have placed themselves in the public
eye. It secures for them the exclusive right to exploit the
commercial value that attaches to their identities by virtue
of their celebrity. The right to publicity protects that value as property, and its infringement is a commercial, rather than a personal tort.
Jim Henson Productions, Inc. v. John T. Brady & Associates,
Inc., 867 F. Supp. 175, 188–89 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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persona
for
commercial
gain
violates
fundamental notions of fairness and deprives the
celebrity of some economic value in his persona.”
Because celebrity status often translates to
economic wealth, the unauthorized use of one’s
persona “harms the person both by diluting the
value of the name and depriving that individual
of compensation.”
Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 658, 664
(D.N.J .2010) (internal citations omitted).
The term “right of publicity” made its first
appearance in a federal court opinion in 1953, in Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202
F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). That case concerned the use of
player images on baseball cards, and the opinion
described the right of publicity as an economic, as
opposed to personal, right. See Marshall Leaffer, The
Right of Publicity: A Comparative Perspective, 70
Albany L. Rev. 1357, 1360 (2007) ( “Publicity ”). The
opinion explained: “a man has a right in the publicity
value of his photograph . . . [and] to grant the exclusive
privilege of publishing his picture . . . .” Haelan, 202
F.2d at 868. The court did not characterize this right as
a property right because “[w]hether it [was] labelled
[sic] a ‘property right’ [was] immaterial.” Id. What
mattered was that “courts enforce a claim which has
pecuniary worth.” Id.
Following Haelan, states began to recognize a
common law right of publicity and some states even
enacted statutes protecting such a right. The right,
effectively, became a property right, with some
statutes providing that the right might be transferred

101a
16
through will or intestacy. Publicity, supra at 1360.
The right of publicity is now recognized by a majority
of the states in the United States, though the scope of
the right and its transferability varies by state.
New Jersey has adopted the Restatement of Torts
2d (1977), thereby incorporating the common law
privacy right of appropriation into its state law. Unlike
other states, such as California and New York, New
Jersey has not enacted a right of publicity statute.
Nonetheless, given the similarity between the two
doctrines, and that New Jersey treats its
misappropriation tort as a property-based rather than
privacy-based right, the Third Circuit has used the
terms appropriation and right of publicity,
interchangeably, to refer to the common law right in
New Jersey. See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 917
(3d Cir. 1994) (“In New Jersey, the right of publicity is
a property right.”) Examples of New Jersey right of
publicity claims upheld by courts include the
misappropriation of professional golfers’ names and
playing profiles, Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises,
Inc., 96 N.J.Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (Ch. 1967), and the
use of a photograph of a former Vietnam veteran in a
16

In recent years, the appropriation tort has “shifted towards being a property protection similar to the right of publicity.” Daniel
J. Solove, et al., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW at 207 (3d
ed.2009). See also Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light:
Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of the Tort of Appropriation of
Identity, 17 Cardoza Arts & Ent. L.J. 213, 213–14 (1999) (“[O]ver
the years, the privacy-based tort of appropriation has receded into
the background as its flashier cousin, publicity, has risen to prominence. Such is perhaps to be expected in a world where seemingly
everything has become a saleable commodity.”)
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letter advertising a non-fiction book on the Vietnam
War, Tellado, 643 F. Supp. at 909–10.
Recently, one federal district court in California
assumed, without expressly deciding the issue, that a
former collegiate football athlete, like Hart, was
entitled to pursue a right of publicity claim for EA’s use
of his image in NCAA Football. See Keller v.
Electronics Arts, Inc., No. C 09–1967, 2010 WL 530108
17
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2010). Here, as noted, EA also
assumes for the sake of argument that Hart has
properly asserted a right of publicity claim.
When an author or creator uses another individual’s
image in a work, the First Amendment rights of the
author or creator are implicated. There are several
theories or policies underlying the First Amendment,
including the marketplace of ideas, human dignity and
self-fulfillment, and democratic self-governance. See
Smolla, supra at § 2:3; McCarthy, THE RIGHTS OF
17

Relatedly, another suit recounts that a jury awarded over $35
million in damages to a group of retired professional football players whose names and likenesses were used in an EA game. James
J.S. Holmes, et al., Defining Liability for Likeness of Athlete Avatars in Video Games, 34 L.A. Lawyer 17, 18 (May 2011). That suit
was not against EA directly, but was against the former players’
union for its breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties. See
Parrish v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, 2010 WL 5141848 at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010) (describing the “Adderley” litigation).
While that verdict was on appeal, the case settled for $26.25 million. Id. See also ESPN, NFLPA settles Adderley suit, www. espn.
com (Jun. 4, 2009) attached as McIlwain Cert., Exh. D. Underlying
this suit was the premise that the former players held a right of
publicity that entitled them to share in licensing fees that EA paid
to the players’ union for the use of the players’ names and likenesses.

103a
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §§ 7:3, 8:16, 8:18 (2d ed.
2008). Important here is the human dignity and
self-fulfillment theory, which views the right of free
expression as central to the dignity and self-realization
of the individual author or creator. Smolla, supra at §
2:5.
While it is clear that the right of publicity may
encroach upon First Amendment rights, there is little
clarity as to how to balance the competing interests
that each set of rights protects. As one scholar has
noted, “[m]ost would acknowledge that the right of
publicity needs to be reigned in when it burdens free
expression, but no one convenient legal format has been
found to set those limits . . . The fact is that no judicial
consensus has been reached on the contours of the First
Amendment vis-a-vis the right of publicity.” Publicity,
supra at 1363. Indeed, this body of law can be aptly
described as “disordered and incoherent.” Id.
For example, “New Jersey recognizes a robust
First Amendment constitutional defense to right of
publicity claims: if the speech is newsworthy and
informative, it may be protected even if it incidentally
implicates the right of publicity; if, on the other hand,
the speech is primarily commercial, the privilege may
be lost.” Right of Publicity, supra at § 16:3. New
Jersey, further, recognizes First Amendment
protection for entertainment-based, news-related
works. As the Third Circuit stated in Jenkins v. Dell
Pub. Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357
U.S. 921, 78 S. Ct. 1362, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1365 (1958) (en
banc), “it is neither feasible nor desirable to make a
distinction between news for information and news for
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entertainment in determining the extent to which a
publication is privileged.” Id. at 451 (emphasis added).
This Court is not constrained by First Amendment
analysis employed by New Jersey courts in this context
because just as state courts are not limited by federal
court interpretations of the U.S. Constitution, so too is
this Court not bound by state court interpretations of
the U.S. Constitution. See Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d
520, 535 (3d Cir. 2006); Kermani v. New York State Bd.
of Elections, 487 F. Supp. 2d 101, 114 (N.D.N.Y. 2006)
(“Federal District Courts are not bound to adopt or
follow the decisions of State courts when the State
courts interpret Federal constitutional principles, even
18
when those principles are applied to state statutes.”).
See also Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 567, 97 S. Ct. 2849
(describing First Amendment limitation as a “federal”
issue).
Moreover, neither New Jersey nor the Third Circuit
has explicitly adopted a test that reconciles First
Amendment interests with the state right of publicity.
Accordingly, I look to decisional law throughout the
country that has attempted such reconciliation, as well
as secondary sources, for guidance. As noted, many
decisions and sources refer to the attempt to reconcile

18

This is not a case involving undecided questions of state law that
would require the exercise of Pullman abstention in order to afford New Jersey courts the opportunity to first interpret a state
law “in a way that alters or eliminates the federal question.”
McMullen v. Maple Shade Tp., 643 F.3d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 2011).
Rather, New Jersey courts have already recognized that the right
of publicity is subject to First Amendment limitations.
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the competing interest of publicity rights and First
Amendment rights as a type of “balancing test.”
Courts throughout the United States have utilized
up to eight “balancing” tests that attempt to weigh the
First Amendment rights of an author/creator against
the right of publicity. Michael D. Scott, 1 SCOTT ON
MULTIMEDIA LAW § 11.49– § 11.52 (3d ed.2006). It
is important to note, before describing the various
tests, that the Supreme Court in Zacchini, the only
Supreme Court case addressing a First Amendment
defense to the right of publicity, did not engage in a
balancing of the competing interests.
Zacchini involved a television station’s broadcast, in
its news programming, of a stunt performer’s entire
cannonball act without the performer’s permission.
Ruling in favor of the performer’s publicity right, and
against the broadcaster’s reliance on the First
Amendment in defense of its airing of the performance,
the Zacchini Court reasoned that the First
Amendment “does not immunize the media when they
broadcast a performer’s entire act without his consent.”
Id. at 575, 97 S. Ct. 2849. And, the Court added, “the
rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the
straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment
by the theft of good will. No social purpose is served by
having the defendant get free some aspect of the
plaintiff that would have market value and for which he
would normally pay.” Id. at 576, 97 S. Ct. 2849.
Since Zacchini was decided in 1977, however, many
courts have limited its application to its facts; only
when a performer’s entire act is appropriated do courts
find it unnecessary to engage in any balancing. See
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ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 956 (6th
Cir. 2003) (“ Zacchini has been criticized as being very
‘narrowly drawn’ in that it involved the wholesale
reproduction of a live ‘entire act’ . . . .”); McCarthy,
supra at § 8:27. See also Wisconsin Interscholastic
Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., Inc., 658 F.3d 614, 624,
2011 WL 3773844, *10 (7th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that
Zacchini “distinguishes between the media’s First
Amendment right to “report on” and “cover” an event
and its lack of rights to broadcast an “entire act.””); id.
at 625, at *11 (“. . . Zacchini makes clear [that] the
newspapers do not have the underlying right to
19
broadcast an entire event . . . .”).
The two key tests followed by courts today are the
transformative test, which is borrowed from the
copyright fair use doctrine, and the Rogers test, which
is most often applied in Lanham Act trademark actions.
Here, Hart advocates for the former and EA for the
latter. The United States Supreme Court, the Third
Circuit, and the New Jersey Supreme Court have not
explicitly endorsed either test.
Hart further urges the Court to adopt a third test
he describes as “the predominance test.” This test,
Hart argues, was utilized by a district court in this
district in Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp.

19

See also C.B.C. Distrib. and Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1098 (E.D. Mo.
2006) aff’d 505 F.3d 818 (2007); Comedy III Productions, Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal.4th 387, 401, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21
P.3d 797 (2001).
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1339, 1356 (D.N.J. 1981). That decision, however,
predates both the transformative test and the Rogers
test. More importantly, the court in Presley was not
fashioning a “test,” but applied First Amendment
principles to the Elvis impersonation act at issue in that
case, and courts have since limited Presley to its unique
facts. See e.g., Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574
F. Supp. 2d 758, 766 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 2008)
(distinguishing Presley as involving “merely a copy or
imitation” of a performance); Bosley v. Wildwett.com,
310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 928 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (relying on
Presley where images, in that case, were “mere
copies”).
Notably, Presley suggested that the copyright fair
use doctrine serves as an appropriate analogy for
balancing First Amendment interests with right of
publicity concerns. In this way, Presley predicted a
transformative-style test. Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1359
(“[While] entertainment . . . enjoys First Amendment
protection ..., entertainment that is merely a copy or
imitation, even if skillfully and accurately carried out,
does not really have its own creative component and
does not have a significant value as pure
entertainment.”). As the Presley court reasoned:
Unlike a copier, a parodist or satirist adds his
own new and creative touches to the original
work, which, in this case, would be the likeness
20

Hart’s “predominance test” should not be confused with the test
adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo.2003), a test that has received some attention in the legal literature but has not been adopted by many
courts. That test is referred to as the “predominant use test.” Id.
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of Elvis Presley as he is performing. The original
work basically becomes part of a new and
different work which derives its popularity from
the added creative elements. The original work,
or the likeness of Elvis Presley, is being used in
a different manner and for a different purpose.
Id. at 1360 n.21. Accordingly, this Court does not view
Presley as espousing an independent test that requires
separate analysis, and I will focus my analysis on the
transformative test that Presley appears to have
21
foreseen, as well as the Rogers test.
In my view, and as explained in more detail herein,
the transformative test is more refined than the Rogers
test and better balances the competing interests of the
right of publicity and the First Amendment. The
transformative test’s incorporation of copyright’s fair
use doctrine not only reflects the common underlying
principles shared by the right of publicity and
copyright doctrine, but properly takes into account the
extent of a defendant’s use of a plaintiff’s image. In this
way, the transformative test captures the intricacies
involved in deciphering whether a challenged work is a
“new” work entitled to First Amendment protection or
merely a blanket attempt to profit from another’s
property without due compensation. That said, I need
not explicitly adopt either test because, for the reasons
explained herein, EA’s First Amendment defense
prevails under both tests.
21

To be sure, the first California decision to adopt the transformative test, Comedy III, supra, referenced Presley. Comedy III, 25
Cal.4th at 402, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797.

B.
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Transformative Test

The tension between copyright interests and the
First Amendment is apparent. The First Amendment
provides that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech. . . .” Yet the Copyright Act,
enacted by Congress under the authority of the U.S.
Constitution’s Copyright Clause, grants individuals
monopoly-like power to preclude others from
expressing copyrighted material. It is this “paradox,”
Smolla, supra at § 21:2, that creates tension between
the two legal doctrines. The copyright laws grant a
copyright owner the right to suppress another person’s
freedom of speech, when that person seeks to express
copyrighted material.
In 2003, the Supreme Court commented on this
apparent tension in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
123 S. Ct. 769, 154 L. Ed. 2d 683 (2003). In that case, the
Supreme Court observed that both the First
Amendment and the Copyright Clause were adopted
close in time, suggesting that “in the Framer’s view,
copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with free
speech principles. Indeed, copyright’s purpose is to
promote the creation and publication of free
expression.” Id. at 788. Importantly, the Court
concluded thereafter, “copyright law contains built-in
First Amendment accommodations.” Id. This is because
the Copyright Act protects only expression, not ideas,
and thereby “strikes a definitional balance between the
First Amendment and copyright law by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author’s
expression.” Id. at 788–89 (citation omitted). “Due to
this [idea/expression dichotomy],” the Court continued,
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“every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work
becomes instantly available for public exploitation at
the moment of publication.” Id.
Additionally, the Court noted, the fair use defense
codified in the Copyright Act “allows the public to use
not only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted
work, but also expression itself in certain
circumstances.” Id. at 789. Per that defense, “[t]he fair
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies . . ., for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright.” Id.
Notably, the Court held that there is no need to apply a
strict scrutiny test to First Amendment defenses to a
copyright infringement claim in light of the
aforementioned, built-in First Amendment protections.
Id. at 788 (“We reject petitioners’ plea for imposition of
uncommonly strict scrutiny on a copyright scheme that
incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and
safeguards.”).
I briefly turn to a description of the idea/expression
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine for context. The
idea/expression dichotomy serves as one means of
alleviating the tension between copyright protection
and First Amendment goals. While scholars debate the
precise contours of what constitutes an “idea,” see
generally Smolla, supra at § 21:5, copyright law
protects the “expression of the idea.” Id.
This
expression represents the “selection and arrangement
of ideas, as well as a given specificity in the form of
their expression which warrants protection under the

111a
law of copyright.” Id.; see also Melville Nimmer, et al.,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1].
The contours of the fair use doctrine are more clear.
As codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107, the fair use doctrine is
comprised of a list factors for courts to consider:
(1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id.
Transformative use was first coined, as a phrase, by
Judge Pierre N. Leval in a 1990 Harvard Law Review
article on the copyright doctrine of fair use. In that
article, Judge Leval argued that the fair use doctrine is
best effectuated if individuals are permitted to
appropriate another’s expression as “raw material”
that the individual then “transform[s] in the creation of
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and
understandings . . . .” Pierre N. Leval, Commentary,
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L.Rev. 1105,
1111 (1990). Just four years following Judge Leval’s
suggestion, the Supreme Court employed the
transformative use analysis in Campbell v. Acuff–Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 127 L. Ed. 2d
500 (1994). Quoting from Judge Leval’s article, the
Court reasoned that “whether and to what extent [a]
new work is ‘transformative’ ” informs the Court’s
analysis as to the first factor of the fair use analysis,
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i.e., the purpose and character of the use. Id. at 579, 114
S. Ct. 1164.
Post- Campbell, California state court decisions
have been credited with shaping the development of
the transformative use doctrine in right of publicity
cases. The doctrine was adopted by the California
Supreme Court in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal.4th 387, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d
126, 21 P.3d 797 (2001), in 2001. In that case, the
California Supreme Court held that an artist’s sale of
lithographed t-shirts of the likenesses of The Three
Stooges, which likenesses were reproduced from a
charcoal drawing, were undeserving of First
Amendment protection because the likenesses were
insufficiently transformed. That court recognized that
“creative appropriation of celebrity images can be an
important avenue of individual expression . . . [because
the celebrities] symbolize individual aspirations, group
identities, and cultural values.” Id. at 397, 106
Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797. Nonetheless, the
California Supreme Court cautioned, First Amendment
rights may not trample without bounds the right of
publicity.
Viewing the right of publicity as akin to an
intellectual property right, designed to protect the
“considerable money, time, and energy . . . needed to
develop one’s prominence in a particular field,” id. at
399, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797 (quoting Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 25 Cal.3d 813, 160 Cal.Rptr. 323,
22
603 P.2d 425 (1979)), the Court concluded that a test
22

The court continued: “Years of labor may be required before
one’s skill, reputation, notoriety or virtues are sufficiently devel-

113a
incorporating elements of the copyright fair use
doctrine most appropriately balanced the competing
First Amendment and right of publicity interests. Id. at
404, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797. The California
Supreme Court adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s
language in Campbell that “whether and to what
extent the new work is ‘transformative’ ” should frame
the court’s balancing test inquiry. Id. (quoting
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114 S. Ct. 1164).
The Comedy III Court reasoned that the
transformative test best protects the competing
interests of protecting the celebrity while preserving
First Amendment rights. The Court explained:
[w]hen artistic expression takes the form of a
literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity for
commercial gain, directly trespassing on the
right of publicity without adding significant
expression beyond that trespass, the state law
interest in protecting the fruits of artistic labor
outweighs the expressive interests of the
imitative artist.
Id. at 405, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797 (emphasis
added). A transformative work, in contrast:
is not only especially worthy of First
Amendment protection, but is also less likely to
interfere with the economic interest protected
by the right of publicity [because] distortions of
oped to permit an economic return through some medium of commercial promotion. For some the investment may eventually
create considerable commercial value in one’s identity.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
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the celebrity figures are not, from the celebrity
fan’s
viewpoint,
good
substitutes
for
conventional depictions of the celebrity and
therefore do not generally threaten markets for
celebrity memorabilia that the right of publicity
is designed to protect. Accordingly, First
Amendment protection of such works outweighs
whatever interest the state may have in
enforcing the right of publicity.
Id. Ultimately, the California Supreme court concluded,
“the right-of-publicity holder continues to enforce the
right to monopolize the production of conventional,
more or less fungible, images of the celebrity.” Id.
In addition, the Comedy III Court provided another
(oft-quoted) formulation of the transformative test:
Another way of stating the inquiry is whether
the celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw
materials’ from which an original work is
synthesized, or whether the depiction or
imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and
substance of the work in question.
Id. at 406, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797. In using the
word “expression,” the court meant “something other
than the likeness of the celebrity.” Id. And, the inquiry
is a qualitative rather than quantitative one, “asking
whether the literal and imitative or the creative
23
predominate in the work.” Id. Because the t-shirt
23

The court further noted that, in close cases, “courts may find
useful a subsidiary inquiry . . .: does the marketability and economic value of the challenged work derive primarily from the
name of the celebrity depicted?” Id. at 407, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21
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lithograph depictions of The Three Stooges were
nothing more than portraits that lacked any creative
contribution by the artist, the court concluded that the
t-shirts were not transformative expressions. Id.
Since Comedy III, many courts have adopted and
applied the transformative test. See e.g., Hilton v.
Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2009); C.B.C.
Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Adv.
Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007); Reyes v.
Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 289 (D.
Puerto Rico 2009); Romantics v. Activision Publ’g,
Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Bosley v.
Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914 (N.D. Ohio 2004);
World Wrestling Fed. Entert. Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings,
Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Mine O’Mine,
Inc. v. Calmese, No. 2:10–cv–00043, 2011 WL 2728390,
*8–9 (D. Nev. Jul. 12, 2011).
The transformative test, however, has been subject
to some criticism. As explained by one scholar, the test
lacks clear, objective guidelines and, thus, “can
encourage judges to be art critics or base decisions on
external factors like the fame of the artist.” David Tan,
Political Recoding of the Contemporary Celebrity and
the First Amendment, 2 Harv. J. Sports & Ent. L. 1,
25–26 (2011). Tan further explains:
In addition, the cryptic judicial comments that
literal depictions like Andy Warhol’s silkscreens
P.3d 797. However, even if this question is answered in the affirmative, “it does not necessarily follow that the work is without
First Amendment protection—it may still be a transformative
work.” Id.
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of celebrities may also be transformative if they
carry a particular social message lend little
guidance to how a court may meaningfully
determine what constitutes the criteria for
transformative use. As shown by recent
California decisions, the test is focused on visual
transformation which can be overprotective of
art and entertainment that contribute little to
the
discussion
of
public
issues,
but
underprotective of political speech which may be
contextually transformative (because of its
recoding) though not visually transformative . . .
. In summary, the usefulness of this test appears
confined to visual depictions of the plaintiff, and
the extent to which the defendant’s use has
departed from a realistic rendition of the
plaintiff’s likeness.
Id. at 26. Moreover, Tan notes, the copyright fair use
doctrine, from which the transformative test was
crafted, “has been criticized as one of copyright’s ‘most
nebulous and unpredictable aspects’ and should only be
‘invoked as a last resort [in publicity claims] after all
other solutions have been tried and found wanting.’” Id.
(quoting McCarthy, supra at § 8:38).
While some may question the vagueness of the fair
use doctrine, it nonetheless remains the statutory law
for copyright matters and the U.S. Supreme Court
found it appropriate in Zacchini to analogize the right
of publicity to federal copyright law. See Zacchini, 433
U.S. at 573, 97 S. Ct. 2849. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has described the fair use copyright doctrine as
embodying First Amendment principles, thereby
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dispensing with the need for a strict scrutiny test. See
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 788–89. Still, Tan’s
point that the transformative test may encourage
judges to be art critics has some merit. It is clear from
reviewing some of the decisions applying the
transformative test, including those discussed below,
that courts must engage in a degree of artistic
interpretation in order to determine whether a work
contains additional expressive elements. Even
considering that the test may have some indeterminate
qualities, I find that the test’s rooting in the fair use
doctrine and its consideration of the extent to which an
image is copied fairly takes into account the competing
right of publicity and First Amendment interests.
There are several decisions applying the
transformative test that deserve mention here. In 2003,
the California Supreme Court held in Winter v. DC
Comics, 30 Cal.4th 881, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d
473 (2003), that a comic book’s use of two musicians as
inspiration for comic book characters was a
transformative use. The comic book series features
“Jonah Hex,” an “anti-hero” in the context of a five
volume miniseries that involved, inter alia, singing
cowboys and an emporium patterned after the life of
Oscar Wilde. Id. at 886, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d
473. Also included in the series were two worm-like
creatures in a volume entitled “Autumns of Our
Discontent.” Id. These worm-like creatures, which are
half-worm and half-human, are ultimately killed by
Jonah Hex in the final volume of the series. The
creatures were named Johnny and Edgar Autumn, and
had long white hair and albino features.
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Plaintiffs Johnny and Edgar Winter, two musician
brothers with long white hair and albino features, sued
the creator of the comic books, asserting that the
worm-like creatures were appropriations of their
likenesses. Rejecting their claim, the California
Supreme Court reasoned that it “reviewed the comic
books ... [and] can readily ascertain that they are not
just conventional depictions of plaintiffs but contain
significant expressive content other than plaintiffs’
mere likenesses.” Id. at 890, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69
P.3d 473. While acknowledging the similar hair and
features, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs were
“merely part of the raw materials from which the comic
books were synthesized,” and in the Court’s view, the
drawings were “but cartoon characters—half-human
and half-worm—in a larger story, which is itself quite
expressive.” Id. The Court further reasoned that the
plaintiffs’ fans would not find the comic books a
substitute for the musicians’ work. Id.
Several years later, and drawing upon Winter, the
Ninth Circuit in Hilton, supra, applied the
transformative test to a Hallmark® greeting card that
contained Paris Hilton’s image and quoted her famous
statement “that’s hot.” As described by that court, the
card
contains a picture above a caption that reads,
“Paris’s First Day as a Waitress.” The picture
depicts a cartoon waitress, complete with apron,
serving a plate of food to a restaurant patron. An
oversized photograph of Hilton’s head is
superimposed on the cartoon waitress’s body.
Hilton says to a customer, “Don’t touch that, it’s
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hot.” The customer asks, “what’s hot?” Hilton
replies, “That’s hot.” The inside of the card
reads, “Have a smokin’ hot birthday.”
Hilton, 580 F.3d at 891.
The question before the Ninth Circuit was whether
Hallmark was entitled to strike and, thereby dismiss,
the plaintiff’s right of publicity claim based upon its
First Amendment defense; the court applied the
transformative test to conclude that Hallmark was not
24
so entitled. After comparing Paris Hilton to the
character on the Hallmark card, the court reasoned
that “[d]espite [some] differences . . . the basic setting
is the same: we see Paris Hilton born to privilege,
working as a waitress.” Id. at 891. This mimics Paris
Hilton’s role on the popular television show, Simple
25
Life, where Ms. Hilton worked as a waitress.
24

Hilton’s procedural posture differs from that present in this
case. In Hilton, the Ninth Circuit ruled on a motion to strike under
California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The anti-SLAPP (Strategic
Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute is a law “designed to
bar meritless lawsuits filed merely to chill someone from exercising his First Amendment rights on a matter of public interest.”
580 F.3d at 880 n.1. The standard of review on a motion to strike
brought under California’a anti-SLAPP statute differs in some
way from the summary judgment standard applicable to this case.
See id. at 882 (“Such test is similar to the one courts make on
summary judgment, though not identical.”). Therefore, in light of
the distinct standard of review at work in Hilton, I rely primarily
on Hilton’s statement of the law as opposed to its application.
25

In addition, Hilton states that the Comedy III Court “envisioned
the application of the [First Amendment] defense as a question of
fact.” 580 F.3d at 890. Hilton quotes the following language from
Comedy III, to support its statement: “Although the distinction
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Two cases applying the transformative test to video
games are particularly instructive. In Kirby v. Sega of
America, Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 47, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607
(Cal. App. 2006), a California court ruled that a video
game character fashioned after the plaintiff, a celebrity
singer was a transformative use protected by the First
Amendment. The plaintiff-singer was a 90’s artist who
was known for the phrase “ooh la la.” The video game
character was named “Ulala,” and shared some
similarities with the singer. Id. at 59, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d
607. Like Kirby, the character wore platform shoes, had
similar facial features and hair color, and wore attire
like that worn by Kirby. Id. at 55, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607.
The character also used phrases known to be used by
Kirby, such as “groove,” “meow,” and “dee-lish.” Id.
However, the Ulala character differed from Kirby
in physique, and was based, in part, on the
Japanese-style animation form of anime. While the
character’s hairstyle and primary costume mimics one
of Kirby’s hair colors and outfits, Kirby often varied
her hair color and clothing, the court reasoned.
between protected and unprotected expression will sometimes be
subtle, it is no more so than other distinctions triers of fact are
called on to make in First Amendment jurisprudence.” Hilton, 580
F.3d at 890 (emphasis in original) (quoting Comedy III, supra at
409, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797). To the extent Hilton suggests that applicability of the transformative defense is a jury
question, I disagree with that reading of Comedy III. Read in
context, the quote simply clarifies that courts and juries are capable of determining whether or not a particular work of art is sufficiently transformative to be worthy of First Amendment protection, even where the distinction between protected and unprotected expression is a subtle one. See Comedy III, 25 Cal.4th at
409, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797.
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Importantly, the court noted, the setting for the game
was unique—in the game, the character was a
space-age reporter in the 25th Century. Id. at 59, 50
Cal.Rptr.3d 607. And, the character’s dance movements
were unlike Kirby’s. Altogether, the court concluded,
the video game character was transformative. Id.
Recently, another California court applied the
transformative test to the Band Hero video game that
included computer-generated avatars designed to look
like the members of the rock band No Doubt. In that
case, No Doubt v. Activision, Inc., 192 Cal.App.4th
1018, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 (Cal. App. 2011), the avatars
were literal recreations of the band members, who had
posed for photography to enable the video game
developer to reproduce the band members’ likenesses
with great detail. The No Doubt band members sued
the developer for exceeding the bounds of the parties’
license agreement, and relied on their right of publicity
as one basis for their suit. The developer of the video
game asserted the First Amendment as a defense.
Ruling in favor of the band members, the court
reasoned that the video game was not transformative.
The court reasoned:
[The developer] intentionally used . . . literal
reproductions so that players could choose to
“be” the No Doubt rock stars. The game does
not permit players to alter the No Doubt avatars
in any respect; they remain at all times
immutable images of the real celebrity musicians
....
Id. at 1033, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 397. The court contrasted
these depictions to those in Kirby, noting that the
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depictions here were not “fanciful, creative characters.”
26
Id.
Here, NCAA Football’s use of Hart’s image
presents a closer call than that in Kirby and No Doubt.
The Ulala character was placed in an entirely different
setting in the video game, although her characteristics
relied heavily on the singer. Hart’s NCAA Football
virtual player, on the other hand, plays college
27
football—just like Hart did. In contrast to the
transformative Ulala character, the avatars in No
Doubt were exact replicas of the No Doubt band
members who could not be altered in any way by the
video game user. Hart’s image in NCAA Football
differs from the images in No Doubt because his image
can be altered in many ways—from his personal
26

One of the justices in No Doubt filed a concurring opinion, disagreeing with the majority that it was necessary to decide the First
Amendment question. Id. at 416. However, the justice made clear
that she “[did] not dispute the majority’s reasoning on that issue.”
Id.

27

For this reason, I do not find EA’s citation to the Arenas case
helpful. As noted, Arenas involved an NBA player’s challenge to
the potential use of his name and likeness on the Basketball Wives
reality television program. On a motion for preliminary injunction,
the Arenas court concluded that the television program’s potential
use of the player’s name was transformative because
it appears that any references in [Basketball Wives ] will
be incidental to the show’s plot as a whole. At its core, the
show is about the women who have or have had relationships with basketball players rather than the players
themselves. Thus, the show appears to be transformative.

Slip Op. at 9. NCAA Football, in contrast, is about college football
players like Hart.
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characteristics (height, weight, athletic ability), to his
accessories (helmet visor, wristband). In addition, the
image’s physical abilities (speed and agility, throwing
arm, passing accuracy), attributes, and certain
biographical details (right handed/left handed) can also
be edited by the user.
On the other hand, that Hart’s image is placed in a
college football game is problematic for EA’s assertion
of a transformative defense. Placing present and
former college athletes, including Hart, into the
fittingly-titled NCAA Football game setting strongly
suggests that the goal of the game is to capitalize upon
the fame of those players. Indeed, “[i]t seems ludicrous
to question whether video game consumers enjoy and,
as a result, purchase more EA-produced video games
as a result of the heightened realism associated with
actual players.” Holmes, supra at 20. This, alone,
however, does not mean that EA’s use of Hart’s image
was not transformative. See Winter, supra at 889, 134
Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473 (“[i]f it is determined that
a work is worthy of First Amendment protection
because added creative elements significantly
transform the celebrity depiction, then independent
inquiry into whether or not that work is cutting into
the market for the celebrity’s images . . . appears to be
irrelevant.”) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, a game
developer that bases its work on real players, in the
context of the games that bring them notoriety, may
walk a fine line between using reality as a building
block for the developer’s own creative work and
exploiting the hard-earned reputations of college
players for its own profit.
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For this reason, the Court appreciates the plight of
college players who are prohibited by NCAA bylaws
from entering into licensing agreements and other
“commercial opportunities” during their playing years.
Hart Decl., ¶ 5. In this connection, Hart argues that EA
has a practice of paying professional football players for
the use of their images in EA’s professional football
video games, suggesting that it is disingenuous for EA
to refuse to pay college athletes for the use of their
images. In support of this proposition, he attaches the
Declaration of Katrina Yu, a law student who avers
that she attended a seminar in which Ondraus Jenkins
and Michael Shaffer, EA employees, stated that EA
licensed professional player images from the players
and the NFL. Yu Decl., ¶¶ 1–7. However, the Court
may not consider this hearsay evidence for the truth of
the matter asserted on summary judgment. See Smith
v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 693 (3d Cir. 2009).
That said, EA states that it “does not dispute that it
licenses publicity rights from certain NFL players for
its Madden NFL game . . . .” Def. Resp. Pl. Stat. Mat.
Facts ¶¶ 2, 5.
Hart further states, in a declaration, that EA has a
practice of entering into license agreements with
Collegiate Licensing Company, “the nation’s leading
collegiate trademark licensing and marketing
company,” The Collegiate Licensing Company, About
CLC, http:// www. clc. com/ clcweb/ publishing. nsf/
Content/ aboutclc. html (Sept. 2, 2011), for use of team
trademarks, uniforms, and logos, that are included in
the NCAA Football video game. Hart Decl. at ¶ 9. As
noted, EA admits that it has licensing agreements with
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the Collegiate Licensing Company. Def. Resp. Pl. Stat.
Mat. Facts ¶ 15.
That EA may license professional player images, as
well as team intellectual property from the N.C.A.A.,
yet refuse to license former college athlete images may
suggest an element of unfairness. Nevertheless, it
bears not on the question before this Court
here—whether or not EA’s use of Hart’s image is
protected by the First Amendment.
Viewed as a whole, there are sufficient elements of
EA’s own expression found in the game that justify the
conclusion that its use of Hart’s image is
transformative and, therefore, entitled to First
Amendment protection. For one, the game includes
several creative elements apart from Hart’s image.
Similar to the Madden NFL video game, as described
in a case dismissing a former professional football
player’s Lanham Act claim, Brown v. Electronic Arts,
supra, the NCAA Football game contains “virtual
stadiums, athletes, coaches, fans, sound effects, music,
and commentary, all of which are created or compiled
by the games’ designers.” Slip Op. at 7. Furthermore,
as explained by Jeremy Strauser, an Executive
Producer at EA responsible for the development of
NCAA Football,
[t]he virtual world of NCAA Football is
constructed from a vast array of graphics, sound
and other material. Once a user chooses two
college teams to compete against another, the
video game assigns a stadium for the match-up
and populates it with players, coaches, referees,
mascots, cheerleaders and fans—all designed
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and rendered by EA’s artists. Each game has
over 100 virtual teams and thousands of virtual
players.
Strauser Decl., ¶ 4. The Court’s own review of the
video games confirms Mr. Strauser’s description.
Even focusing on Hart’s virtual image alone, it is
clear that the game is transformative. It is true that the
virtual player bears resemblance to Hart and was
designed with Hart’s physical attributes, sports
statistics, and biographical information in mind.
However, as noted, the game permits users to alter
Hart’s virtual player, control the player’s throw
distance and accuracy, change the team of which the
player is a part by downloading varying team names
and rosters, or engage in “Dynasty” mode, in which the
user incorporates players from historical teams into the
gameplay. See id. at ¶¶ 6–8. That the user is able to
change the image’s features, statistics, and teammates
distinguishes NCAA Football from the game at issue in
28
No Doubt, where the characters were immutable.
28

Moreover, one court persuasively reasons that the use of player
names, statistics, and biographical data is entitled to First
Amendment protection because that data is in the public domain.
C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 823. The same reasoning applies to the public
facts connected to Hart’s image. While those public facts are relevant to Hart’s prima facie case that his right of publicity was impinged, a legal conclusion assumed for the sake of argument here,
“it would be strange law that a person would not have a first
amendment right to use information that is available to everyone.”
Id. The C.B.C. court’s rationale is consistent with the copyright
idea/expression dichotomy that the Supreme Court views as properly balancing First Amendment freedoms with intellectual-property like interests. See Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 789 (noting
that, by virtue of the idea/expression dichotomy, “every idea,
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These aspects also distinguish the video game from the
greeting card in Hilton, where Paris Hilton’s
photograph was used in a single, static setting.
To be clear, it is not the user’s alteration of Hart’s
image that is critical. What matters for my analysis of
EA’s First Amendment right is that EA created the
mechanism by which the virtual player may be altered,
as well as the multiple permutations available for each
virtual player image. Since the game permits the user
to alter the virtual player’s physical characteristics,
including the player’s height, weight, hairstyle, face
shape, body size, muscle size, and complexion, see e.g.,
Strauser Decl., Exh. F at 4 (Part I) (displaying “Edit
Player–Appearance” screenshot), it follows that EA’s
artists created a host of physical characteristic options
from which the user may choose. For example, EA
artists created the several different hairstyles that can
be morphed onto the image. See id. The Court’s review
of the game revealed eight such hairstyle options: fade
1, fade 2, close crop, buzzout 1, buzzout 2, afro, balding
29
1, and balding 2. In my view, the creation of these
varied potential formulations of each virtual player

theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly available
for public exploitation at the moment of publication”).
29

Similarly, there are 24 “face” options from which a user may
choose to alter the appearance of the virtual player’s face, as well
as 16 “face shape” options. EA artists, further, created the options
for all types of equipment, the virtual player’s sports ratings, and
the player’s “player info.” The only data that may not be altered is
the virtual player’s home state, hometown, team, and year (e.g.,
senior, freshman).
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alone makes the game a transformative use of Hart’s
image.
One could argue that the use of Hart’s unaltered
image as the starting point for the virtual player
suggests that EA’s use of Hart’s image is not
transformative. The problem with this argument is that
it fails to fully take into account the distinctive
interactive nature of video games. As noted by the
United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Entert.
Merch., supra,
[l]ike the protected books, plays, and movies that
preceded them, video games communicate
ideas—and even social messages—through many
familiar literary devices (such as characters,
dialogue, plot, and music) and through features
distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s
interaction with the virtual world ). That suffices
to confer First Amendment protection.
131 S. Ct. at 2733 (emphasis added). This language from
Brown recognizes that a user’s interaction with a video
game is one of the means by which video games
communicate ideas and social messages. To deny
NCAA Football First Amendment protection because
the game initially displays the virtual player in an
unaltered form would not give due accord to this
expressive aspect of video games.
That NCAA Football 2009 includes a photograph of
Hart throwing a pass, in a photo montage that can be
seen when a user selects Rutgers as his or her favorite
team, does not alter my conclusion. Having viewed the
montage, it is clear that the photograph is but a fleeting
component part of the montage and the video game as a
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whole. Because the photograph comprises such a small
portion of the entire work, it cannot be said that the
work itself fails to incorporate transformative
elements.
This leaves only the screenshot images from the
game that Hart attached to his Second Amended
Complaint and his opposition to the instant motion. As
noted, those images are taken from NCAA Football,
though Hart has not explained in his papers from which
game or game(s) the screenshots were taken. In his
Complaint exhibit, Hart juxtaposed, next to the
screenshots, photographs of himself taken during his
college career. In comparing the screenshots to the
photographs, it is clear that the screenshots reflect his
image. Hart further argues that the screenshots show
the virtual player “in the same position” as in the
photographs. McKenna Cert., ¶ 7.
While the screenshots reflect Hart’s image, in my
view, the screenshots do not depict the virtual player in
the exact position as Hart appears in the photographs.
There are variations. Even if the screenshots did
replicate the photographs, that would not end the
inquiry—the question here is whether EA’s use of
Hart’s image in the game is transformative. That a few
still screenshots in the context of a larger video game
reflect his image does not undercut the existence of the
additional creative elements of the game, discussed
above, and the variable permutations of his image,
created by EA’s artists, for use in the game.
In this connection, Hart points to a statement from
EA’s website indicating that the goal of NCAA
Football (no pun intended) is to create “the most
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realistic authentic [football] performance [so that the
user may] feel what it’s like to cover the field and play
at the most elite level in college football.” McKenna
Cert., Exh. I. He, further, attaches statements from
online articles that also describe the video game as a
realistic experience. See id. at Exh. H, J, K. Whether
EA has attempted to create a realistic experience,
however, is not the focus of my inquiry. The pertinent
question is whether EA’s use of Hart’s image is
transformative and, for the reasons expressed above, I
30
conclude that the use is transformative.
My analysis is in contrast to that in Keller, supra,
cited by Plaintiff. In that case, the District Court for
the Northern District of California held that NCAA
Football is not sufficiently transformative. Looking
solely at the image of the former college player-plaintiff
in that case, who had previously played for Arizona
State University, the court reasoned:
the quarterback for Arizona State University
shares many of Plaintiff’s characteristics. For
example, the virtual players wears the same
jersey number, is the same height and weight
and hails from the same state. EA’s depiction of
30

Lastly, Hart states in his declaration that, “[i]n addition to my
image being used in the video game, my image was used in the
promotion for Defendant EA’s NCAA game wherein I was throwing a pass with actual video footage from Rutgers’ bowl game
against Arizona State.” Hart Decl., ¶ 20. However, Hart does not
point to any evidence in support of this assertion, he does not explain where or when his image was purportedly used, nor does he
attach a copy of this use. Accordingly, the Court does not consider
this ostensible promotional use of his image.
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Plaintiff is far from the transmogrification of the
Winter brothers. EA does not depict Plaintiff in
a different form; he is represented as he [sic]
what he was: the starting quarterback for
Arizona State University. Further, unlike in
Kirby, the game’s setting is identical to where
the public found Plaintiff during his collegiate
career, on the football field.
31

2010 WL 530108 at *5. EA argued to the Keller court
that the court should consider the video game as a
whole, and not focus solely on the former player’s
image. The court rejected this argument, reasoning
that Winter and Kirby did just that. Id.
As an initial matter, EA’s motion before the Keller
court was a motion to dismiss. As such, the court
considered only “those documents whose contents
[were] alleged in [the] complaint,” 2010 WL 530108 at
*5 n. 2, and it did not take into account declarations,
submitted by EA, that described the games. Nor did
the court consider other materials submitted by the
parties, although it did take “judicial notice” of the
content of the games. Id. That this Court considers
EA’s motion as one for summary judgment, taking into
account declarations and other materials, as well as the
games themselves, distinguishes my ruling from Keller.
With regard to Keller’s substantive analysis, that
court fails to address that the virtual image may be
altered and that the EA artists created the various
formulations of each player. As noted, I find this aspect
31

This aspect of Keller’s ruling is currently on appeal to the Ninth
Circuit.
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of the game significant because it suggests that the goal
of the game is not for the user to “be” the player, as in
No Doubt, where the virtual player could not be
altered. The malleability of the player’s image in
NCAA Football suggests, instead, that the image
serves as an art-imitating-life starting point for the
game playing experience. In this way, while the player
image may not be fanciful, like the worm-like
characters in Winter, it is one of the “raw materials’
from which an original work is synthesized, [and] the
depiction or imitation of the celebrity is [not] the very
sum and substance of the work in question.” Comedy
III, supra at 406, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797.
Moreover, one could argue that even the technology
that permits users to alter a player’s image is itself a
noteworthy, expressive attribute of the game. None of
these facts were considered by the Keller court.
Finally, I disagree with Keller’s approach of
focusing solely on the challenged image, as opposed to
the work as a whole. Contrary to Keller’s reasoning, I
read Kirby as looking at the video game in that case, as
a whole. By focusing on the setting in which the Ulala
character appeared, Kirby considered the entire game.
Similarly, the Winter court considered that the
purported images of the Winter brother musicians
were
“cartoon
characters—half-human
and
half-worm—in a larger story, which is itself quite
expressive.” Id. at 890, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473
(emphasis added). While the Winter Court did focus
most of its attention on the fanciful worm-like
characters, it also considered the larger story of which
the characters were a part. Moreover, in my view, it is
logically inconsistent to consider the setting in which
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the character sits, which Keller does in its analysis, yet
ignore the remainder of the game.
For the aforesaid reasons, I conclude that, under
the transformative test, EA is entitled to assert the
First Amendment as a defense to Hart’s appropriation
claim.
C.

Rogers Test

The Rogers test was developed by the Second
Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.
1989). Courts have determined that application of the
Rogers test makes sense “in the context of commercial
speech when the appropriation of a celebrity likeness
creates a false and misleading impression that the
celebrity is endorsing a product.” ETW, 332 F.3d at 956
(quoting Comedy III, 25 Cal.4th at 396, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d
126, 133, 21 P.3d 797). Like the transformative test, it is
created to balance the competing interests of
intellectual property rights and First Amendment
freedom-of-expression rights. In contrast to the
transformative test, it was developed in the context of
trademark law rather than copyright.
In Rogers, the Second Circuit was faced with a
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), false-endorsement
claim by Ginger Rogers, of the famous film duo of Fred
Astaire and Ginger Rogers, against the creators of a
film titled “Ginger and Fred.” 875 F.2d at 996. This
section of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), creates
civil liability for “[a]ny person who shall affix, apply,
annex, or use in connection with any goods or services .
. . a false designation of origin, or any false description
or representation . . . and shall cause such goods or
services to enter into commerce . . . .”
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The Rogers court fashioned a “relevance” test,
which mandates that Lanham Act liability should not
be imposed unless the title to the challenged work has
no relevance to the underlying work, or, if the title
bears some relevance, whether the title misleads the
public as to the content or source of the work. 875 F.2d
at 999. In the Rogers court’s view, this test is useful
because “[a] misleading title with no artistic relevance
cannot be sufficiently justified by a free expression
interest.” Id. This is because
if a film-maker placed the title “Ginger and
Fred” on a film to which it had no artistic
relevance at all, the arguably misleading
suggestions as to source or content implicitly
conveyed by the title could be found to violate
the Lanham Act as to such a film.
Id. If there is some modicum of relevance, the court
further reasoned, a title that was “explicitly
misleading” could still be found to violate the Lanham
32
Act. Applying its newly minted test, the Second
Circuit held that “Ginger and Fred” was entitled to
First Amendment protection because the film bore
some relevance to the film’s story and because the title
32

By way of example, the court applied its relevance test to the
song title “Bette Davis Eyes,” and concluded that such a use of
Bette Davis’ name would be protected by the First Amendment
despite the “slight risk that such use of a celebrity’s name might
implicitly suggest endorsement or sponsorship to some people....”
Id. at 999–1000. That slight risk, in the court’s view, was “outweighed by the danger of restricting artistic expression....” Id. at
999. In contrast, the court reasoned, the title “The True Life Story
of Ginger and Fred” would be an “explicitly misleading description
of content.” Id.
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contained no explicit indication that Ginger Rogers
endorsed or had a role in developing the film. Id. at
1001.
Noticeably, the Rogers court does not explain the
genesis of its Lanham Act, “relevance test.” See id. It
appears, however, that this test may have been
borrowed from a doctrine developed under New York
state law that is referred to as the “real relationship”
test. That test was first applied in a 1957 decision by a
New York appellate court in Dallesandro v. Henry
Holt & Co., 4 A.D.2d 470, 166 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1957). In
that decision, the court applied the “real relationship”
test to a right of publicity claim, brought under the
New York statute, by a priest who alleged that a book
based on his life, and that featured him on the book
cover, violated his right of publicity. The court ruled
that the book and cover did not violate the New York
statute because the statute does not bar uses connected
to matters of public interest. Id. at 807.
The Dallesandro court described the “real
relationship” test as a newsworthiness exception to the
statutory right of publicity:
A picture illustrating an article on a matter of
public interest is not considered used for the
purpose of trade or advertising within the
prohibition of the statute unless it has no real
relationship to the article, or unless the article is
an advertisement in disguise. It makes no
difference whether the article appears in a
newspaper; a magazine; a newsreel; on
television; in a motion picture; or in a book. The
test of permissible use is not the currency of the
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publication in which the picture appears but
whether it is illustrative of a matter of
legitimate public interest.
Id. at 806–07 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added). The purpose of the test is to exclude from the
New York right of publicity statute those uses of a
individual’s image that are not commercial in nature or
33
“used for the purpose of trade.” Id. This test has been
criticized because the result reached may be
manipulated depending on what level of generality is
34
employed by a reviewing court.
33

The real relationship test continues to be applied by courts interpreting the new York statute’s “used for the purpose of trade”
element. See Messenger v. Gruner Jahr Printing and Pub., 208
F.3d 122, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]here a plaintiff’s picture is
used to illustrate an article on a matter of public interest, there can
be no liability under sections 50 and 51 unless the picture has no
real relationship to the article or the article is an advertisement in
disguise . . . .”); Finger v. Omni Publications Intern., Ltd., 77
N.Y.2d 138, 564 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 566 N.E.2d 141, 144–45 (1990)
(“[Q]uestions of ‘newsworthiness’ are better left to reasonable
editorial judgment and discretion; judicial intervention should occur only in those instances where there is “‘no real relationship’”
between a photograph and an article or where the article is an
“‘advertisement in disguise’””) (internal citation omitted). In addition, the test has been applied by a federal court interpreting District of Columbia law as well. See Lane v. Random House, Inc., 985
F. Supp. 141, 146 (D.D.C. 1995) (“A plaintiff cannot recover for
misappropriation based upon the use of his identity or likeness in a
newsworthy publication unless the use has “no real relationship”
to the subject matter of the publication.”).
34

For example, in Finger, the New York Court of Appeals held
that a photograph of a large family, with multiple children, used in
a magazine article about caffeine and in vitro fertilization, did not
violate the family’s right of publicity. 77 N.Y.2d at 144–45, 565
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Like the Rogers test, the “real relationship” test
does not apply to a use that “has no real relationship to
the article, or unless the article is an advertisement in
disguise.” Id. Yet Rogers expands upon the “real
relationship” test by not requiring that the substance of
the challenged work be related to newsworthy matters
of public interest. Important here is that, while Rogers
was addressing a First Amendment defense to a
Lanham Act claim, it apparently imported the New
York “real relationship” test without explaining why
that test was helpful in the Lanham Act context.
In addition to its Lanham Act analysis, Rogers
engages in a separate legal analysis of Ms. Rogers
common-law right of publicity claim. In addressing that
claim, the Second Circuit noted that “the right of
publicity, unlike the Lanham Act, has no likelihood of
confusion requirement [and is, therefore,] potentially
more expansive than the Lanham Act.” Id. at 1004.
After clarifying a choice-of-law question as to which
state law applied to her claim, the court determined
that an Oregon court would determine that Ms. Roger’s
right of publicity claim failed. Referencing the Oregon
state constitution’s free speech clause, which Oregon
courts have interpreted more broadly than the federal
constitution, Rogers then turned to Oregon decisional
law, holding that a celebrity’s name may be used in a
N.Y.S.2d 434, 566 N.E.2d 633. The family-plaintiffs argued that the
article was not related to their photograph because none of the
children were conceived by in vitro fertilization. Rejecting the
family’s focus on the precise topic explored in the article, the court
reasoned that the photograph was related to the article’s more
general topic of fertility because the picture included several
children. See Solove, supra at 221 (questioning Finger’s rationale).
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movie title unless the title was “wholly unrelated” to
the movie or the title was “simply a disguised
commercial advertisement . . . .” Id. at 1004. This
“wholly unrelated” and “disguised commercial
advertisement” language is strikingly similar to the
Lanham Act relatedness test, but comes from a distinct
body of law. Ultimately, it is not clear from my reading
of Rogers’ language whether it disposed of the right of
publicity claim on state law, as opposed to federal
constitutional grounds, but other courts have read
Rogers as resting on federal constitutional grounds. See
e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th
Cir. 2003) (discussing Rogers).
EA properly acknowledges in its briefing that
Rogers actually involves the application of two separate
tests—the Lanham Act test, and the right of publicity
test. Some courts have described the Lanham Act as
the federal equivalent of a state right of publicity, see
Kirby, supra at 57, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 (citing ETW, 332
F.3d at 924), and have applied the Lanham Act test to
appropriation claims like that presented here. The
35
court in ETW is one example. In that 2003 case, the
Sixth Circuit applied the Lanham Act test to conclude
that an artist who depicted Tiger Woods in a painting
35

EA points to Arenas, supra, as an example of a court implicitly
applying the Rogers Lanham Act test to a misappropriation claim.
The language EA cites in Arenas consists of one paragraph in the
“Transformative Use Defense” section of the opinion, which states,
in pertinent part, that “there is an obvious connection between
Arenas and [Basketball Wives ].” Slip Op. at 9. I do not find the
Arenas analysis useful here because Arenas did not explicitly apply the Rogers test and, apparently, viewed its “connection” reasoning as related to the transformative test instead.
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was entitled to a First Amendment defense for his
36
work. Id. at 937–38.
Other courts have applied the right of publicity
claim test to misappropriation claims. For example, in
Parks v. LaFace Records, supra, the Sixth Circuit
applied the right of publicity test in denying summary
judgment on a claim brought by the civil rights icon
Rosa Parks against a rap group that used her name in a
song title. The Sixth Circuit held that genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether the song title was
“wholly unrelated” to the song and whether the use of
her name was a “disguised commercial advertisement.”
Id. at 461. These courts may have chosen to apply the
right of publicity test because right of publicity claims
do not embody the same likelihood-of-confusion
concerns that the Rogers Lanham Act test is designed
to protect. See Parks, 329 F.3d at 460 (“[A] right of
publicity claim does differ from a false advertising
claim in one crucial respect; a right of publicity claim
does not require any evidence that a consumer is likely
to be confused.”) (citing Herman Miller, Inc. v.
Palazzetti Imports, 270 F.3d 298, 319–20 (6th Cir. 2001);
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004; Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co.,
24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1030 (C.D. Cal. 1998)).
Similarly, in Romantics, supra, a district court
applied the right of publicity test to conclude that the
use of a band’s distinctive sound in the Guitar Hero
video game was not unrelated to the game or a
disguised advertisement. 574 F. Supp. 2d at 766. While
36

The ETW court also applied the transformative test to reach the
same conclusion. Id.

140a
this holding is technically dicta, because the Romantics
court first determined that the plaintiffs in that case
failed to adequately assert a publicity claim under state
law, it further illustrates that several courts have
applied the right of publicity test as opposed to the
Lanham Act test. In any event, the Lanham Act and
right of publicity tests are very similar and EA argues
that it is entitled to a First Amendment defense under
either test. See Def. Mov. Br. at 32 (discussing both
tests simultaneously).
EA’s argument as to why I should apply Rogers
here is convoluted, yet easily addressed. According to
EA, because New Jersey follows the Restatement, and
the Restatement (Third) mirrors New York’s statutory
appropriation tort which a New Jersey court has
described as “essentially the same” as New Jersey’s
common law tort, Tellado, 643 F. Supp. at 912, and
because the Rogers test appears to track the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, I should
37
adopt that test. Underlying EA’s argument is the
37

It is true that the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
promotes a new trend of treating right of publicity claims as competition-based claims, as opposed to property-right-based claims.
However, even if this Court were bound by New Jersey’s approach to a federal constitutional issue, New Jersey has yet to
formally adopt this particular Restatement. That said, there is an
historic rationale for applying a test that treats right of publicity
actions as akin to unfair competition claims. In the early U.S. Supreme Court opinion of International News Service v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S. Ct. 68, 63 L.Ed. 211 (1918) superceded by
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L.
Ed. 1188 (1938), the Court analyzed one news service’s almost
verbatim copying of another news service’s newspaper articles as
violating unfair competition laws as opposed to copyright or other
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assumption that I should follow New Jersey law.
However, as explained supra, I am bound by federal
law interpretation of the constitutional defenses—not
state law interpretations thereof.
Moreover, as explained above, courts have noted
that right of publicity claims do not embody the same
likelihood-of-confusion concerns that the Rogers
Lanham Act test is designed to protect. See Parks, 329
F.3d at 460 (“[A] right of publicity claim does differ
from a false advertising claim in one crucial respect; a
right of publicity claim does not require any evidence
that a consumer is likely to be confused.”) (citing
Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports, 270 F.3d
298, 319–20 (6th Cir. 2001); Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004;
Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1030
(C.D. Cal. 1998)). And, the Rogers right of publicity test
mirrors the Lanham Act test. For this reason, I
question the wisdom of applying a trademark-based
test to right of publicity claims without accounting for
this difference. The Rogers court did not explain the
genesis of its Lanham Act test, yet it appears that the
test was borrowed from New York’s “real relationship”
property-based laws. Id. at 235–36, 39 S. Ct. 68 (“We need spend
no time, however, upon the general question of property in news
matter at common law, or the application of the copyright act,
since it seems to us the case must turn upon the question of unfair
competition in business . . . . [T]his does not depend upon any general right of property analogous to the common-law right of the
proprietor of an unpublished work to prevent its publication without his consent; nor is it foreclosed by showing that the benefits of
the copyright act have been waived . . . . [T]the news of current
events may be regarded as common property. What we are concerned with is the business of making it known to the world, in
which both parties to the present suit are engaged.”).
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test. If that is the case, Rogers fails to explain why it
imported that newsworthiness-based test into the
38
Lanham Act context.
Arguably, one benefit of applying either of the
Rogers tests (the Lanham Act or right of publicity
tests) is that they are both straightforward, and do not
require courts to engage in as much artistic
interpretation as required by the transformative test.
However, like the “real relationship” test, the Rogers
tests may be manipulated depending upon the level of
generality employed by the parties or the reviewing
court.
It is important to note that the Third Circuit has not
adopted the Rogers test in the context of either a
Lanham Act claim or a right of publicity claim. In
Facenda, the Third Circuit declined to rule on the test’s
applicability to a Lanham Act claim. See 542 F.3d at
1018. In addition to the Sixth Circuit, two other
circuits, however, have adopted the test for use in the
Lanham Act context. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records,
Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002); Sugar Busters
LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 & n. 7 (5th Cir.
1999). And, in E.S.S. Entert. 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star
38

Others may argue that the Rogers Lanham Act test derives
solely from trademark law. A dissenting justice in ETW explains
that the Second Circuit decision issued shortly after Rogers, Cliffs
Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886
F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989), clarified that application of the “the Rogers
balancing approach” must “take[ ] into account the ultimate test in
trademark law, namely, the likelihood of confusion as to source of
the goods in question” by also applying the “the eight-factor likelihood of confusion test . . . .” ETW, 332 F.3d at 948 (quoting Cliffs
Notes, 886 F.2d at 495).
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Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth
Circuit applied the Rogers test to a Lanham Act claim
relating to the content of a video game that
incorporated the use of a night club’s name into the
game scenery.
Notably, in Brown v. Electronic Arts, No.
2:09–cv–1598 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2010) (Slip Op.), the
Central District of California applied the Rogers test to
conclude that the use of a former professional football
player’s likeness in EA’s Madden NFL video game was
protected by the First Amendment. In that Lanham
Act action, the court concluded that “the mere use of
[the plaintiff’s] likeness in the game, without more, is
insufficient to make the use explicitly misleading.” Id.
at 8. A similar holding was reached in another Lanham
Act video game case brought against EA, albeit not a
39
sports-related game. That court had already dismissed
the plaintiff’s right of publicity claim on other grounds,
39

A recent Lanham Act case applies Rogers to EA’s The Godfather
video games. That case, Dillinger, LLC v. Electronic Arts, Inc.,
No. 1:09–cv–1236, 2011 WL 2457678 (S.D. Ind. Jun. 16, 2011), involved the video game’s use of the image of John Dillinger, a
gun-slinging bandit from the 1930’s era who was a flashy womanizer. Dillinger was also known for his use of the Tommy Gun
submachine gun. Id. at *2. In The Godfather video game, which is
fashioned after Francis Ford Coppola’s The Godfather films, users
may choose a Tommy Gun weapon out of seventeen weapon options. The weapon is identified, in the game, as the “Dillinger
Tommy Gun.” Id. at *3. Ruling in favor of EA, the court reasoned
that EA’s use of the “Dillinger Tommy Gun” name in its video
game is (1) related to the Godfather world where flashy gangsters
spray their enemies with such guns, and (2) does not explicitly
mislead purchasers into believing that Dillinger sponsored or endorsed the game. Id. at *6.
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but noted that “it would have analyzed that claim under
Rogers also . . . .,” Dillinger, LLC v. Electronic Arts,
Inc., No. 1:09–cv–1236, 2011 WL 2457678, *4 n.1 (S.D.
Ind. Jun. 16, 2011), at the parties’ request.
In short, although the Third Circuit has not adopted
the Rogers test to either Lanham Act or right of
publicity claims, there is some precedent for applying
the Rogers test to misappropriation actions like that
presented in this case. Accordingly, although I am not
convinced by EA’s arguments as to the applicability of
the Rogers test, and, in my view, the transformative
test better balances First Amendment and right of
publicity interests, I will assume for the sake of
argument that the test applies. Applying the test here,
I conclude that, under either the Rogers Lanham Act
test or the strikingly similar right of publicity test,
NCAA Football is entitled to First Amendment
protection.
As noted, the Rogers Lanham Act test is a
two-prong test that asks: (1) whether the challenged
work has relevance to the underlying work; and (2) if
the challenged work is relevant, whether the title
misleads the public as to the source of content of the
work. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. The use of Hart’s image
in the video game has great relevance to the game
itself, which is set on a college football field and
revolves around the playing of virtual football. In
addition, the use of Hart’s image in the game cannot
reasonably be said to mislead the public as to the
content or source of the video game. Hart has not
suggested, in his opposition brief, that the use of his
image leads the public to believe that he has endorsed
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the NCAA Football product. Indeed, in his opposition
brief, Hart fails to adequately address the Rogers test
altogether. He merely cites the case in one footnote,
and provides no analysis of the Rogers test factors.
Under the Rogers right-of-publicity test, the two
queries are: (a) whether the challenged work is wholly
unrelated to the underlying work; or (b) whether the
use of the plaintiff’s name is a disguised commercial
advertisement. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004. One cannot
reasonably argue that Hart’s image is wholly unrelated
to the game, for the same reasons expressed under my
analysis of the Lanham Act test. Nor is the use of
Hart’s image a “disguised commercial advertisement.”
Id. Instead, the use of his image is part of an expressive
act by EA that might draw upon public familiarity with
Hart’s college football career but does not explicitly
state that he endorses or contributes to the creation of
the game.
As explained by the court in Seale v. Gramercy
Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1996), applying
Rogers to a Pennsylvania right of publicity claim, “[i]f
the name or likeness is used solely to attract attention
to a work that is not related to the identified person,
the user may be subject to liability for a use of the
other’s identity in advertising.” Id. at 336 (quoting
Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition § 47, cmt c.).
On the other hand, the “use of a person’s name and
likeness to advertise a novel, play, or motion picture
concerning that individual is not actionable as an
infringement of the right of publicity.” Id. (citing
Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition § 47, cmt a.)
Here, EA’s use of Hart’s image is clearly related to the
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video game and is not simply an advertisement for an
40
unrelated product. Therefore, I conclude that EA is
entitled to First Amendment protection under the
Rogers right of publicity test.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In sum, it is my view that the transformative test
best encapsulates the type of nuanced analysis required
to properly balance the competing right of publicity and
First Amendment interest. Nonetheless, having
concluded that EA is entitled to First Amendment
protection under either the transformative test or
either of the Rogers’ tests, the Court need not decide
which test should generally apply to misappropriation
cases. On the facts of this case, EA is entitled to assert
the First Amendment defense and its motion for
summary judgment must, therefore, be granted.

40

Otherwise put, “[c]ourts long ago recognized that a celebrity’s
right of publicity does not preclude others from incorporating a
person’s name, features or biography in a literary work, motion
picture, news or entertainment story. Only the use of an individual’s identity in advertising infringes on the persona.” George M.
Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity: Persona as Property,
51 La. L. Rev. 443, 467 (1991) (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F.
Supp. 112, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989))
cited in Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1994).
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Appendix C
United States District Court
D. New Jersey
Ryan HART, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v.
ELECTRONIC ARTS, INC., and John Does, 1–50,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 09–5990.
Sept. 22, 2010.
OPINION
WOLFSON, District Judge.
In this putative class action lawsuit, Plaintiff Ryan
Hart filed suit on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated against Defendant Electronic Arts,
Inc. (“Defendant”), alleging, inter alia, that Defendant
appropriated Plaintiff’s likeness and used his likeness
for commercial purposes in connection with
Defendant’s NCAA Football video games. The suit was
initially filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Somerset County, and then removed by
Defendant to this Court. Defendant now moves to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that
each count of the Amended Complaint—invasion of
privacy-right of publicity (appropriation of commercial
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1

likeness), New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act
(“NJCFA”), unjust enrichment, and conspiracy—fails
to state a claim. For the following reasons, Defendant’s
motion is granted. Plaintiff’s right of publicity claim is
dismissed without prejudice and Plaintiff is granted
leave to amend that claim. His remaining claims are
dismissed with prejudice.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this action in
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division,
Somerset County, on June 15, 2009. In that complaint,
Plaintiff alleged that, without his consent, Defendant
advertised and sold products bearing his identity and
likeness from the years in which he played as a
2
quarterback on the Rutgers University football team.
Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 6. Shortly thereafter, on July 28, 2009,
Defendant moved for a more definite statement. In that
motion, Defendant argued that the Complaint failed to
identify which games depicted Plaintiff’s likeness and
“what attributes ... of plaintiff[ ] constitute[s his]
likeness....” Notice of Removal, Exh. B, Def. Mot. More
Definite Statement at 2. That motion was heard in state
court on September 11, 2009. At the hearing, the
1

As New Jersey and federal courts applying New Jersey law interchangeably refer to these claims as appropriation or misappropriation of commercial likeness, and “right of publicity,” this Court
will do the same.

2

Troy Taylor was a co-plaintiff in the original Complaint in this
action. He is no longer party to this suit, however, and Plaintiff
Ryan Hart proceeds as the sole plaintiff.
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parties placed a settlement, with respect to that motion
only, on the record. Id., Rosen Ltr. dated September
17, 2009 at 1. Per their agreement, Plaintiff was to file
an amended complaint that included “the names of the
video game(s) and the version/year of those game(s)
upon which plaintiff [is] seeking relief.” Id. Thereafter,
Defendant withdrew its motion. On October 24, 2009,
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. Defendant then
removed the suit to this Court, on November 24, 2009,
and this motion to dismiss followed.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts right of
publicity, NJCFA, unjust enrichment, and conspiracy
claims based on Defendant’s use of Plaintiff’s image in
its NCAA Football video game series for the years of
2004, 2005 and 2009. Am. Compl. at ¶ 22. In connection
with the 2009 game, he alleges that a photograph of him
appears in a photo montage of actual college players.
He asserts two invasion of privacy claims, one titled
“Appropriation of Likeness” and one titled
“Appropriation of Likeness for Commercial Purposes.”
See id. at pp. 5–6. In connection with these claims, he
asserts that Defendant “incorporat[ed] Plaintiff’s
identify [sic] and likeness into its video games.” Id. at ¶
20; see also id. at ¶ 25 (“Defendant ... invaded Plaintiff’s
right to privacy by appropriating Plaintiff’s likeness by
including him in its video games.”). Plaintiff clarifies, in
his opposition papers, that these two claims should be
construed as one claim instead. Pl. Opp. at 13.
In connection with his NJCFA claim, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant violated the NJCFA’s
prohibition against unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent acts
by: (a) failing to disclose to its customers that Plaintiff
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has not consented to the use of his image, (b)
appropriating Plaintiff’s likeness in order to enhance its
sales; and (c) engaging in deceptive practices by
“misleading the public that Plaintiff endorsed the use of
his likeness.” Id. at ¶ 34. His unjust enrichment claim
alleges that Defendant has been unjustly enriched by
Defendant’s use of his likeness, id. at ¶ 39–42, and his
conspiracy claim alleges that Defendant and JOHN
DOES 1–50 conspired to utilize Plaintiff’s image in
“disregard of the rights of Plaintiff.” Id. at ¶ 45.
The Amended Complaint does not address what
attributes of Plaintiff appear in the NCAA Football
games; however, in opposition to this motion, Plaintiff
submitted a Declaration in which he avers additional
facts. Specifically, Plaintiff’s Declaration avers that
NCAA Football depicts a “virtual” player in screen
shots that replicate photos taken of Plaintiff while
playing as a Rutgers University quarterback from 2002
through 2005. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 12, Exh. A–E. Plaintiff,
further, points to the NCAA Football 2006 game, which
“lists the Rutgers University ‘virtual’ QB as hailing
from Florida,” and avers that he was “the only Rutgers
QB during this time from Florida.” Id. at 14. Regarding
physical attributes, Plaintiff asserts that:
a. I was listed as standing six (6) feet and two (2)
inches tall, the same height as the “virtual”
Rutgers QB in the NCAA Football game
versions in question;
b. I weighed one hundred ninety-seven pounds
(197 lbs.), the same weight as the “virtual”
Rutgers QB in the NCAA Football game
versions in question;
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c. My Jersey number was 13, the same as the
“virtual” Rutgers QB in the NCAA Football
game versions in question;
d. I wore a left wrist band, the same as the
“virtual” Rutgers QB in the NCAA Football
game versions in question; and
e. I wore a helmet visor, the same as the
“virtual” Rutgers QB in the NCAA Football
game versions in question.
Id. at ¶ 15. In addition, Plaintiff avers, the NCAA
Football 2006 game used the same “speed and agility
rating,” “passing accuracy,” and “arm strength in the
video [g]ame compared to actual footage.” Id. at ¶ 17.
Similarly, the game “shows my contribution to the team
and importance to total team success as identical to the
actual season,” he asserts. Id. at ¶ 18. Finally, Plaintiff
avers in his declaration that actual video footage of him
was “used in the promotion for Defendant EA’s NCAA
game wherein I was throwing a pass [in a] Rutgers’
bowl game against Arizona State.” Id. at ¶ 19.
In his opposition brief, Plaintiff asserts additional
facts not found in his declaration. Specifically, he
asserts that, while playing at Rutgers, he agreed to be
bound by the NCAA rules, regulations and bylaws,
including NCAA “Bylaw 12.5 [which] prohibits the
commercial licensing of the ‘name, picture or likeness’
of a student athlete while he/she attends an
NCAA-member institution.” Pl. Opp. at 1–2. Further,
he states, that “[d]uring [his] college career in 2002,
2003, 2004 and 2005, [he] had forgone commercial
opportunities in order to maintain his eligibility as an
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NCAA student athlete at Rutgers University.” Id. at 2.
In terms of the role of his likeness in the game, Plaintiff
asserts that the game “allows the public to simulate the
college football playing experience by stepping into the
shoes of Rutgers’ QB Ryan Hart, and other college
football players, where fans can mimic Plaintiff’s style
and movements and play against Plaintiff’s actual
opponents.” Id. at 3.
Defendants filed the instant motion on January 12,
2010, seeking to dismiss the Amended Complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
As noted, Plaintiff has opposed the motion and filed a
Declaration in support thereof. Having reviewed all the
parties’ motion papers, the motion is now ripe for
decision.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a motion to dismiss on the
pleadings, courts “accept all factual allegations as true,
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may
be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and quotations
omitted). In Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007), the
Supreme Court clarified the 12(b)(6) standard.
Specifically, the Court “retired” the language contained
in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2
L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957), that “a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim which would entitle him to
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relief.” Id. at 561, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (quoting Conley, 355
U.S. at 45–46, 78 S. Ct. 99). Instead, the factual
allegations set forth in a complaint “must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at
555, 127 S. Ct. 1955. As the Third Circuit has stated,
“[t]he Supreme Court’s Twombly formulation of the
pleading standard can be summed up thus: ‘stating . . . a
claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest the required element.’ This
‘does not impose a probability requirement at the
pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough
facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of the necessary element’.”
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
In affirming that Twombly standards apply to all
motions to dismiss, the Supreme Court recently
explained the principles. “First, the tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed.
2d 868 (2009); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009). “Second, only a complaint
that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion
to dismiss.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Therefore, “a
court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to
begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Id. Ultimately, “a complaint must
do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.
A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its
facts.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211.
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On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must
limit its review to the pleadings. A court may not
consider matters extraneous to the pleadings without
treating the motion as one for summary judgment and
giving all parties reasonable opportunity to present
materials pertinent to such a motion under Rule 56. An
exception is made, however, for a “document integral to
or explicitly relied upon in the complaint,” and it has
been long established that “a court may consider an
undisputedly authentic document that a defendant
attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the
plaintiff’s claims are based on the document.” In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis omitted).
Based on this doctrine, Defendants argue that the
Court may consider the 2004, 2005, and 2009 NCAA
Football video games it submitted to the Court in
connection with its motion. The Court agrees that the
video games may be considered in the context of this
motion. However, the Court may not consider the other
declarations and exhibits that Defendant attached to its
motion, including the license agreement between it and
the National Collegiate Athletics Association
(“NCAA”), see Strauser Decl., Exh. F, because those
documents/materials are not integral to or referenced
in the plaintiff’s pleadings.
Furthermore, a party may not amend his pleadings
by making factual assertions in a brief. Penn ex rel.
Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir.
1988); Cardiology Consultants of North Morris v.
UFCW Local, Civil Action No. 06–5557, 2007 WL
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4570160, *3 n.5 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2007) (citations
omitted). Nor may he amend his complaint through a
declaration or certification. Del Sontro v. Cendant
Corp., Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 563, 581 (D.N.J. 2002). See
also McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1089 (3d Cir.
1992) (“[D]efects in [a] complaint clearly [can] not be
remedied by [an] affidavit.”). Accordingly, the Court
may not consider the allegations made in Plaintiff’s
opposition papers or declaration.
That said, “if a complaint is vulnerable to [Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district
court must permit a curative amendment, unless an
amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 238, 256
n.14 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236)
(citation omitted). This rule applies “even if the plaintiff
does not seek leave to amend.” Id. (citing Phillips, 515
F.3d at 245 (citation omitted)). Futility “means that the
complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.” Id. (quoting In re
Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1434). Thus, the
Court may consider the allegations made in Plaintiff’s
opposition papers and declaration to determine
whether a second amendment of his complaint would be
futile.
III.

DISCUSSION

Defendant makes specific challenges to each of
3
Plaintiff’s causes of action. As to Plaintiff’s right of
publicity claim, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has
3

The parties agree that New Jersey law governs their dispute.
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failed to point to specific attributes that belong to
Plaintiff, which are misappropriated in the video game.
In addition, and in the alternative, Defendant argues
that the video game’s use of Plaintiff’s height, weight,
and home state do not impinge upon Plaintiff’s right to
publicity.
Furthermore, Defendant argues that the NCAA
Football games are expressive works entitled to full
First Amendment protection. In response, Plaintiff
urges this Court to adopt the transformative test
employed by the court in Keller v. Electronics Arts,
Inc., No. C 09–1967, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6,
2010), a factually similar case brought by a former
college football player against Defendant. That case
ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the
Defendant was not entitled to First Amendment
protection for its use of the plaintiff’s likeness in its
NCAA Football video games.
With regard to Plaintiff’s NJCFA claim, Defendant
argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege, inter alia, that
he does not have standing under the NJCFA because
he is not a consumer. Defendant argues, with respect to
Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claims, that they must be
dismissed because there is no direct relationship
between it and Plaintiff. And, lastly, Defendant argues
that Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim must be dismissed
for failure to allege an agreement.
A.

Right of Publicity

The right to publicity is one of four invasion of
privacy torts recognized in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, § 652. Castro v. NYT Television, 370
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4

N.J.Super. 282, 296, 851 A.2d 88 (App. Div. 2004).
Succinctly put, “[New Jersey’s] right of publicity
signifies the right of an individual, especially a public
figure or celebrity, to control the commercial value and
exploitation of his name and picture or likeness and to
prevent others from unfairly appropriating this value
for commercial benefit.” McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d
912, 918 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted) quoted in
Prima v. Darden Rest., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 348 (D.N.J.
2000); see also Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp.
282, 297 (D.N.J. 1993) (“The right of publicity generally
applies to situations where the plaintiff’s name,
reputation or accomplishments are highly publicized
and the defendant used that fact to his or her
advantage.”). Underlying this right is the theory that
“a celebrity has the right to capitalize on his persona,
and the unauthorized use of that persona for
commercial gain violates fundamental notions of
fairness and deprives the celebrity of some economic
value in his persona.” Prima, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 349
(citing McFarland, 14 F.3d at 919); Castro, 370
N.J.Super. at 297, 851 A.2d 88 (“The foundation for this
tort is recognition that a person has an interest in their
name or likeness ‘in the nature of a property right.’ ”)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C
comment a.). Because celebrity status often translates
to economic wealth, the unauthorized use of one’s
persona “harms the person both by diluting the value of
4

“The others are invasion of privacy by an unreasonable intrusion
upon the seclusion of another, § 652B, giving unreasonable publicity to another’s private life, § 652D, and publicity that unreasonably places a person in a false light in the public eye, § 652E.” Id.

158a
the name and depriving that individual of
compensation.” Prima, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 349 (citing
McFarland, 14 F.3d at 919).
As an initial matter, the Court addresses
Defendant’s preemption argument relating to Plaintiff’s
allegations regarding the use of his photograph in a
photo montage of actual college players in NCAA
Football 2009. Defendant concedes that this image was
used without Plaintiff’s consent, but argues that
Plaintiff’s claim is preempted by the Copyright Act
because Defendant licensed that photograph from
Collegiate Images, LLC, citing Laws v. Sony Music
Entertainment, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir.
2006), in support of its argument. Because Defendant’s
argument relies upon the license agreement, and that
agreement may not be properly considered on a motion
to dismiss, the Court denies without prejudice
Defendant’s preemption argument at this juncture.
With respect to Plaintiff’s remaining right of
publicity allegations, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
fails to put forth sufficient facts detailing the attributes
Plaintiffs believes are appropriated in the NCAA
Football game. As explained above, Plaintiff included
the attributes in a declaration attached to this
opposition papers but that declaration may not be
properly considered on a motion to dismiss. In addition,
Plaintiff makes further factual assertions in his
opposition papers, such as stating that his weight was
listed in the game as “one hundred ninety-seven pounds
(197 lbs.),” which corresponds to his actual weight at
the time. See Pl. Opp. at 4. However, Plaintiff may not
amend his pleadings through his briefing. Looking
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solely to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s failure to
plead any allegations regarding the attributes found in
the games does not meet the Twombly pleading
standard. “[A] complaint must do more than allege the
plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. [It] has to ‘show’ such
an entitlement with its facts.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211.
Here, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff has
a claim that the NCAA Football games appropriate
Plaintiff’s likeness when there are no allegations in the
Amended Complaint as to what aspects of his likeness
have been appropriated.
Apparently recognizing the need for additional
detail, Plaintiff states that he is “willing to file an
amended complaint to set forth the statements” made
in his brief and declaration. Id. at 1, n.1. Although
Plaintiff already had one opportunity to amend at the
state court level, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s request
because the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Declaration and
in his opposition appear to state a right of publicity
claim under New Jersey law. Should Plaintiff decide to
file a Second Amended Complaint in order to include
the proposed facts and any additional ones he chooses
to assert, the Court will then consider any subsequent
motion by Defendant based on a First Amendment
defense.
Plaintiff’s proposed allegations, found in his
declaration and opposition, are of the sort recognized
by New Jersey courts as stating a prima facie right of
publicity claim. Courts have explained the prima facie
case for infringement of the right of publicity as a
two-fold requirement, including allegations of validity
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5

and infringement. See id. (citing McCarthy, The Rights
of Publicity and Privacy § 3.1[B] ). Validity relates to
whether the plaintiff “owns an enforceable right in the
identity or persona,” the likeness of which he alleges
was misappropriated. Id. Infringement relates to
whether the defendant “without permission, . . . used
some aspect of identity or persona in such a way that
[plaintiff] is identifiable from defendant[s’] use,” and
that the “defendant[‘s] use is likely to cause damage to
the commercial value of that persona.” Id.
Here, in terms of validity, Plaintiff proposes to
assert that he played for Rutgers as a quarterback
during the 2002–2005 college seasons. This assertion
could sufficiently allege that he has a persona as a
Rutgers quarterback. As to likeness, Plaintiff proposes
to aver that the video games depict a “virtual” player in
screen shots that replicate photos taken of Plaintiff
while playing at Rutgers. Plaintiff further proposes to
assert that the virtual player hails from the same home
town, has the same height and weight as he did while a
quarterback, wears the same jersey number, wrist
band, and helmet visor. In addition, he asserts that the
2006 game used the same speed and agility rating,
5

Another formulation of the prima facie case is: “1) the defendant
appropriated the plaintiff’s likeness, 2) without the plaintiff’s consent, 3) for the defendant’s use or benefit, and 4) damage.” Jeffries
v. Whitney E. Houston Academy P.T., Docket No. L–1389–07,
2009 WL 2136174, *3 (App. Div. Jul. 20, 2009) (citing Faber v.
Condecor, Inc., 195 N.J.Super. 81, 86–90, 477 A.2d 1289 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 99 N.J. 178, 491 A.2d 684 (1984)). While this
formulation contains four elements, the test described in Prima
collapses the same elements into only two parts.

161a
passing accuracy, and arm strength, mirroring
statistics from Plaintiff’s actual game footage. These
sorts of allegations could provide enough factual
matter, if taken as true as they must be on a motion to
dismiss, to suggest that the virtual player in the video
games depicts Plaintiff’s likeness. Consistent with
Twombly’s pleading standard, these facts could “raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of th[is] element” of Plaintiff’s right of
publicity claim. 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955.
Regarding the allegations of infringement,
Plaintiff’s Declaration and statements in his opposition
brief allege that, without Plaintiff’s permission,
Defendant used Plaintiff’s likeness in such a way that
Plaintiff is identifiable, and that Defendant’s use caused
damage to the commercial value of Plaintiff’s persona.
As noted, he alleges that the virtual player has the
same
physical
characteristics,
uniform,
and
game-related statistics as he did while playing at
Rutgers, such as Plaintiff’s speed and agility rating.
These assertions are similar to those in a Ninth Circuit
case referenced by a New Jersey treatise. That case,
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d
821 (9th Cir. 1974) cited in Brent A. Olson, et al., The
Right of Publicity in New Jersey, 49 N.J. Prac.,
Business Law Deskbook § 16:4 (2009–2010 ed.),
involved allegations that the Defendant R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., owner of the “Winston” name, televised a
commercial
utilizing a color photograph of a professional
racing driver’s car in which the driver’s facial
features were not visible. Furthermore, in
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producing the commercial, defendants slightly
altered the photograph by changing the numbers
on plaintiff’s car from “11” to “71,” attaching a
wing-like spoiler to plaintiff’s car, and by adding
the word “Winston” to that spoiler. All other
familiar characteristics of the car were retained.
Id. at 826 (emphasis added). Ruling in favor of the
plaintiff in that case, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
the “distinctive decorations appearing on the car . . .
were not only peculiar to the plaintiff’s car, but they
caused some persons to think the car in question was
plaintiff’s and to infer that the person driving the car
was the plaintiff.” Id. at 827. Similarly, here, the
proposed allegations aver that virtual player’s physical
attributes and statistics are peculiar to Plaintiff and
invoke his likeness, even if his exact facial features are
not replicated. Finally, in terms of economic damage,
Plaintiff’s proposed allegations aver that Defendant’s
video game sales, for all of its sports-related games,
including NCAA Football, generate over 4 billion
dollars in revenue for Defendant. The implication of
Plaintiff’s allegations is that he would now be entitled
to sell his own likeness and recover a portion of those
monies for himself.
Altogether, Plaintiff’s proposed allegations suggest
that he may be able to state a right to publicity claim.
Accord Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96
N.J.Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (Ch. Div. 1967) (ruling in
favor of professional golf athletes whose name and
playing profiles were included in board game);
Presley’s Estate v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339 (D.N.J.
1981) (granting preliminary injunction enjoining Elvis
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impersonator from using Elvis’ likeness in products or
merchandise connected with the impersonator’s stage
show). This includes Plaintiff’s allegations regarding
the use of his video footage in promotional materials
related to a version of the video game. Accord Tellado
v. Time–Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904, 909–910
(D.N.J. 1986) (holding that use of photograph of former
Vietnam veteran in letter advertising non-fiction
Vietnam book violated veteran’s right to publicity).
Defendant’s key challenge to Plaintiff’s proposed
allegations is that they fail to demonstrate that
Defendant’s use of Plaintiff’s likeness was for a
commercial purpose. Defendant is correct that, under
New Jersey law,
defendant[s] would be liable for the tort of
misappropriation of likeness only if defendant’s
use of plaintiff’s likeness was for a
predominantly commercial purpose, i.e., if
defendant was seeking to capitalize on
defendant’s likeness for purposes other than the
dissemination of news or information.
Tellado, 643 F. Supp. at 909–10. Thus, to determine if
granting leave to amend would be futile, the Court
considers Defendant’s argument.
In support of its argument, Defendant relies upon
Castro v. NYT Television, supra. Castro involved an
appropriation of likeness claim asserted by plaintiff
emergency-room patients who had been videotaped
after executing a consent form. The plaintiffs claimed
that the videotapers misrepresented that they were
part of the hospital when, in fact, they were media
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employees seeking footage for a reality television show.
Because the plaintiffs did nothing more than assert that
“[d]efendants appropriated plaintiffs’ likenesses,
images and/or names for commercial profit and
advantage,” the Castro Court dismissed their claim for
failure to allege that the videotape footage had been
used for trade purposes. 370 N.J.Super. at 289, 851 A.2d
88. In reaching its conclusion, the Castro Court
reasoned that “it is irrelevant whether a videotape is
broadcast in connection with a television story about
important public events or a subject that provides only
entertainment and amusement . . . .” Id.
Defendant focuses its argument on Castro‘s broad
language; however, courts interpreting Castro have
limited its holding to media defendants. For example,
the court in Liebholz v. Harriri, Civil Action No.
05–5148, 2006 WL 2023186 (D.N.J. Jul. 12, 2006), held
that a biotechnology corporate defendant who
fraudulently displayed on its website that a scientist
was affiliated with the company could not rely on
Castro to shield it from liability. That court reasoned:
Leibholz cannot rely on cases like Castro ...
because those were cases in which the mere use
of a person’s likeness by a media defendant,
without use of the likeness to encourage more
viewership or sell more magazines, was held to
be incidental and therefore not actionable. Not
every use of one’s image or likeness by a
magazine is considered a “commercial use,” since
otherwise almost any publication of a name or
likeness would be misappropriation. Use of
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names and likenesses by non-media parties are
different.
Id. at *4. Indeed, language in Castro suggests this
interpretation is correct in that the decision speaks of
“enlightening the public,” and that there is no
distinction between “news for information” and “news
for entertainment,” 370 N.J.Super. at 298, 851 A.2d 88
(emphasis added). Other decisions applying New Jersey
law, such as Tellado, contain similar news-related
language. 643 F.Supp. at 914 (discussing Zacchini v.
Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.
Ct. 2849, 53 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1977)).
That said, case law and commentaries discussing
New Jersey law make clear that the touchstone of the
commercial purpose requirement is whether the
publication uses the plaintiff’s likeness “for the purpose
of capitalizing upon the name by using it in connection
with a commercial project . . . .” Palmer, 96 N.J.Super.
at 79, 232 A.2d 458; see Castro, 370 N.J.Super. at 297,
851 A.2d 88 (“defendant[s] would be liable for the tort
of misappropriation of likeness only . . . if defendant
was seeking to capitalize on defendant’s likeness”)
(quoting Tellado, 643 F. Supp. at 909–10); 49 N.J. Prac.,
Bus. Law Deskbook § 16:4 (2009–2010 ed.) (“In New
Jersey, an advantage or benefit accruing to the
defendant is a sine qua non for a successful claim: mere
publicity is not actionable; it must be shown that
defendant acted with a commercial purpose or
otherwise sought some benefit from revealing
information about plaintiffs.”) (emphasis in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted). As the
Restatement puts it, “[u]ntil the value of the name has
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in some way been appropriated, there is no tort.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C c (emphasis
added).
Thus, in my view, to show that the commercial
purpose requirement is met here, Plaintiff would have
to allege that Defendant used his likeness to increase
its sales of the video games, for example. Plaintiff
proposes to assert that “[w]ith its NCAA Football
video game, Defendant ... allows the public to simulate
the college football playing experience by stepping into
the shoes of Rutgers’ QB Ryan Hart, and other college
football players, where fans can mimic Plaintiff’s style
and movements and play against Plaintiff’s actual
opponents.” Pl. Opp. Br. at 3 (emphasis added). This
allegation, though inartfully plead, may evoke the
notion that Defendant has utilized Plaintiff’s image in
order to increase sales of its video game. Accord
Presley’s Estate, 513 F. Supp. at 1360 (concluding Elvis
impersonator’s use of Elvis’ likeness in his stage show
was primarily to appropriate the commercial value of
Elvis’ likeness even though the impersonator’s show
had some independent, creative, entertainment value).
In sum, “[w]hile the Court could ignore [Plaintiff’s
Declaration] and test the sufficiency of the allegations
in the [Amended Complaint] without reference to [the
Declaration or briefs],” I find it more efficient and in
the interest of justice to “grant Plaintiff leave to amend
the Complaint . . . and to permit Defendants to refile
their dismissal motions following Plaintiff[‘s]
amendment.” Liberty and Prosperity 1776, Inc. v.
Corzine, Civil Action No. 08–2642, 2009 WL 537049, *7
(D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2009) (“the court should freely give
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leave [to amend the complaint] when justice so
requires”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)). The Court,
thus, grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss without
prejudice, so to afford Plaintiff the opportunity to file a
Second Amended Complaint. In so ruling, the Court is
not holding that Plaintiff’s proposed allegations are
sufficient as a matter of law. Rather, the Court merely
concludes that the sort of allegations Plaintiff’s
proposes suggest that an amendment may not be futile.
With regard to Defendant’s First Amendment
defense, applicability of the defense depends upon
whether the video game is considered commercial
speech or an artistic work. See Facenda v. N.F.L.
Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008)
(discussing first amendment defense in trademark
context). Indeed, the Third Circuit noted in Facenda
that sports-related video games may contain both
6
noncommercial and commercial elements. Id. at 1017.
Accord Scott Jon Shagin, Celebrity Rights in New
Jersey, 231 N.J. Lawyer 15, 17 (2004) (“The First
Amendment defense analysis becomes especially
thorny in circumstances where the use of the
celebrity’s identity may serve dual purposes: as
6

Defendant attempts to rely on Facenda for the proposition that a
video game is an expressive work entitled to First Amendment
protection; however, the speech at issue in Facenda was a thirty-minute video program describing a video game, which the Third
Circuit held (on summary judgment) to be in the nature of an infomercial. Thus, any language suggesting that a video game is, by
its nature, an expressive work is dicta. That said, the Court questions whether Plaintiff will be able withstand the First Amendment defense at a later stage in the proceedings.
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expressive speech designed to entertain or newsworthy
speech designed to inform, but also as speech that is
designed to help sell products or services.”) Typically,
this sort of defense is heard on a motion for summary
judgment in light of the intricate facts that the Court
must consider in divining the nature of the speech. See
e.g., Id. at 1011; see In re Orthopedic Bone Screw
Products Liability Litigation, 193 F.3d 781, 793–94 (3d
Cir. 1999) (explaining a number of key facts that must
be assessed in ruling on First Amendment claim
involving potentially commercial speech). For this
reason, the Court will not consider Defendant’s First
7
Amendment defense at this juncture. If Plaintiff
chooses to file a Second Amended Complaint, the Court
will consider the First Amendment defense by way of
an appropriate motion brought by Defendant.

7

Defendant cites Castro for the proposition that the First
Amendment defense may be decided on a motion to dismiss. Castro, however, did not address the First Amendment defense but
held that the plaintiffs did not state a prima facie case for misappropriation because they failed to allege a commercial purpose. 370
N.J.Super. at 298–99, 851 A.2d 88. The Court is aware of Castro‘s
comment that “a member of the general public who is subject to
videotaping for a television program cannot reasonably expect
that he or she will receive payment from the producer of the show.
In fact, a substantial First Amendment issue would be raised if a
court were to find a right of compensation in such circumstances.”
Id. at 300, 851 A.2d 88. In the context of the entire opinion, however, that phrase does not indicate that the Castro Court ruled on
First Amendment grounds.
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B.

Remaining Claims

1. New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act
Defendant is correct that Plaintiff’s NJCFA claim
must be dismissed because he is not a “consumer” and,
therefore, does not have standing to bring that claim.
In response, Plaintiff argues that this Court should
follow a line of cases holding that competitors have
standing to sue under the NJCFA. While Plaintiff is
correct that some cases have held that competitors
have standing under the statute, those cases refer to
direct competitors of the defendant, i.e., “competitors in
a commercial sense.” General Development Corp. v.
Binstein, 743 F .Supp. 1115, 1131 (D.N.J. 1990); see
Feiler v. New Jersey Dental Ass’n, 191 N.J.Super. 426,
431, 467 A.2d 276 (Ch. Div. 1983) (“A practicing New
Jersey dentist has standing to complain that another
dentist gains an unfair competitive advantage over him
by fraudulent billing practices that enable him to
promise and deliver cost savings to patients that are
unavailable to patients of an honest practitioner.”).
Plaintiff is not a direct, commercial competitor of
Defendant; he does not produce and sell video games.
See 800–JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp.
2d 273, 296 (D.N.J. 2006) (“As a cigar retailer, JR
cannot be considered a commercial competitor of
GoTo’s search engine.”). Moreover, he has not pointed
to any cases in which a non-direct competitor was held
to have standing, and the Court sees no reason to
presume that the New Jersey Supreme Court would
extend the NJCFA to such plaintiffs. Accord IDT
Telecom, Inc. v. CVT Prepaid Solutions, Inc., Civil
Action No. 07–1076, 2009 WL 5205968, *6 (D.N.J. Dec.

170a
28, 2009) (declining to extend NJCFA to cover
complaint brought by phone card distributor against
phone card provider); Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker
State–Slick 50, 992 F. Supp. 709, 716 (D.N.J. 1998) aff’d
on other grounds 165 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting
that “commercial resellers such as plaintiffs do not
qualify as ‘consumers’ and declining plaintiffs’
invitation to construe the [NJCFA] to permit
non-consumers such as plaintiffs to assert claims
thereunder.”). Therefore, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff is not a consumer under the NJCFA and
dismisses his NJCFA claim with prejudice.

2. Unjust Enrichment
Defendant argues that Plaintiff may not proceed
under the unjust enrichment theory because he has no
direct relationship with Defendant, upon which basis he
could assert that he reasonably expected to be
compensated for Defendant’s use of his likeness. While
conceding that he “has no direct relationship with
Plaintiff to create a reasonable expectation of benefit,”
Plaintiff’s argues that he may nonetheless recover
under an unjust enrichment theory because “had [he]
known that [Defendant] intended to use his likeness ...,
he had a right to be compensated for such use [and] a
jury could determine that Plaintiff had a right of
renumeration [sic].” Pl. Opp. at 23. He, further, argues
that his filing of the instant suit “reveals an expectation
of renumeration [sic].” Id.
This sort of argument has been explicitly rejected
by New Jersey courts. In Fasching v. Kallinger, 211
N.J.Super. 26, 510 A.2d 694 (App. Div. 1986), the
Appellate Division rejected an unjust enrichment claim
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by survivors of a murder victim who alleged that the
defendant author and publisher of a book about the
victim profited from the victim’s story without first
seeking their permission. The court based its ruling on
two facts, that the plaintiffs did not confer any benefit
on the defendants and that the plaintiff did not expect
any remuneration at the time the victim’s story was
misappropriated. While the “Plaintiffs contend[ed] that
had they known defendants were publishing a book
they would have expected remuneration,” the Court
reasoned that “this fact lacks legal significance in the
absence of any benefit conferred by plaintiffs.” Id. at
36, 510 A.2d 694. Fittingly, this is the case upon which
Castro, supra, relies in rejecting an unjust enrichment
claim based on misappropriation of one’s image. 370
N.J.Super. at 299–300, 851 A.2d 88.
Here, because Plaintiff alleges in his Amended
Complaint that Defendant did not seek his permission
before using his likeness or photograph, Plaintiff
clearly did not confer any benefit upon Defendant.
Accordingly, for the same reasons expressed in both
Castro and Fasching, Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment
claim fails and is dismissed with prejudice.

3. Civil Conspiracy
As to Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim, Defendant
argues that it must be dismissed for failure to allege
that two parties agreed to conspire. Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint asserts that Defendant conspired,
and actively participated in, “utiliz[ing] [Plaintiff’s]
image for the sale of products bearing the identity and
likeness of Plaintiff in disregard of the rights of
Plaintiff.” Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 44–45. There is no mention
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in the pleading of a second party with whom the
Defendant conspired. Plaintiff argues in his opposition
papers that this claim refers to a conspiracy between
Defendant, the NCAA, and the Collegiate Licensing
Company (“CLC”), which serves as the NCAA’s
licensing entity. In this connection, his proposed
allegations aver that NCAA rules govern the use of
players’ images and that Defendant entered into an
agreement with CLC to license NCAA member “teams’
trademarks, uniforms, logos, etc., licensing all elements
except collegiate athletes’ likenesses.” Pl. Opp. at 1–2.
Even if the Court permitted Plaintiff to file a
Second Amended Complaint to incorporate his
proposed allegations regarding the NCAA and CLC,
those allegations make no mention of a conspiratorial
agreement between Defendant and those parties to
utilize his image in disregard of his rights. Because an
agreement is essential to his cause of action, his
proposed allegations could not resurrect his claim. See
Morgan v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders,
268 N.J.Super. 337, 364, 633 A.2d 985 (App. Div. 1993)
(“A civil conspiracy is ‘a combination of two or more
persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or
to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal
element of which is an agreement between the parties
‘to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another,’ and
‘an overt act that results in damage.’’”). Plaintiff is
correct that an agreement may be proven by
circumstantial evidence, see id. at 364–65, 633 A.2d 985,
but he has failed to allege any agreement to inflict a
wrong or injury. His only allegation is that Defendant,
the NCAA, and the CLC agreed not to license his
likeness. For this reason, granting Plaintiff leave to
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amend his conspiracy claim would be futile and his
claim is, therefore, dismissed with prejudice.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion is
granted. Plaintiff’s right of publicity claims are
dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiff is granted
leave to file a Second Amended Complaint asserting
such a claim within twenty (20) days. Plaintiff’s
remaining claims are dismissed with prejudice.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 11-3750
__________
RYAN HART, individually and on
Behalf of all others similarly situated
v.
ELECTRONIC ARTS, INC.,
A Delaware Corporation;
DOES 1-50
Ryan Hart, Appellant
__________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT
OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civ. Action Number 3:09-cv-05990)
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson
__________
Present: McKEE, Chief Judge, SLOVITER,
SCIRICA, RENDELL, AMBRO, FUENTES,
SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN,
GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, SHWARTZ,
and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
__________
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
WITH SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN
BANC
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__________
The petition for rehearing filed by Appellee and
briefs in support by amici having been submited to all
judges who participated in the decision of this court,
and to all other available circuit judges in active
service, and a majority of the judges who concurred in
the decision not having asked for rehearing, and a
majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular
active service not having voted for rehearing by the
court en banc, the petition for rehearing by the panel
and the Court en banc is hereby DENIED. Judges
Ambro and Fuentes voted for rehearing.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.
Circuit Judge
Dated: June 25, 2013

